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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research objectives 
 
The sector of the world economy which is labeled ‘Financial Services’ on economic 
pie-graphs, has changed considerably over the last 25 years. Its slice of that pie has also 
grown, as financial institutions evolved from domestic firms engaged in distinct banking, 
securities, and insurance services into integrated financial services conglomerates offering a 
broad range of financial products across the globe. These Medusa-like firms and their 
products now appear even in the most unexpected places, wearing all manner of disguises, 
and the task of regulating them has grown astronomically. Given these developments, an 
assessment of the architecture and history of supervisory structures in different parts of the 
world is long overdue. 
The financial turmoil which unfolded in 2007 has raised questions regarding the 
efficiency of the financial regulatory structures which existed in the world then, and those 
which exist today. Many questions remain unanswered, casting doubts on the approaches 
taken by financial regulators to financial crisis management, and on the efficiency of current 
national and international structures in dealing with the collapse of systemically important 
global financial institutions.   
Following the crisis, many countries reformed their financial regulatory structures and 
moved from one type to another, yet these changes did not cause any convergence towards 
any particular type of financial regulatory structure. This puzzling phenomenon is at the heart 
of this research: why don’t countries converge towards one type of financial regulatory 
structure? Can we identify a structure which performs better than others in a given situation 
and so helps minimize the severity or frequency of financial crises? Is there a structure which 
is better suited to deal with a financial crisis once it has occurred? 
The structure of financial supervision is vitally important because of its impact on the 
efficiency of the regulator, which in turn has an effect on the costs of regulation, and on the 
success of regulation in meeting its statutory goals.1 
In the past, the large differences between financial institutions called for a number of 
financial regulators with relevant expertise. One of the rationales for this breakdown was to 
divide the power among these regulators so that none became too influential. Nowadays, the 
                                                 
1
 C. Briault, ‘The rationale for a single national financial services regulator’, (1999) 2 Financial Services 
Authority, 1, 5. 
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rise of financial conglomerates means the borders between different financial institutions 
have become vague.2 This is a recent phenomenon which was made possible, at least in part, 
due to regulatory changes such as the cancellation of the Glass-Steagall Act of 19333 in the 
USA, which had, until 1999, restricted a bank holding company from owning other financial 
companies. The repeal of the Act effectively removed the separation which had previously 
existed between investment banks and depository banks, and allowed financial conglomerates 
to develop.  
Other factors which fertilized the growth in financial conglomerates include: the 
impact of mergers and acquisitions;4 the result of financial services firms extending through 
internal growth into new areas;5 and new entrants to the financial services sector choosing to 
offer a range of financial services to their customers.6  
This increase in the number and size of financial conglomerates has almost 
completely eliminated the boundaries between different financial products. This in turn 
means that the Functional Approach to financial supervision, which divides the regulatory 
powers among the different regulators according to the product type, is no longer as effective 
as it was, since it no longer matches the structure of the market or the regulated firms. 
Instead, regulatory oversight of a financial conglomerate as a whole has become more 
important, since there may be systemic risks arising within the group which are not 
adequately addressed by any of the solo specialist prudential supervisory authorities.7 Such 
oversight, to be effective, relies on: an effective exchange of information; coordination of 
regulatory requirements across the regulators responsible for different parts of a 
conglomerate’s business; and mechanisms for coordinated action when problems arise in a 
conglomerate.8  
The people and corporations who favor consolidating the financial regulators into one 
authority assume that such consolidation might parallel developments in some multiple 
function firms, and solve problems of communication, coordination, cooperation, and 
consistency which can arise between the different regulators in a fragmented system. They 
                                                 
2
 Conglomerates are usually defined as a group which undertakes at least two major financial services activities. 
3
 The Banking Act of 1933 (The Glass-Steagall Act), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1982), 12 
U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982) [hereinafter The Act]. 
4
 Such mergers occur perhaps most frequently between banks and securities firms, and between banks and 
insurance companies, but also involving purchases of fund managers by banks and by insurance companies. 
5
 For example, banks setting up insurance companies and vice-versa, insurance companies selling investment 
products, and banks setting up securities and fund management operations. 
6
 See supra n. 1, p. 13.  
7
 See supra n. 1, p. 14.  
8
 See supra n. 1, p. 14. 
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argue that the lack of these attributes across specialist regulatory bodies has become acute 
and increasingly difficult to manage efficiently, and that a "one stop shop" is the best 
solution.9 
Facts can be found to support this view. Given the unclear boundaries between 
financial institutions, having several uncoordinated regulators can clearly lead to 
inefficiencies, such as gray zones or overlaps, and to regulatory arbitrage on the part of the 
regulated institutions. Moreover, the existence of several regulators increases the risk of 
incoherent regulation, which leads to uncertainty on the part of market participants.  
In light of this, the consolidation of financial regulators - moving from a fragmented 
or diversified regulatory system which consists of a few separate financial regulatory 
authorities, to a system where all or some of the separate financial regulators are consolidated 
into one authority - seems tempting. At first sight it seems as though it might yield both more 
efficient regulation, plus a reduction in government expenditure; fewer authorities would call 
for less personnel, thereby imposing a lower financial burden on taxpayers.   
However, consolidated regulation has its costs, too. Suppose that the financial 
regulator is mistaken in its approach to a particular issue; after all, government agencies are 
not free of errors, and the concentration of power into fewer hands is always a risky business. 
With a single financial regulator, there is no alternative forum. How can an agency be made 
aware of its mistakes and reform its procedures? With no competition, what will encourage 
innovative thinking inside the regulatory authority? Consolidated regulation might also yield 
a higher possibility of the regulator being captured, as interest groups would only have to 
target a single authority rather than a few.   
Another point that needs to be addressed concerns resistance to systemic risk.10 The 
global economy has demonstrated that it is vulnerable to such risks. To combat these risks, 
several important markets around the world have moved towards consolidation of financial 
regulatory authorities responsible for the regulation of banks, insurance companies, and 
securities markets. Countries which established one single regulatory authority which is 
responsible for the regulation of all financial institutions include the United Kingdom (prior 
to the 2007-2009 financial crisis),11 Switzerland, Japan, Canada, and Germany.12 Other 
countries are also in the process of adopting the consolidated model.  
                                                 
9
 See supra n. 1, p. 19. 
10
  See infra n. 15.  
11
 As referred to by a number of authors including: V.V. Acharya, T. Philippon, M. Richardson & N. Roubini, 
‘The financial crisis of 2007-2009: causes and remedies’, (2009) 18/2 Financial markets, institutions and 
instruments, 89, 89-137.  
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Up until recently it was believed that, in order to minimize the chance of a financial 
crisis occurring, there was a need for collective thinking with regards to regulation,13 and that 
such collective thinking was best achieved in a consolidated regulatory authority. However, 
the latest global financial crisis has emphasized the systemic risks in financial systems and 
raised questions regarding the efficiency of the consolidated model; the UK with its previous 
consolidated model did not show greater resistance to the crisis than countries with 
diversified regulators such as the USA, when measured in terms of debt per GDP,14 and as a 
result has moved back to a model of diversified regulators (i.e. the Twin Peaks Approach in 
the UK’s case). This raises the question of whether the consolidated model is indeed more 
efficient. Unfortunately it may require another crisis to assess the efficacy of the Twin Peaks 
approach in regulating the UK’s market. 
Effective regulatory reform can take place only when policymakers take fundamental 
regulatory principles into account. One of the most important of these principles is to prevent 
or minimize the chance for systemic risks,15 i.e., reduce externalities, which occur when each 
institution manages its own risks but does not consider its impact on the risk of the system as 
a whole. 
The fact that consolidated regulation is not more resistant to systemic risks may be an 
argument against consolidation of regulation. If, during a crisis, all countries are affected, no 
matter what the structure of their financial regulatory authorities, transitioning from one 
structure to another may be pointless or even damaging, to the extent that moving from one 
system to another always incurs initial costs.16 Consolidating a system entails initial costs 
such as opposition from the disappearing authorities and those doomed to lose power, while 
moving in the opposite direction would probably face no opposition but cost more in terms of 
staff and location.  
                                                                                                                                                        
12
 After the crisis the United Kingdom changed its financial supervisory structure and is now following the Twin 
Peaks approach (see Chapter 3 of this research for details).  
13 J. Peek, E.S. Rosengren & G.M.B. Tootell, ‘Synergies between bank supervision and monetary policy: 
implications for the design of bank regulatory structure’ in Frederic Mishkin (Ed.), Prudential supervision: what 
works and what doesn’t, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2001, pp. 273-300. 
14
 M. Moora, ‘Global Crisis and Financial Regulation: Who Determines What? Cross-Country Analysis of 
China, Germany, Japan, UK and USA’, (2010) 1/1 Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate Research 
Journal,  Article 10.  
15
 Systemic risk is the risk that an entire system or market might collapse. This risk is exacerbated by links and 
interdependencies, where the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a cascading failure. See: 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, ‘The Global Financial Crisis, A Plan for Regulatory Reform’, 
(2009). 
16
 As any change to the legal system is costly (M.P. Van Alstine, ‘The costs of legal change’, (2001) 49/3 UCLA 
Law Review, 789, 789-870).  
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The economic integration and institutional consolidation which have occurred over 
many decades in the EU make it a special case, however similar questions are still being 
asked there – should there be a movement toward a single European market regulator? Or 
will the best solution require multiple regulators operating on a European level, or the 
establishment of entities for coordinating national regulators?17 
This study builds on the Law and Economics literature. The main research question of 
this study, as was presented at the beginning of this introduction, relates to the fact that even 
though countries keep changing their regulatory structures, they do not seem to converge 
towards one financial regulatory structure. The question is why?  This question leads 
inexorably to the secondary question of whether there is an optimal structure for financial 
regulators and if so, what are the attributes which need to be taken into account when trying 
to reach such an optimal structure?  
Guided by these questions, this study examines the existing structures of the financial 
regulators and the markets which contain them while asking what parameters should be taken 
into consideration when opting for one regulatory structure over another.  
Due to the complexity of this subject, this study approaches the issue using three 
different analytical frameworks: the first looks at incentives which influence the heads of 
regulatory bodies, while applying game theoretical concepts; the second seeks an answer by 
analyzing the institutional design of the financial regulators in an attempt to find an optimal 
design for information–flow; the third looks for a solution for global coordination from the 
prism of network effects and congestions.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in the above-mentioned analytical 
frameworks by using novel approaches and ideas, and by binding those literatures together in 
one study in order to provide a clearer solution to the question of what is the best way to 
structure the financial regulators on a local, regional, and global level.   
1.2 Research structure and methodologies  
 
This study is organized as follows:  
In order to reach a position where we can choose between the different potential legal 
and institutional structures for financial regulators, this study starts off in Chapter 2 by 
defining the expectations held by society, scholars and professionals on the role of financial 
regulators; meaning, what are the reasonable goals of financial regulation and what is it 
                                                 
17
 See the discussion with regards to the formation of a Banking Union in Chapter 3 of this research.  
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meant to achieve? It then describes the potential costs that financial regulation might incur on 
the industry and on society as a whole.  
Thinking about these framing issues depends, in turn, on an analysis of the costs and 
utilities of various interventions which seek to remedy specific market failures. Of course, the 
issues for retail financial products may be quite different from those related to derivatives 
trading. But it is hard to imagine designing a good regulatory system of any kind without an 
explicit account of what that system is meant to do and why. 
Chapter 3 of this study describes the legal and institutional framework in fifteen 
jurisdictions around the world. The chapter opens with the common attributes found among 
the reviewed jurisdictions and then moves on to describe in detail the organizational and legal 
situation in each jurisdiction, and what changes have taken place in those jurisdictions with 
regards to their financial regulatory institutional structure post the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
The main finding of this chapter relates to the fact that a large number of countries chose to 
deviate from the four classic approaches to financial supervision and follow a Hybrid 
Approach to their regulatory structures. This chapter helps lay the foundations for the 
discussions which follow it.  
After defining the goals of financial regulation, its costs and how it is structured in 
different jurisdictions, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this study offer a view of what is the optimal 
structure for financial supervision using three different methodologies.  
These chapters make use of three different analytical tools at hand, (game theory 
concepts, organizational design and network effects), in order to try and reach a conclusion as 
to which approach is more advantageous - the fragmented or the consolidated approach to 
financial regulation.  
Chapter 4 discusses the regulators’ incentives to regulate or refrain from regulating 
using the private interest approach to regulation, (i.e. assuming that regulators promote their 
private objective functions), and applying game theory concepts in order to analyze the 
regulators’ expected behavior in different states of the world.  
This chapter departs from existing literature in its approach to the analysis of the 
existing financial supervisory structures, as it uses the prism of the incentives which influence 
regulators, and provides an innovative solution to the ‘Lack of Regulation’ or ’Under–
Regulation’ problem.  
This chapter provides many fresh insights, however it does not come up with a 
conclusive answer as to which of the financial regulatory structures is more advantageous, so 
an alternative strategy is then used in the following chapters to try and reach a solution.    
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Chapter 5 relies on the fact that, in order to stop or prevent a financial crisis, there is a 
need for good information-flow in and between different financial regulators. This chapter 
tries to analyze the question of the optimal financial regulatory structure from an institutional 
design perspective and determine whether there is a structure for financial regulators which 
best facilitates information-flow in all situations.  
With a view to better analyze the optimal structure for financial regulators, this 
chapter also aims to bridge the research gap that exists between the institutional design 
literature and the financial regulation literature, by applying tools used in the institutional 
design literature with regards to information-flow and coordination of firms or institutions to 
financial regulatory authorities.  
Chapter 6 of this research is concerned with global cooperation between financial 
regulators, and with global standard-setting for financial regulation. This chapter goes back to 
the literature on network effects and congestion, and applies the insights from that literature 
to the area of the structure of financial regulators. It then combines insights from Chapter 5 of 
this research with regards to cooperation between authorities and mechanisms aimed at 
enhancing cooperation in order to try and solve the coordination problems which it identifies. 
It concludes with a solution which, according to the insights gleaned during the preceding 
analyses, ought to enhance global coordination between financial regulators from different 
jurisdictions using a combination of global forums and market-based solutions.  
Chapter 7 of this study concludes. The use of the previous three approaches leads to 
the conclusion that, while the fragmented model for financial supervision may seem to be 
suboptimal with respect to the risk of lack of regulation or under regulation, it appears to be 
more advantageous from the point of view of institutional design and information-flow. 
Therefore the fragmented model of financial supervision is recommended, with enhanced 
cooperation mechanisms between the different authorities.    
1.3 Room for future research 
 
 Having said all that, there may be other approaches to the problem which have not 
been covered by this study, and are consequently left open for future research. Such 
approaches may include advanced game theoretical models, behavioral Law and Economics, 
and different variations of regulatory competition models.  
Another issue which is left outside the scope of the current study is the issue of 
accountability and observability. Some of the chapters of this research raise issues that have 
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to do with accountability of regulators and the observability of their regulatory work. It is 
safe to assume that some tradeoffs might exist between accountability and autonomy of the 
regulatory institutions. This is indeed an important legal aspect; however this aspect is 
outside the scope of this research.  
The issue of what is the right portfolio of policy instruments given to each financial 
regulator in order to perform the regulatory task, is also left outside the borders of the 
discussion in this study. After deciding on the structure of the financial regulators, each 
jurisdiction must choose which tools to supply the regulators with, be it civil or criminal law 
enforcement mechanisms, rule-making tools, research and reporting, advocacy etc. Although 
they are important questions, the answer to them is conditional on first determining the right 
kind of regulatory structure.  
Another question that is being left for future research is which financial regulatory 
authorities does a country need? The identity of the required financial regulators has not been 
covered by this research. As can be seen in Chapter 3 of this research, most jurisdictions 
around the globe have decided to divide the supervisory of their financial market into three 
main supervisory functions: banking supervision, insurance supervision, and market 
supervision. However questions can be raised with regards to the optimality of this decision.  
This question is of great importance when we come to think of the structure of 
financial regulators in each jurisdiction, as it requires a study of the conflicting goals between 
different authorities. For example, one question could be whether the competition authority 
should be included in this discussion. On the one hand, the competition authority already 
regulates financial institutions and, with the growth of financial conglomerates and an 
increasing number of corporations issuing stock on the stock exchange, financial regulation 
becomes relevant to most if not all of the corporations that are also regulated by the 
competition authority. On the other hand, the competition authority has different goals than 
the "typical" financial regulator.    
All of these questions impact financial regulation and the work of the financial 
regulatory institutions. However, these questions are outside the scope of this study and are 
left open for future research.  
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2. WHY DO WE NEED FINANCIAL REGULATION AND WHAT 
ARE THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IT?  
2.1  Introduction 
 
Since the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, there has been a need to re-evaluate the 
existing financial supervisory models and their efficiency. The turmoil that occurred in the 
different financial markets post the 2007-2009 crisis reignited the search for the optimal 
structure for financial supervision. This is reflected in the fact that different countries around 
the world are in the process of examining and often changing their financial regulatory 
structures.18  This discussion begs the question: why is financial regulation required and what 
are the costs associated with it? 
Regulation tends to disrupt the market process and changes opportunities and costs for 
entrepreneurial discovery and profits.19 If a free market is generally a desirable goal from an 
economic point of view, why not allow it in the financial service sector? If nothing is wrong 
with the free market, then financial regulation becomes worthless or even harmful. If there is 
something wrong with the way free market forces influence the financial services sector, then 
what is it exactly about the financial sector that makes the free market inefficient from an 
economic point of view?20  
Assuming that the financial sector does require specific regulation, the second 
question that has to be considered is: what are the costs of such regulation? If the costs 
exceed the benefits of regulating, then regulating is not desirable as it causes social welfare to 
decrease.  
In sum, prior to discussing the optimal structure for financial regulators, it is 
important to understand why financial regulation is necessary and what are the costs 
associated with it. 
In the following pages this research puts together a comprehensive list of the reasons 
for regulation and its potential costs. Some of the costs are not quantifiable, but may have a 
strong impact on the efficiency of financial regulation; others are quantifiable and are used in 
                                                 
18
 For a detailed discussion see Chapter 3 of this research.  
19
 J.M. Hendrickson, Regulation and instability in U.S Commercial Banking, A History of Crises, Palgrave 
Macmillan studies in Banking and Financial Institutions, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2011, pp. 4-5. 
20
 K. Dowd, ‘The case for financial Laissez – Faire’, (1996) 106/436 The Economic Journal, 679,  679-687.  
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the Regulatory Impact Analysis conducted by regulators before issuing a new piece of 
regulation.21  
This chapter is structured as follows: part two introduces the rationale behind 
regulation in general, part three looks into the rationale for prudential regulation, part four 
examines the need for conduct of business regulation, part five investigates the costs of 
financial regulation and part six concludes this chapter.  
  
                                                 
21
 Regulatory Impact Analysis is best described as a decision method, among many other methods, which is 
used in order to assess regulatory decisions prior to the issuing of the regulation. The assessment is meant to 
assess both positive and negative impacts expected due to the issuance of the proposed regulation. This decision 
making tool is comprised of two stages: 1. assessing the impact of the proposed regulation; and 2. 
communicating the information deducted in stage one to the hands of the decision makers. See: S.H. Jacobs, An 
overview of regulatory impact analysis in OECD countries, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Best Practices in 
OECD Countries, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris 1997, 1, 13-14; M.  
Minogue, ‘Governance–Based Analysis Of Regulation’, (2002) 73/4 Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 649, 649-666; C. Kirkpatrick &  D. Parker, ‘Editorial: Regulatory Impact Assessment—An 
Overview’ (2004) 24/5 Public Money & Management, 267, 267-270; and many more.  
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2.2  The building blocks 
 
2.2.1 What are the rationales behind regulation? 
 
Traditional economic approach lists three main purposes behind regulating markets:22 
1. Promoting competition, constraining the use of monopoly power, and preventing 
distortions to the markets integrity; 
2. Protecting consumers in cases where asymmetric information, which is costly to 
obtain, might harm them; and 
3. Protecting against externalities where the cost of regulation is lower than the costs of 
the externalities. 
This traditional approach to regulation is called the public interest approach which 
assumes that a market economy may produce undesirable outcomes for consumers.23 
A different and more modern approach to regulation, the self interest approach, 
claims that regulation is made to serve the interest of the regulated group. In other words, the 
group which stands to benefit and the group which stands to be harmed both have an 
incentive to influence regulation in order to produce a better outcome for themselves.24  
These considerations also come into play in the financial market. However, as the 
financial sector has a few special attributes which make it more prone to misuse consumers or 
suffer market failures, the considerations for regulating the financial market are slightly 
different than those which exist in markets in general.  
When we think of modern financial regulation we can identify three main goals: 
1. To prevent systemic risk; 
2. To protect consumers/investors; and  
3. To help design a framework for deciding monetary policy and determining exchange 
rates. 
                                                 
22
 M. Brunnermeier, A. Crocket, C. Goodhart, M. Hellwig, A. D. Persaud & H. Shin, ‘The Fundamental 
Principles of Financial Regulation’, (2009) 11 Geneva Report on the World Economy , p. 2. 
23
 J.M. Hendrickson,  supra n.19, pp. 10-12. 
24
 See as early as: J.W. Stigler, ‘The economic theory of Regulation’, (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science, 3, 3-21, S. Peltzman, ‘Toward A More General Theory of Regulation’. (1976)  19 
Journal of Law and Economics, 211, 211–240 followed by many others, including J.M. Hendrickson, supra 
n.19, pp. 10-12. 
  
12 
 
The economic rationale for regulation and supervision in banking and financial 
services has long been known and debated.25 Generally the need for financial regulation 
stems from addressing the concerns and needs listed below;26 
- Internalizing externalities;   
- Reduction of transaction costs for an efficient allocation of financial resources; 
- Enhancing consumers and investors’ confidence and reliance, and preventing a race to 
the bottom of risk management criteria; 
- Limiting and preventing unwanted herding directions;27 
- Fighting crime and terror (e.g. anti-money laundering regulation); 
- Correcting market failures (e.g. information asymmetries, externalities, and agency 
costs); 
- Achieving economies of scale in monitoring and regulation28; 
- Correcting behavioral biases on behalf of the consumers;  
- Responding to consumer demand for regulation; and 
- Reducing litigation costs by referring consumer complaints to the financial regulator. 
These rationales can be divided into two general types of regulation and supervision29 
- prudential regulation and conduct of business regulation.  
Prudential regulation assumes that consumers do not have enough information to 
assess the stability of the institution in which they place their money, nor are they in a 
position to assess its risk approach. In this case, regulation is needed to ensure that the 
financial institution does not take on excessive risk and endanger consumers’ savings. Even if 
consumers are given information at the time contracts are signed, the information is usually 
                                                 
25
 D. Heremans & A.M. Pacces, ‘Regulation of banking and financial markets’, in Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, 2nd edn., Cheltenham, Elgar 2011, work in progress. 
26
 These concerns and needs were mentioned by a few scholars. See for example: D. Llewellyn,, ‘The economic 
rationale for financial regulation’, (1999) FSA Occasional papers in Financial regulation, 1, 9-10.  
27
 For a definition of herding and discussion of its implications, please refer to section 2.3.2 of this research.  
28
 Economies of scale can be defined as follows:”...Economies associated with increases in all of a firm’s 
outputs are referred to as overall economies of scale…” (J.A. Clark, ‘Economies of scale and scope at 
depository financial institutions: A review of the literature.’ (1988) 73/8 Economic Review, 17, 17). 
29
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, pp. 9-10.  
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provided by the financial firm providing the service, and it is not enough to protect 
consumers down the road from risky behavior on behalf of that financial firm.30  
If we take into account systemic risk factors, the need for prudential supervision is 
paramount. One of the most important roles of financial regulation is to prevent or minimize 
systemic risks,31 i.e., reduce externalities.32 
Conduct of business regulation focuses on protecting consumers during their 
ongoing encounters with financial firms. Such regulation will generally cover proper 
disclosure rules, fair treatment of customers, and competence of advisors and other service 
providers.  
Generally speaking, conduct of business regulation solves problems arising from 
asymmetric information and principle-agent relationships, and ensures proper conduct when 
doing business with consumers. 
2.2.2 Why not use contracts? 
 
The economic literature considers contracts preferable to regulation, as regulation is 
generally costly and is likely to yield a less efficient allocation of resources then bargaining. 
However, for the reasons discussed below, in the case of financial services it is likely that 
contracts will fail.33  
Contract failure has many dimensions, such as:34 (i) agency conflicts which may lead 
to bad advice to consumers; (ii) insolvency of the supplying firm prior to the delivery of the 
goods; (iii) mismatch between the consumers' expectations and the product or service 
delivered; (iv) fraud on behalf of the financial institution; (v) incompetence to supply the 
product in the expected standard; (vi) misunderstanding of the type of product or of its risk 
attributes by the consumer; and (vii) behavioral inclinations which offset rational decision 
making by consumers.  
As mentioned before, financial markets are highly complex and are prone to 
asymmetric information, externalities, and agency costs. Those problems are intertwined with 
high transaction costs which make contracting inefficient to the point at which it is 
                                                 
30
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, p. 10.  
31
 D. Heremans & A. M. Pacces, supra n. 25, p. 11.  
32
 See supra n. 15.  
33
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, pp. 37-38.  
34
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, pp. 37-38.  
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uneconomic.35 For these reasons contracts are not enough to ensure a well-functioning 
market, and regulatory intervention is needed.  
2.2.3 Summing up 
 
As previously described there are several rationales behind financial regulation. In the 
following subchapters these rationales are discussed in greater detail.  For the sake of clarity 
the rationales have been divided roughly between the rationales for prudential regulation and 
the rationales for conduct of business regulation, although some rationales fit both categories 
to a certain extent.  
  
                                                 
35
 R.H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics, 1, 1-44, O. Hart & J. 
Moore, ‘Incomplete contracts and renegotiation.’ (1988) Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric, 755, 755-
785.  
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2.3  The rationales for prudential regulation 
 
Prudential regulation can be further subdivided into: micro prudential regulation 
which concerns itself with the stability of the individual institutions; and macro prudential 
regulation which is concerned with the stability of the financial system as a whole.36  
Micro-supervision concerns itself with risk monitoring and risk control and can be 
described as a process which includes four steps: licensing (the key to enter into business); 
supervision; sanctioning in cases of non-compliance with the regulation; and crisis 
management which includes deposit insurance and lender of last resort.37 Macro-supervision 
concerns itself with the linkages between and among financial institutions and financial 
markets.38  
In general the rationale for prudential regulation stems from addressing the following 
major points: 
2.3.1 Reducing externalities  
 
Unlike the "perfect" market described in the economic literature, financial markets do, 
when unsupervised, allow for externalities. This is mainly due to the presence of what is 
known as "external diseconomies from the activity of risk taking",39 meaning that a financial 
firm takes into consideration solely its own risk without taking into account the risks that 
society might suffer as a whole from its malfunction.  
The results of such externalities became evident during the 2007-2009 Financial 
Crisis and the large "bail-out" schemes which followed. Most financial institutions avoided 
taking responsibility for the risks they undertook, and society as a whole had to pay the price 
in order to avoid an even larger turmoil.  
Moreover, as some countries lacked some or all of the bail-out money, they had to 
increase their national debt. This is likely to produce negative effects on the economies of 
these countries in the future, such as inflation, fluctuation of currency, or reduction of their 
ability to borrow more money if needed.40  
                                                 
36
 M. Brunnermeier, A. Crocket, C. Goodhart, M. Hellwig, A. D. Persaud & H. Shin, supra n. 22, p. ii.  
37
 R.M. Lastra, infra n. 359, p. 1193.  
38 Such concerns lead to discussions with regards to cooperation between different regulators which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapters of this research.  
39
 R. Dodd, ‘Special Policy Report 12: The Economic Rationale for Financial Market Regulation’, (2002) 
Derivatives Study Center Washington DC, 1, 6.  
40
  C.M. Reinhart & K.S. Rogoff, This time is different, Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey 2009 , see chapter 10  in general and p. 142 in particular. The scholars found that during the 
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The excessive risk-taking on the US market spread to nearly all markets around the 
world, affecting them and bringing down firms which, at first glance, did not have anything 
to do with the excessive risk-taking in the US market.  
The problem with systemic risk unfolding in financial firms is that even if the risk of 
collapse is small, its consequences may be devastating.   
Even with capital restrictions on some financial institutions such as banks,41 they may 
still produce some externalities. Capital requirements may limit their amount of direct 
exposure to default, but indirect exposure is still prevalent.  
As Randall Dodd rightly points out: 
 
"Firms do not hold capital based on the risk-taking activities of firms or individuals 
whose assets they do not own, i.e. who are not direct counterparties; nor do they hold 
capital based on conditions in the broader market or the overall economy" (p.7).42  
 
If capital requirements cannot prevent all externalities, could government guarantees 
such as deposit insurance reduce concerns with regards to risk-related externalities?  
The idea behind government guarantees is that consumers should not be forced to face 
the consequences of actions that were not under their control.43 However, in order for deposit 
insurance to protect against a run on the financial institution, the coverage of the insurance 
has to be one hundred percent. This is not the current situation in most countries.44  
The problem with the idea of granting insurance coverage for deposits is that it 
induces moral hazard problems. If the banks know that the depositors will be compensated by 
                                                                                                                                                        
modern era real government debt increases on average by 86 percent during the 3 years following a banking 
crisis. Furthermore, their research shows that the same is true for advanced and emerging market economies.  
41
  S.G. Cecchetti, ‘The Future of Financial Intermediation and Regulation: An Overview’, in ‘Why and How 
Do We Regulate?’, (1999) Current issues in economics and finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1, 1-5, 
J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, pp. 21-42: Capital restrictions come to minimize the chance for externalities 
resulting from the fact that the money being used to make the loans is that of the depositors and not of the bank 
itself. This, in turn, creates the potential for moral hazard problems. This problem had already been identified 
during the antebellum era (1781-1863)  by the bank regulators in the U.S who decided to limit the type of loans 
that banks could extend to creditors (Virginia was the first state to enact reserve requirements) . In 1837 the state 
demanded that banks maintain 20 percent of their notes in circulation as cash reserves. 
42
 R. Dodd, supra n. 39, p. 7. 
43
 Deposit insurance is the classic example for public-interest regulation. The idea of deposit insurance came up 
in discussions at state level in the U.S in 1830 and at the national level in 1893 when William Jennings Bryan 
proposed a national deposit insurance bill to the congress. The idea was to protect the helpless depositors from 
losing their money due to bad bank management or bad economy. See J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, p. 96. 
44
  The deposit insurance in the U.S, for example, covers deposits in a sum of up to one hundred thousand 
dollars (see Table 8 in the Appendix of this research), the idea is that the insurance is meant to protect the small 
helpless customers and not the sophisticated customers who are able to diversify their portfolios and take all 
risks into account. 
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the deposit insurance company they will take less care in controlling against risk, due to the 
fact that if the risk materializes, the insurance company will be the one to bear it  – banks 
might thus be tempted to take on more risks and to operate with less capital.45  
Depositors on the other hand might seek banks who take on more risk as they can 
receive higher interest rates as long as the bank is solvent, and still be compensated if the 
bank goes bankrupt.  
But if the deposit insurance is anything short of 100% the incentive for a run on the 
bank in specific circumstances remains.46 The situation can therefore be viewed as a tradeoff 
between preventing bank runs and preventing moral hazard problems. 
As deposit insurance removes the incentives of liability holders in the financial 
institution to oversee the financial institutions, there is need for regulatory intervention which 
guarantees that the behavior of the insured institutions is not irresponsible.47  
In a way, financial regulation is expected to bring a cure to the liability holders’ 
inherent moral hazard problem.48 
Externalities are also present with regards to pricing of some securities, such as 
derivatives, OTC's (Over The Counter) and other securities which are based on an underlying 
asset. It is thought that the price of securities reflects the risk levels inherent to the underlying 
asset. A more "risky" security, i.e. the one which yields more variance, will have a lower 
price.49  
                                                 
45
 For definition of Moral Hazard please see: D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, Game Theory and the 
Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts 1998, p. 309., Indeed history has proven this 
assumption to be true; at the early stages of introduction of deposit insurance in the U.S, before it became a 
federal requirement, New York chartered banks that were covered by the NY insurance system had a failure rate 
of 11.1 percent as opposed to chartered banks which were not covered by the NY insurance system and had zero 
failure rate. Similarly insured banks in Vermont demonstrated a much higher failure rate than uninsured banks 
(J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, p. 44).   
46
 D. Llewellyn,  supra n. 26, p. 17.  
Such was the case of the run on the United Kingdom's Northern Bank. The British government provided for 
partial insurance, yet panicked depositors formed long queues in front of the bank in September 2007 which 
eventually forced the government to take over the bank and provide for a full backup of its liabilities (C.M. 
Reinhart & K.S. Rogoff, supra n. 40, Preamble pp. xl - xli) 
47
 From the early stages of deposit insurance in the U.S it was clear that financial supervision is necessary to 
reduce moral hazard problems. Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio established a mutual guarantee system which was 
designed to reduce moral hazard problems by subjecting banks to special assessments. In addition to the mutual 
guarantee provisions the Indiana Fund created a supervisory board, comprised of individual member banks, 
which had the authority to examine member banks each six months to make sure they were adhering to capital 
requirements which were set by the supervisory board. That board also had the authority to shut down member 
banks which were decided to be "unhealthy". As the board was comprised of the member banks themselves 
there was great incentive to ensure that all banks operate within an acceptable risk range (J.M. Hendrickson, 
supra n. 19, p. 44). 
48
 S.G. Cecchetti, supra n. 41, pp. 3-4.  
49
 R. Dodd, supra n. 39, pp. 7-10.  
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However that is only true for direct ownership of the security. The risk associated 
with risky securities extends beyond direct ownership. That extra risk is not priced nor 
calculated within the price of such securities.50 
What is special to the type of externalities in the financial market is that they cannot 
be solved by self-regulation even if the financial institutions agreed to it, as any single 
financial institution alone is not aware of the magnitude of the risk involved in its activities. 
This is due to the recurring fact that financial institutions only take into account the risks 
which will affect them, and are unable to take into account the risks which might be caused to 
the entire system due to their failure.  
2.3.2 Controlling herding 
 
Prudential regulation is also needed in order to prevent and limit unwanted herding 
directions. It is thought that investors influence other investors and this influence has a first 
order effect.51  
Herding is a concept which is hard to define, yet when we refer to herding in the 
financial sector context we refer to it as decision making by entire populations which can lead 
to systemic erroneous, or sub-optimal choices. Herding is the power behind bubbles, bank 
runs, noise trading, and other unwanted phenomena in the financial markets which lead to 
distraction of wealth.52  
Bankers and other financial employees can also suffer from herding when comparing 
their actions to the actions of other financial employees in their sector, and so mimicking 
them. Thus in time of crisis there can be unwanted behaviors on behalf of financial 
employees, such as shortage of credit in the market due to the fact that one bank decides to 
cut down on its loans and all other banks react and follow.  
Herding does not require coordination, but simply an ability to collect information 
about what others are doing in the market. There are two views with regards to herding; the 
first claims that investors/financial employees are not rational and simply behave like cattle 
in a herd, blindly following the lead of others. The second views investors/financial 
                                                 
50
 R. Dodd, supra n. 39, pp. 7-10.   
51
 A. Devenow & I. Welch, ‘Rational Herding in Financial Economics’, (1996) 40 European Economic Review, 
603, 603-615. 
52
 A. Devenow & I. Welch, supra n. 51, pp. 603-615. 
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employees as rational players and puts its focus on externalities; the distortion of optimal 
decision making is explained away by lack of information or sub optimal incentives.53 
Either way, one of the goals of financial regulators is to reduce unwanted herding to a 
minimum and to redirect the power of herding towards wealth-maximization by: providing 
reliable information to the market; monitoring in order to try and prevent the unwanted 
effects of bubbles which are created due to herding;54 and solving credit crunches once they 
have already formed.   
2.3.3 Efficient allocation of financial resources and strengthening investors’ 
confidence  
 
Prudential regulation is also necessary in order to allocate financial resources 
efficiently. The financial market and the institutions operating in this market are essential for 
economic growth.55 Banks, insurance companies, the stock exchange and other financial 
institutions allow for the concentration of savings and for the efficient allocation of these 
resources to investment projects that generate economic growth.56  
Financial regulators play a crucial role in reducing information asymmetries with 
regards to products, and providing a satisfactory level of probity for the financial institutions 
and for the financial stability of the country in which these institutions operate.57  
                                                 
53
 A. Devenow & I. Welch, supra n. 51, pp. 603-615. 
54
 One of the most famous babbles was what is now known as "The South Sea" bubble. The South Sea 
Company was a British company that traded in South America during the 18th century. As part of a treaty 
during the war of the Spanish Succession, the British company was granted a monopoly to trade in the Spanish 
colonies in South America. In exchange, the company took on the national debt England had incurred during the 
war. The South Sea Bubble which occurred in 1720 was caused due to speculation in the stock of the company 
and led, upon its explosion, to a large financial crisis. 
 Another famous bubble which occurred around the same time was the French Mississippi Company bubble; In 
May 1716, the Banque Générale Privée ("General Private Bank"), which developed the use of paper money, fell 
prey to a scheme plotted by John Law. It was quite a complicated scheme, but at the base Law convinced 
investors that one of his companies was richer than it really was. This led to wild speculation on the shares of 
the company in 1719. Law's plan was to have the success of the Mississippi Company (a company operating at 
the time under his ownership) combine the wealth of its Louisiana prospects into a joint-trading company. The 
company's shares were so popular that a demand for bank notes was created. When shares generated profits the 
investors were paid out in paper bank notes. In 1720, the bank and the company were united and Law was 
appointed Controller General of Finances. Law's pioneering note-issuing bank was successful until the French 
government was forced to admit that the number of paper notes being issued by the Banque Royale was not 
equal to the amount of metal coins it held. The "bubble" burst at the end of 1720. For description and discussion 
of  these bubbles see: P.M. Garber, ‘Famous First Bubbles’, (1990) 4/2 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
35, 35-54. 
55
 See infra n. 56, p. 12.  
56
 H. Geiger and O. Wuensch, ‘The Fight Against Money Laundering – An Economic Analysis of a Cost-
Benefit Paradoxon’, (2007) Journal of Money Laundering Control, 91, 102. 
57
 The first true international debt crisis is thought to have its roots in loans provided by rich Italian merchants to 
England in the late 13th century. During that time, Italy was the developed financial center and England was a 
country rich with valuable resources such as wool. Italian loans helped finance wars between England and 
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This in turn strengthens investors' confidence and allows them to invest not only in 
the financial institutions, but also in the country itself, knowing that in high probability, their 
investment will be returned, sometimes with a profit.58 
2.3.4 Providing information to the market 
 
A financial regulator plays an important role in providing information to the market, 
mainly through disclosure requirements, which in turn helps the market assign the right price 
tag to its products and prevents the problem of a market for lemons.59  
A market for lemons relates to the problem of quality and uncertainty. In such a 
market there are good and bad products being sold and the buyers cannot tell the good from 
the bad. This leads to buyers being willing to pay a sum which averages out the value of the 
good and bad products. However, the sellers of the good products will not be willing to sell 
for the average price as they know that their products are worth more. In this situation the 
sellers with the good quality products will leave the market. Now the buyers know that the 
price they are expected to pay is much higher than what the bad products are worth so they 
will lower the price of what they are willing to pay, causing sellers with medium quality 
                                                                                                                                                        
France. A series of bank runs hit Florence's economy when Edward the third, king of England at that time, 
defaulted in 1340. Two major Italian banks, the Peruzzi Bank and the Bardi Bank, went bankrupt in 1343 and 
1346 respectfully.  
England then went through several sovereign external defaults before it eventually reached the status of a non-
defaulter. What helped England abandon its position as a serial defaulter was the start of the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 which led to strengthening parliaments' power. For the first time, the Bank of England, by 
providing a delegated bureaucratic monitoring instrument to oversee the governments' debt, provided the 
ultimate instrument through which the parliament expressed its power. Although meant as a political tool at 
first, the happy consequence of such bureaucratic monitoring was moving England away from the serial 
defaulter position and enhancing investors' confidence, thus contributing to the economic prosperity in England 
of that time (C.M. Reinhart & K.S. Rogoff, supra n. 40, pp. 69-71).  
58
 When we look at the willingness to pay (rather than the ability to pay) we see that during the 16th to 18th 
centuries it was not at all evident that as an investor you would ever see your money again. In those days France 
and Spain borrowed money to fuel their wars and maintain their armies. As a foreign investor you could hardly 
expect to collect back your debt by force. During the 19th century super powers intervened from time to time in 
order to enforce debt contracts. Britain often intervened and even occupied countries which refused to pay back 
their debts (Egypt in 1882, Turkey in the beginning of the 1876 default). The U.S did the same (Debt repayment 
concerns were partly behind the U.S's "gunboat diplomacy" which began in the mid 1890's in Venezuela, Haiti's 
occupation by the U.S as of 1915 was rationalized by the need to secure debt collection) (C.M. Reinhart & K.S. 
Rogoff, supra n. 40, pp. 54-55). Today, as most countries borrow and lend to one another, the risks are 
diversified among countries and reduce the incentives of a country to promote a non-repayment of debt policy.   
59
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, p. 18. 
 In the U.S for example The Securities Act of 1933, compiled at 15 U.S.C §§77 a et. seq. was enacted in order to 
prevent fraudulent securities offerings and to ensure that adequate information is given to the public with 
regards to the issuer and the nature of the securities that are offered on the market. This act was the first general 
federal law to regulate the issuance of securities and it required certain issuers of securities to file registration 
statements with the Federal Trade Commission and to provide a prospectus to investors. In order to insure that 
the act is complied with and that the investors are protected, the FTC had been given the power to issue stop 
orders to prevent the sale of an issuer's securities. 
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range products to leave the market as well. At the end the market which is left is filled with 
very low quality products, also known as lemons.60 
A recent example of what can happen when financial markets are wracked by 
uncertainty can be taken from the 2007 crisis where, after the crisis, banks were reluctant to 
trade with other banks and financial institutions due to the uncertainty of their stability; some 
banks held a huge amount of toxic assets, most of which were residential mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), while others did not.  
However, banks could not tell the "intoxicated" banks from other banks that were 
"clean". In order to release the "frizz" in the market the government had to buy the toxic 
assets from the financial institutions thus allowing the trade to resume.61 
This was a classic example of a market for lemons. In this case, as in others, 
regulation helped clear the market of lemons.  
In some cases regulation sets minimum standards for products and by doing so it 
helps clean the market of lemons.62  
Minimum standards are also needed in order to prevent adverse selection, i.e to 
prevent "good" or "careful" firms from being driven out of the market.63 Adverse selection 
refers to a problem of hidden information. When parties hold private non-verifiable 
information they can in theory impose higher costs on their contracting parties which cannot 
tell the reliable service providers from the dangerous or more costly ones. The parties which 
impose the highest costs will be disproportionately likely to enter a contract at a given price 
as they know that they can extract more rent. However, the contracting party knows that the 
more risky party will be the one drawn to the contract and will thus raise the price of the 
contract, ultimately driving out the “good” parties, as they know that they are not risky and 
will not be willing to contract at such a high price.64  
                                                 
60
 G.A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, (1970) 84/3 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 488, 488-500.  
61
 O. Armantier, C.A. Holt and C.R. Plott, ‘A reverse Auction for Toxic Assets’, (2010) Social Science Working 
Paper 1330. 
62
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, p. 26. One example given by Llewellyn is the substantial fall in the purchase of 
personal pensions and life insurance in the UK during 1994-1995 due to a series of scandals and risky selling 
practices. 
63
 After the panic of 1907 in the U.S, five states established state deposit insurance programs, but as membership 
was not compulsory for all banking institutions, severe adverse selection problems occurred. By 1931 all of the 
deposit insurance programs ceased to exist due to bank failures and lack of funds (J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 
19, p. 96). 
64
 D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra n. 45, p.300.  
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There are some similarities between the situation described above and the tragedy of 
the commons;65 as banks race for higher profits they drive risk management criteria down - a 
situation which may lead to the collapse of the system.  
We could look at risk management criteria as a sort of common – when appropriate 
risk management criteria are in place, all sides benefit from it as it protects banks from 
collapsing. In theory, all banks should vote for appropriate risk management criteria. 
 However, without regulation the dominant strategy66 of each bank is not to invest in 
appropriate risk management, due to the fact that risk management is costly as it restrains the 
business from acting more aggressively and therefore cuts down on short term profits. As all 
banks do the same, the Nash equilibrium67 is then set on all banks not investing in appropriate 
risk management and eventually collapsing.    
Moreover, due to the systemic connections between banks, if one bank behaves 
irresponsibly and collapses, it may bring down other banks, including those banks that have 
behaved responsibly in managing their risks while giving up on the extra profits attainable 
from high-risk, high-reward bets.68  
Financial regulation is needed in order to solve this race to the bottom by setting 
common minimum standards and ensuring compliance with the standards. Such standards 
will not always differ from the standards that would have been set by the industry if each 
financial institution could ensure that its competitors would also follow these standards.69 
This situation may be referred to as a prisoner’s dilemma game, which describes a 
collective action problem. The strategy combination that is in the interests of all competitors, 
i.e., set common minimum standards, is not played because each player finds that the strategy 
of setting common minimum standards is strictly dominated by the strategy of lowering the 
                                                 
65 G. Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, (1968) 162 Science, 1243, 1243-1248.  
66
 A dominant strategy is defined as: “A strategy that is a best choice for a player in a game for every possible 
choice by the other player…” D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra  n .45, p.306. 
67
 Nash equilibrium is defined as: “The central solution concept in game theory. It is based on the principle that 
the combination of strategies that players are likely to choose is one in which no player could do better by 
choosing a different strategy given the ones the others choose… We establish whether a particular strategy 
combination forms a Nash equilibrium by asking if either player has an incentive to deviate from it…” D.G. 
Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra n .45, p.310. 
68
 An example of what might happen when banks are allowed to deal with more "risky" assets may be found in 
the debt crisis of the 1980's. Bank loans were made instead of bond loans. The thinking at the time was that due 
to the fact that individual banks took up large loans, there would be an incentive for information-gathering and 
monitoring on behalf of those banks. The truth was that Western banks were lured into these loans by the chance 
of making huge profits and had readily relaxed their monitoring and risk criteria. In August 1983, due to steeply 
higher real interest rates together with a collapse of global commodity prices, Mexico defaulted on its loans. 
Shortly after a large number of emerging markets countries defaulted as well. Commodity prices were cut down 
by 70 percent or more from their peak and a fully-fledged global crisis had begun (C.M. Reinhart & K.S. 
Rogoff, supra n. 40, pp. 17 - 18) 
69
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, pp. 27-28. 
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standards. The individual self-interests of each financial firm leads to actions which are 
harmful for itself and for all other financial firms as well.70  
In other words, financial regulation is sometimes useful in order to coordinate 
competitors in situations in which the Nash equilibrium dictates that each firm defects, even 
though it is in their interest to cooperate.   
                                                 
70
 D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra n. 45, p.312. 
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2.4  The rationales for conduct of business regulation 
 
Over the years scholars have played with the idea of an "efficient" financial market, 
i.e., a market in which there are no information gaps or asymmetries, in which the price of 
securities accurately reflects the value of the firm, and in which investors have access to all 
the relevant and needed information and are able to analyze it properly.71 In such a market, 
agency costs, externalities, and moral hazard would not exist. Therefore, in such a market 
there would be no need for regulation, as financial regulation is costly and therefore should 
be avoided whenever possible.  
The rationale for financial regulation, as for all regulation, is to correct market failures 
and imperfections. Such market imperfections and failures are abundant in the financial 
markets72 and include: 
- Lack of information or wrong information on behalf of the consumers which then 
leads to agency costs deriving from the fact that the financial institution is better 
informed than its consumers. 
- Potential for conflict of interest, both between the financial institution and its 
consumers, and between two consumers of the same financial institution. 
- Inability of consumers to assess the stability of the financial institution,73 the quality 
of the service or the product they receive,74 or inequality in their ability to assess the 
information given to them. 
- "Free riders" problem arising from the fact that each consumer tends to assume that 
other consumers must have devoted time and means to assess the quality of the 
service and products supplied by the financial institution. 
                                                 
71
 W.F. Sharpe, ‘Stock Market Price Behavior. A Discussion’, (1970) 25/2 Journal of Finance, 418, 418-420. 
72
 D. Llewellyn,  supra n. 26, pp. 21-22. 
73
 In extreme cases such inability to assess the stability of the financial institution (especially when it comes to 
banks) might cause a run. If many banks suffer from runs at the same time a financial crisis will be triggered. 
Bank runs have been around since the 16th century when English goldsmiths issuing promissory notes suffered 
severe failures due to bad harvests. The Dutch Tulip mania which occurred in 1634-1637 and which is 
considered to be the first recorded bubble is another example; after the collapse of the bubble for tulip bulb 
prices Holland suffered from a series of runs on its banks further spiraling it deeper into a large financial crisis. 
See:  A. Devenow & I. Welch, supra n. 51, pp. 603-615.  
74
 Such inability to assess the value of the product, especially when increased by an atmosphere of panic, might 
bring on a fully-fledged financial crisis. Take for example the financial crisis of 1860 which occurred in the U.S, 
the fear of war caused paper, which under regular conditions would have been liquidated by the future goods on 
which it was based, to become worthless. This in turn caused banks to cut back on loans and to refuse to accept 
notes of other banks which were not backed up by cash (J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, pp. 51-52). 
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It is worth mentioning that although these market failures may be behind both 
Conduct of Business regulation and Prudential Regulation there are still important differences 
between the two.   
The main difference is that Conduct of Business regulation concerns the relationship 
between the financial institution and its investors and aims at promoting efficient transactions 
which might otherwise not take place due to asymmetric information, while Prudential 
Regulation concerns individual and systemic stability of the financial institution. The 
rationale for Conduct of Business regulation stems from addressing the above-mentioned 
market failures, and is mainly based on the ideas described in the following sub-chapters. 
2.4.1 Asymmetric information  
 
The problem of asymmetric information and lack of ability to assess the financial 
product are enhanced by the existence of products which mature over a large number of 
years. Such products include pension funds, insurance policies, options with a long duration 
date, saving accounts which are closed for a long period of time, funds, current accounts, etc. 
Moral hazard issues may come into play causing the supplier of the product to behave 
differently prior to the purchase of the product then post the purchase.  
Moral hazard problems are solvable by contracts only when it is not too costly to 
contract.75 In the case of financial institutions and their customers or investors, the costs of 
contraction are too high due to information asymmetries and collective action problems. 
Consequently there is no way, other than by regulation, to prevent moral hazard problems 
from occurring between financial institutions and their customers or investors.76 
For this reason, regulation which enforces disclosure is essential. Moreover, such 
regulation, if assembled correctly might also encourage competition between financial firms 
which, under the assumption that stability is not at risk due to competition, further enhances 
consumers' welfare.77 
                                                 
75
 B. Holmstrom, infra n.422, pp. 74-91. 
76
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, p. 38. 
77
 An example of such competition-enhancing regulation can be found in the ‘Banks fees reform for household 
consumers’ introduced by the supervisor of banks in Israel in mid-2008. Prior to the reform, each bank could set 
its own fee for each type of service it offered household consumers and call it by a different name. The reform 
restricted banks to a given number of fees attached to financial products purchased by household consumers, 
which now have the same name in each bank, thus enabling household consumers to compare the prices charged 
by each bank for the same service. The comparison of various bank fees is available on the web site of the Bank 
of Israel (the Israeli supervisor of banks).   
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But simply providing the consumers with information is not always enough. The 
existence of complex financial products makes it difficult for unprofessional customers to 
monitor the financial institution.  
2.4.2 Monitoring  
 
One of the goals of financial regulators is to monitor financial enterprises and assist in 
monitoring investments and management performance in these firms.78 Financial regulators 
are better equipped to monitor financial products, partly due to the fact that they develop the 
relevant expertise in monitoring over an extended period of time. 
Monitoring is important in this market as one of the attributes of financial products is 
the fact that the contracts attached to the products are usually long-term contracts.79 This in 
turn creates several problems, chief among which are Principle-Agent problems and 
monitoring problems.  
Another monitoring role of financial regulators involves reducing information 
asymmetries with regards to risk. In recent developments, some bank regulators require banks 
to divide their clients into types and advise them with regards to the purchasing of financial 
products based on the consumer’s level of expertise and ability to understand the advice. This 
ensures that the clients themselves invest in products which they have the ability to monitor. 
Under this role the financial regulator assists customers in monitoring their own accounts.  
Due to the benefits of economies of scale, the concentration of expertise in the 
regulatory institutions, and the high cost of monitoring for private consumers, it is 
economically rational to leave the responsibility to monitor financial products partially in the 
hands of the financial regulators.  
                                                                                                                                                        
The results of this reform (as taken from The official website of the Bank of Israel: 
<http://www.boi.org.il/he/NewsAndPublications/PressReleases/Pages/091115h.aspx> accessed 20.05.2013) are 
as follows: 
- As of the beginning of 2009 there has been a 7% drop in the average cost of holding a credit card.  
- As of 1.7.2008 (the beginning of the reform) there has been an average drop of 10%-21% in the cost of 
fees for basic services in current accounts. 
- Most banks now offer new consumers a discount on current account fees and some banks now offer 
consumers a fees-free current account. 
- Banks are using the data in their commercials to try and convince consumers to switch a bank.  
78
 W. Dobson, ‘International business – Global Lessons from the 2008 Financial Crisis’, in ‘The Finance Crisis 
and Rescue, What went wrong? Why? What lessons can be learned’ (2008) experts’ views from the Rotman 
School of Management, 95,  95-106.  
79
 D. Llewellyn,  supra n. 26, pp. 23-25. 
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2.4.3 Consumers’ behavioral biases 
 
The first thing that should be considered when we talk about consumer contracts is the 
existence of huge asymmetries between the parties to the contract. One such asymmetry is 
characterized by the existence of behavioral biases on the side of the consumer, while the 
other side is a sophisticated firm taking advantage of these behavioral human flaws.80 
In consumer contracts, sophisticated firms will try and make use of consumers' 
behavioral biases in order to expropriate more profit. Competitive forces push sellers to take 
advantage of their consumers, creating a need for financial regulation to correct for such 
bias.81  
Due to these behavioral biases, financial regulation is needed in order to protect 
consumers from themselves and from abuse by the financial intermediaries, and to make sure 
that the financial firms do not take advantage of these biases.  
2.4.4 Consumers’ demand for regulation and low cost dispute settlement 
mechanism 
 
Consumers themselves demand regulation in order to satisfy their need for quality 
reassurance.82 Consumers are aware of the fact that financial markets are highly complicated 
                                                 
80
 O. Bar Gil, infra n. 81, pp. 1-66. An example of such expropriation occurs in the credit card market in the 
U.S; card issuers deviate from the efficient marginal-cost pricing while designing the credit card contract in 
order to take advantage of consumers’ under-estimation of their future purchasing behavior. This is what stands 
behind some of the features of the credit card contracts in the U.S such as zero annual and per transaction fees, 
high interest rates, high fees for over limit or late payment, teaser rates and negative amortization rates. 
The first underlying bias identified by Bar Gil is the "imperfect self-control bias"; this is the type of bias which 
also plays a role when we make a new year's resolution to attend the gym frequently but forget about it when 
February replaces January. See S. DellaVigna & U. Malmendier, ‘Overestimating Self-Control: Evidence from 
the Health Club Industry’, (2002) Research paper series, Research Paper No. 1880, Stanford graduate school of 
business.  
Under this bias the consumer will end up borrowing much more on his or her credit card then he or she initially 
planned to. This bias also causes people not to save enough for retirement, even though they plan to do so (O. 
Bar Gil, infra n. 81, pp. 2-3).  
The second bias which is relevant for this discussion is the "optimism bias"; consumers tend to underestimate 
future occasions under which they will need to borrow money (for example: loss of job, illness either to oneself 
or to his family, injuries which cause medical bills to accumulate etc.), thus they tend to overlook the sections in 
the credit card contract that mention high fees in case of over limit or late payment (O. Bar Gil, infra n. 81, p. 3). 
Competition in the credit card market forces issuers to compensate for these long-term profits by cutting down 
on short-term profits (which are not subjected to consumer bias). That is why below-marginal costs are 
sometimes observant in the credit card market when it comes to short-term, non-contingent elements of the 
credit card contract (O. Bar Gil, infra n. 81, pp. 3-4).  
81
 O. Bar Gil, ‘Seduction by Plastic’, (2004) American Law and Economics Association Annual Meetings, paper 
12, 1, 1-66. 
82
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, pp. 30-32. 
 The issue of consumers as a class which needs protection is a relatively late phenomenon. Laws protecting 
consumers only began to appear in Europe during the 1960's - 1970's although problems occurred long before. 
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and require a degree of expertise; most consumers are also aware that they themselves do not 
possess such expertise, and so most consumers would like an external regulator to monitor 
and set standards in the financial industry so that they know what they are getting.83  
Furthermore, in the absence of a financial supervisor, each consumer/investor is left 
on his or her own to deal with injustices caused to him or her by the financial institution. The 
existence of a financial regulator provides the consumer/investor with an address to which he 
or she can turn in order to complain about unjust behavior by or on behalf of the financial 
institution. This in turn reduces the need to turn to courts in order to solve petty disputes.84  
Moreover, the existence of a financial regulator enables all consumers to complain 
without distinguishing between them on the basis of their wealth, and provides them with a 
low-cost dispute settlement mechanism. This in turn induces the financial institutions to treat 
their consumers fairly.   
Under this role the financial supervisor prevents the financial institutions from 
imposing externalities on their consumers/investors and prevents some of the principal – 
agent problems that exist between financial institutions and their clients.   
2.5  Summing up  
Over the years a number of positive theories have been developed in order to explain 
how and when government intervention occurs in markets, and what drives changes in 
regulation.85  
                                                                                                                                                        
In Italy, for example, the national securities regulator, Consob, was created in 1974 with the aim of overseeing 
listed companies only after the growth of the stock market and the rising level of investments in securities listed 
therein had made clear that investors in listed securities needed additional protection from a dedicated market 
authority independent of Government. The scope of Consob supervisory powers was then strengthened and 
extended in the 80’s to cover every sale of securities to the retail public following cases of issuance and sales of 
investment certificates held out as direct ownership interests in properties. The failure of many of the issuers had 
prompted fury among investors, who had been cheated into believing their securities were backed by real estate 
assets as a collateral while such securities were simply granting them a junior claim against the assets of the 
issuer on an equal footing with other classes of creditors (See: G. Ferrarini, ‘Sollecitazione del risparmio e 
quotazione in borsa’, in vol. 10.2, Trattato delle società per azioni , edited by G.E. Colombo & G.B. Portale, 
Turin 1993, p. 12 ff,  R. Costi, Il mercato mobiliare, 6th ed., Cedam, Turin 2010, p. 27 ff.,  G.F. Campobasso, 
Diritto Commerciale, 3, Contratti, titoli di credito, procedure concorsuali, 4th edition by M. Campobasso, 
Turin 2008, p. 242 s).    
83 When financial regulation is lacking, consumers (i.e retail investors) tend to avoid using the financial system. 
For example, studies have shown that private investors tend to invest less in institutions that were inflicted with 
corruption. See: J.L. Strachan, D.B. Smith, & W.L. Beedles, ‘The Price Reaction of (Alleged) Corporate 
Crime’, (1983),18/2 The Financial Review, 121, 121-132. 
84
 During 2010, for example, 2757 complaints were referred to the Bank of Israel, the Israeli banks' regulator, 25 
percent of which were found just. (<http://www.boi.gov.il/press/heb/110405/110405p.htm> accessed on 
04.03.2011) 
85
 R.S, Kroszner, ‘The Economics and Politics of Financial Modernization’, (2000) FRBNY Economic Policy 
Review, 25, 26.  
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A few different approaches have been used to study this issue, one of which relates to 
the “public interest"; according to this view regulation is essential in order to correct market 
failures resulting from externalities, and to fix the information gaps between the industry and 
the consumers. From this perspective regulation is needed in order to enhance social welfare.  
A key challenge to this approach lies in the fact that regulation is not always 
optimally designed to enhance social welfare; there are many cases in which designing the 
regulation differently would be more beneficial from a social welfare point of view, yet it is 
not done. Why? The simple answer would be due to costs.  
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2.6  What are the costs associated with financial regulation?  
 
There are many different types of costs which prevent regulators from reaching 
optimal solutions. When we talk about the optimal design of financial regulators it is 
important we take these costs into account.  
Costs are also related to the test of proportionality.86 The principle of proportionality 
originated in Prussia in the late nineteenth century. The idea behind this concept is that of 
private autonomy. Since private autonomy is a value we would like to promote, state 
intervention should always be justified.87  
State intervention can be justified if it contains the following three stages: (1) the 
proposed regulation can solve the problem identified by the regulator; (2) if there are several 
suitable measures for solving the problem, the measure chosen should be the less harmful to 
private autonomy; and (3) the chosen measure should not be out of proportions to the end 
result we would like to achieve.88  
This idea has been largely accepted by modern states around the globe and has 
become part of the culture of the OECD. In order to enact a new piece of regulation under 
any OECD country regime there should be: (i) a public interest which the regulation comes to 
advance; (ii) a rule of law enabling the regulator to regulate; and (iii) the regulation should be 
proportionate to the goal it is trying to achieve. 
Proportionality is also required at an EU level; Article 5 (1) of the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union states that: “…The use of Union competences is 
governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality…”89 Article 5(4) further 
elaborates: “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall 
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties…”90 
  
 
 
                                                 
86
 R. Nebel, ‘Regulation as a source of systemic risk: The need for Economic Impact Analysis’, (2004) 29/2 The 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 273, 273. 
87
 J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1992, p. 685.  
88
 D. Chalmers, G. Davies, & G. Monti,  European Union law: cases and materials, Cambridge University Press 
2010, p. 362. 
89
 The Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union C 83/15 , 
March 2010, art. 5(1). 
90
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, supra n. 89, 
art. 5(4).  
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The white paper on European governance91 states that legislative proposals should be 
evaluated on the basis of whether: a) Public action is necessary; b) The EU level is the most 
appropriate one to achieve the goal; and, c) The measures chosen are proportionate to the 
goal the statute is trying to achieve. 
The principle of proportionality has been well established in EU court cases.92 In 
order to determine whether a regulation is proportionate or not, countries have to consider the 
costs of the proposed regulation compared with the costs which might be incurred by an 
alternative regulation which can be used to achieve the same goal.  
Financial regulation is no different; before enacting or amending existing regulation, 
regulators and governments must take into consideration the costs that the new regulation 
might inflict on the markets, the financial firms, and the individuals who are engaged with 
these firms.  
The costs of financial regulation are listed in the following sections.  
2.6.1 Capture of the financial regulator 
 
Regulation has major distributional effects and is costly to the regulated firms, 
because it restricts them from operating in a way which maximizes their profits and, if 
effective, makes them internalize their costs. Therefore it is in the interests of the financial 
firms to exert influence over the formulation of the regulations they will have to comply with, 
and limit what they perceive to be its "damage" to them.  
This is also known as the "private interest" theory of regulation, or the economic 
theory of regulation.93 This theory describes the regulatory process as a competition between 
two interest groups, in which the well-organized, well-coordinated group is able to extract 
dividends at the expense of the more dispersed, less informed groups.94 Under this theory, the 
strong, organized interest group is able to capture the regulator and influence its regulation, 
                                                 
91
 Commission of 25 July 2001 "European governance - A white paper" ((2001) 428 final - Official Journal C 
287 of 12.10.2001). 
92
 See for example: Case C – 331/88 R v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa (1990) 
ECR I – 4023, Case C-476/99 Lommers [2002] ECR I-2891, paragraph 39, Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v. 
Rüdiger Helm (2005) ECR I – 9981 and many more.  
93
 J.W. Stigler, supra n, 24, pp. 3-21.  
94
 G.S. Becker, ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’, (1983) 98/3 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 371, 371-400; and R.S, Kroszner, supra n.85, p. 26.  
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thus promoting the interests of the regulated firms. A captured regulator will act against its 
own mandate, which is to promote the common good.95 
From a welfare perspective a captured regulator might yield one of the most serious 
costs associated with financial regulation, as a captured regulator has the capability to heavily 
damage the general social welfare in order to promote his other, sometimes personal, goals.96  
2.6.2 Cost of mistakes 
 
Mistakes are another potential cost. If the regulator issues regulation based on wrong 
perceptions of either a market failure or the approach which is needed to be taken in order to 
correct it, then such a mistake will be spread out to the entire regulated market.   
This is sometimes referred to by the literature as "Macroeconomics distortions".97 
Such distortions could increase existing market deficiencies and undermine the objectives 
intended for the regulation in the first place.  
In some cases, mistakes in financial regulation may increase the magnitude of a 
financial crisis or even cause it.  
Strict risk limits, when applied to financial institutions, can lead to forced sales in a 
time of a crisis. A regulatory regime that prevents financial institutions from investing in non-
investment-grade bonds could trigger financial instability on the basis of worries that certain 
bond issuers' investment grade might be downgraded.98 
Harsh capital requirements may also lead to a financial crisis – in uncertain times 
financial regulators tend to increase capital requirements for banks. This in turn leads to a 
decrease in loans, due to the fact that banks have less money to lend to creditors, which may 
lead to the failure of some creditors. If large, systemically important creditors fail, it can 
cause turbulence in the market, and even trigger a full scale financial crisis.99 
                                                 
95
 D.C.L. Hardy, ‘Regulatory capture in Banking’, (2006) WP/06/34 International Monetary Fund Working 
Paper, 1, 3.  
96
 Such was the case in the U.S prior to the Free Banking period (which started in 1838); pressure groups 
influenced legislators not to issue new charters (which were needed in order to open a bank in the U.S at that 
time) in order to prevent competitors from entering the market (J.M. Hendrickson,  supra n. 19, p. 24). 
97
 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, p. 276. 
98
 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, p. 276.  
During the antebellum and national banking eras in the US (1781-1912) some banks were required to purchase 
federal bonds in order to issue banknotes. This meant that the bank's revenue was tied to the yield on 
government bonds and the bank could not use this money to try and gain revenues elsewhere. This type of 
regulation changes the cost and revenues opportunities for banks which in turn contribute to bank instability 
(J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, pp. 70-71).  
99
 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, p. 280. A prominent example is the Banking Capital Accord of 1988 which encourages 
banks to increase credit expansion in times of financial prosperity while requiring them to hold more capital in 
times of recession.  
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2.6.3 Systemic risk arising from financial regulation  
 
As discussed earlier, one of the major goals of financial regulation is to prevent 
systemic risk. However, financial regulation may by itself cause systemic risk if it is 
deficient, and especially if that deficiency spreads to a global level.  
Treaties or global regulation are often a political compromise between the countries 
involved, and thus are not easily adaptable to the needs of a specific market. For example, 
what if Basel lll is wrong or not suitable for the local market?100  
If Basel III’s proposed risk management strategy and unified risk assessment criteria 
for financial institutions worldwide is mistaken or does not take into account specific 
circumstances of specific markets, the result could be dire for worldwide financial stability, 
especially in cases where financial institutions face the same economic environment.   
Some scholars argue that diversity and competition between different legal regimes 
fosters a discovery process to find the best approach.101  These scholars argue against rigid 
global standard setting mechanisms and instead promote the idea of a "high level principle 
based framework with flexible provisions" (p.281).102  
Another source of systemic risk resulting from regulation comes from a regulatory 
attitude promoting complex and detailed regulation. This attitude can cause financial 
institutions to rely solely on the regulation without using common sense to protect against 
dangers which were neglected by the regulation, or unexpected changes in risks. On the other 
hand, it can cause consumers, investors, internal auditors and financial regulators to feel 
overly confident with regards to the stability of the financial system.103  
                                                 
100
 R. Romano, ‘For diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Rethinking the Basel 
Architecture’, forthcoming, Yale Law School, NBER and ECGI (2011), 1, 1-109.   
101
 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, p. 281 refers to a collection of articles dealing with the effects of harmonizing 
financial systems: G. Wood, ‘Competition, Regulation and Financial Stability’, in The Regulation of Financial 
Markets, the Institute of Economic affairs 2003, p. 80, P. Booth, ’Competition in Financial Regulation’, in The 
Regulation of Financial Markets, the Institute of Economic Affairs 2003, 121, 121-137; A. Ridley, ‘Priorities 
for International Financial Regulation’, in The Regulation of Financial Markets, the Institute of Economic 
Affairs 2003, 138, 138-160. 
102
 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, p. 281. 
Regulation constrains the opportunities to diversify. An example can be found in the U.S where most national 
banks were prohibited from extending real estate loans for many years and from investing in corporate equities. 
These restrictions limited the diversification of the banks' asset base and tied banks (especially in small remote 
areas) to one or two firms which were receiving loans from these banks. This approach has left these banks 
extremely fragile as, if that one firm would go bankrupt, the bank would have to declare bankruptcy as well 
(keep in mind that in the past branching was not allowed in the U.S, which meant that these small banks were 
not part of a bigger banking group) (J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, p. 16).  
103
 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, pp. 281 - 282. 
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Given the complexity of reality, the constant change of threats, and different sources 
of risk, even the most experienced and competent regulator cannot regulate against every 
threat that might arise or cover for any mistake that might be made by the financial 
institutions it regulates. This is why it is important to leave room for the common sense of the 
employees of the financial institutions, and incentivize consumers and investors to check 
their accounts for mistakes made by the financial institution in which they invest their money.  
2.6.4 Distortion of competition 
 
Financial regulation often creates barriers to entry. The need for a bank license and 
capital requirements are two prominent examples.104    
As regulators are concerned with stability and preventing systemic risks, they can 
tend to be "over protective" and put up demands which leave "large margins" for protection 
against a collapse of a financial institution. For example, regulators may require high capital 
requirements from the financial firm, oblige it to have a very large board of directors, keep a 
vast compliance department, or ask the owner to provide a personal guarantee to secure some 
of the debts of the financial institution. Such an attitude may prevent or discourage new firms 
from entering the market.  
Concerns of systemic risks may lead the financial regulator to keep financial 
institutions "alive" even in situations which otherwise, given a fully competitive market, 
would have led to the restructuring or removal of the financial institution from the market.105 
Financial regulation may also interfere with competition within the market itself by 
demanding accelerated disclosure, i.e. very vast disclosure requirements which have gone 
beyond the efficient level of disclosure. If all information is disclosed there is less room left 
for competition.106  
                                                 
104
 In this aspect regulation shapes the way the market looks; in the US for example regulation has created a 
market which is consistent of thousands of small banks (when measured by the dollar value of assets). The large 
number of banks is the result of charting and asset restrictions, limits on branching and free banking laws which 
were born in NY in 1838 and spread to other states. These laws stated that anyone who met certain requirements 
was free to enter the banking business, and came as a reaction to charter "selling" and pressure groups 
influencing legislators not to issue new charters in order to keep the industry small. Canada is the opposite 
example; in Canada there were less regulatory limitations on banks and so Canada ended up with a bank market 
structure consisting of a few large banks. The empirical evidence indicates that the Canadian banking market 
structure is much more stable than that of the US (J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, pp. 16 - 17). 
105
 If the financial supervisor is also responsible for encouraging competition in the regulated market he might 
be faced with contradicting goals, as there might be a tradeoff between stability and competition. Therefore, 
such a regulator might chose to promote stability at the expense of competition. Such concerns led Italy in 
2005/2006 to deprive the Italian central bank of antitrust powers regarding banks. 
106
 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, p. 277. 
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Moreover, a rigid and detailed regulatory regime does not leave room for innovation 
on behalf of the financial institutions, thus distorting competition in the market. Strict 
conduct of business regulation restricts the range of financial products available for 
consumers, further limiting the ability of financial institutions to compete.107  
Capital requirements further effect competition in markets in general, extending 
beyond the financial markets themselves, as excessive capital demands often create a 
shortage in credit and/or insurance supply which negatively effects the development of 
different markets.108 
2.6.5 Costs of fragmentation of the regulatory regime  
 
Fragmentation in the context of regulation is a term used in order to describe a 
situation in which there is more than one supervisory authority active in the market. In such a 
case we would consider the market to be "fragmented" from a regulatory point of view, as 
there is more than one regulator imposing regulatory policies and demands on the regulated 
firms in the market. 
The question of whether fragmentation is desirable or not is a complex one. It 
ultimately depends on a cost-utility analysis; is the chosen regulatory structure better than the 
regulatory structure that was not chosen?109  
Either way, there is no doubt that fragmentation incurs costs; as mentioned in the 
introduction to this research, the existence of several regulators acting without coordination 
in the market may lead to inefficiencies and cause regulatory arbitrage on the part of the 
regulated institutions, i.e., if the regulated firms can profit from loopholes in the regulatory 
system, then in order to avoid unwanted regulation, they will move their activity so as to be 
regulated under the regulations more favorable to them. This in turn implies the formation of 
conflict of jurisdiction,110 lack of regulation, or overlapping regulation.111 All of these 
activities are unwanted as they are costly, and not wealth-enhancing.  
Moreover, the existence of several regulators increases the risk of incoherent 
regulation resulting in uncertainty on the part of market participants.     
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 After the Great Depression in the U.S. for example, regulators placed limits on the interest rates banks could 
pay to attract deposits. This altered the competition between banks and also limited the costs of obtaining 
deposits (J.M. Hendrickson, supra n. 19, p. 17). 
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 R. Nebel, supra n. 86, pp. 277-278. 
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 J.P. Trachtman, The Future of International Law: Global Government, Cambridge University Press, 
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2.6.6 Other 
 
Administrative costs - Regulatory agencies, like any agency, cost money. As 
financial regulation is a public good, the financial regulatory agency is financed by the 
government using public money. Needless to say this money has an alternative opportunity 
cost. 
The question is then, how big should the regulatory agency be? More staff for the 
regulatory agency means more resources can be dedicated to designing and controlling 
compliance with the regulation, but it also means more resources are needed. 
Cost of compliance on behalf of the financial institutions - Regulatory compliance 
demands place a heavy financial burden on financial institutions, especially on smaller 
market participants. The cost of regulation exhibits strong economies of scale, sometimes 
resulting in smaller financial institutions being "panelized" twice as much as larger 
institutions.112 
Innovating around the regulator - A profit-seeking firm will invest great efforts in 
order to extract more profit from the market, thus it will be willing to invest a lot to find a 
way to innovate around regulation. In some cases, innovating around the regulation is costly 
and does not generate greater social welfare, since it does not provide the market with a new 
product or service that is materially different from the existing products on the market.   
In the words of Sir Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England: “That is why we 
feel so strongly that the culture of regulation needs to get away from this game in which the 
regulators write ever more complex regulations and the banks and their lawyers write new 
products, which are essentially the same as the previous ones but are defined in such a way 
as not to be caught by the latest rule and regulation. This leads to a very expensive and 
unnecessarily complex system…”113 
Moreover, putting harsh regulatory restrictions on regulated financial institutions may 
facilitate the growing of shadow banking,114 which will carry with it, as it is not exposed to 
regulatory demands, the risks that the regulatory regime tries to prevent.115  
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 H. Geiger and O. Wuensch, supra n. 56, p. 98.  
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 M. King, P. Tucker & A. Bailey, ‘Oral Evidence Taken Before the Joint Committee on the Draft Financial 
Services Bill’, (2011), House of Lords and House of Commons, 1, 24.  
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 Shadow Banks are non-bank financial intermediaries which provide their customers with similar services to 
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 D.W. Diamond and P.H. Dybvig, ‘Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank Regulation’, (1986) 59/1 
The Journal of Business, 55, 55-68.    
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Moral hazard resulting from a rigid regulatory regime - A rigid, detailed and 
protective regulatory regime can remove the responsibility from the employees of financial 
institutions and transfer it to the employees of the financial regulator, thus causing the 
employees of the financial institution to behave recklessly.  
As financial regulation cannot prevent all financial crises, nor should it aim to do so; 
consumers must take into account the possibility that their financial institution might fail. A 
good regulatory regime provides firms with the incentives to avoid engaging in excessive 
risk-taking activities,116and provides consumers/investors with tools to supervise what their 
financial institution is doing with their money, thus taking some of the responsibility for the 
risk involved in the financial institutions' activities.  
The use of deposit insurance creates a Moral Hazard problem on behalf of financial 
institutions - they do not internalize the effects of their risk-taking activities. The reason 
being that if they take on too much risk and fail, they know that the insurance will pay the 
depositors back a partial amount of their deposit (this amount depends on the regulatory 
situation in each jurisdiction).117 Thus, in a competitive market, these financial institutions 
tend to take on more risky activities, in comparison with the activities they would have 
engaged in if there was no deposit insurance, in search of greater profits. 
On the other hand, consumers are attracted to the higher risk-taking financial 
institutions as they know they will be compensated in case of failure, and will gain a higher 
profit so long as the risk does not manifest.118  
This can create a race to the bottom in risk management criteria. Even though the idea 
of deposit insurance was developed to prevent systemic risk by ensuring the stability and 
soundness of the financial system, it is also a potential source of systemic risk as the adverse 
incentive structure may undermine the stability, and magnify the insolvency risk, of the 
financial system as a whole.119  
Other Moral Hazard issues arise with regards to the policy of "too big to fail" in the 
banking sector or the "lender of last resort" function of central banks. Protection from failure 
by an expected bail-out prevents disastrous consequences in the short run, but harbors the 
                                                                                                                                                        
During the financial crisis of 2007-2009 huge "shadow banks" suffered from similar issues as banks. As 
confidence in the investments they made fell, lenders refused to roll-over their short term loans, causing them to 
sell assets on the market at low prices and increase loss. This in turn increased the lack of confidence. 
Eventually the US government intervened in order to stop the "free fall" (C.M. Reinhart & K.S. Rogoff, supra n. 
40, Preamble p. xli)  
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 See Table 8 in the Appendix.  
118
 D. Llewellyn, supra n. 26, p. 17.  
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seeds of future disasters by sending the wrong message that those who fail in running a 
business (or a sovereign state for that matter) will not be held accountable for their actions.120 
If the risk does manifest, and a business (or state) fails, a bail-out policy means the people 
who took on too much risk will not bear the consequences of such a failure.121  
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 R. Gropp, H. Hakenes & I. Schnabel, ‘Competition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policies’, (2011) 
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2.7  Summary and Conclusions  
 
As has been discussed above, financial markets do have special attributes which 
require regulatory intervention. They are complex markets which are abundant with 
asymmetric information, moral hazard, externalities, and agency costs. They are markets in 
which products mature over a long period of time, causing a need for regulatory monitoring 
which is exacerbated by consumer demand for regulation and economies of scale in 
monitoring. Moreover, the financial firms in these markets are crucially important from a 
systemic point of view to the health of the economy in general.  
Having said all that, financial regulation is costly. Financial regulators should be 
aware of the costs of regulation and of the fact that costs will, in one way or another, be paid 
by the consumers.  
Regulation in general should only be enacted if the costs of implementing it are lower 
than the benefits derived from what it seeks to achieve. That is especially true for the 
financial markets, as the health of these markets affects the social welfare of society as a 
whole.  
Moreover, with regards to financial supervision, it is crucial that the responsibility for 
the actions of the financial institutions and for compliance with the laws and regulations 
remains in the hands of the financial institutions' employees and management. The regulator 
can never be fully responsible for the actions of the financial firms, nor should he or she 
attempt to do so as doing so increases moral hazard problems which already exist in the 
market. 
Furthermore, leaving the responsibility in the hands of the financial institutions 
themselves is also important from the aspect of minimizing regulatory mistakes and systemic 
risk caused by regulation. If financial firms are provided with regulatory guidelines instead of 
strict rules, this helps in diversifying the market. In the era of global systemic risk this is 
crucially important.  
Consumers themselves should be entrusted with the responsibility to monitor what 
their financial institution is doing with their assets. In order to do so financial regulation 
should force financial institutions to provide consumers with easy to understand data. The 
approach currently taken by financial regulators of instructing the regulated firms to provide 
their consumers with information that is understandable and suited to them, is a positive one 
as it does not remove the responsibility for monitoring from the consumer.  
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Regulators should keep in mind the costs of financial regulation to competition in the 
market, the costs of compliance, and the costs that might be caused unknowingly by them, 
such as the costs of being unknowingly captured.  
Regulation is not about quantity but about quality. The "right" kind of regulation 
gives the financial institutions the incentives to act in a way which enhances social welfare 
and reduces market failures.  
The costs associated with financial regulation and supervision are largely determined 
by the institutional structure of the financial regulators. Not only does each of these various 
structures come with its own set of direct and indirect costs, the type of structure chosen also 
impacts on the success of regulation in meeting its statutory goals. Thus, the structure of the 
financial regulators must be taken into account in order to try and reduce costs and maximize 
the benefits of financial regulation.  
The following chapter lays the foundation for the discussion of the optimal structure 
for financial regulators which will follow in chapters 4-6 of this research, by reviewing the 
financial regulatory structure in eleven jurisdictions around the globe and examining the 
changes these structures underwent following the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
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3. FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES  
3.1  Introduction  
 
It was not long ago that the structure of financial supervision became relevant. In fact, 
up until around fifteen years ago little attention was paid to the way in which financial 
supervisors were structured. However, the growth of the financial markets and the existence 
of new financial products have brought with them the need for tighter and better supervision, 
and have focused government attention on the financial regulatory structures themselves.122  
The UK opened the trend towards consolidation when it adopted the Consolidated 
Model (also known as an Integrated Model) in June 1998. A few countries, Germany 
included, swiftly followed, and restructured their supervisory model into a consolidated 
one.123  
However, the Consolidated Model did not prove to be more resilient to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis and some of those countries, the UK included, are in the process of 
restructuring their financial regulatory structure yet again.   
Other supervisory models, such as the dispersed model in the USA, did not help 
protect from the crisis either. As a consequence, we are now witnessing many jurisdictions 
reviewing and revising their financial supervisory structures in the hope of avoiding past 
mistakes. Of the jurisdictions studied in this chapter, change has already taken place in 
Switzerland, the UK, the USA, and the EU.124  
These changes suggest that the jurisdictions in which change is taking place were not 
satisfied with the way their financial supervisory structure functioned during the 2007-2009 
crisis, and are now striving to improve them.   
This chapter studies and updates the state of affairs with regards to the financial 
supervisory structures in fifteen jurisdictions. Furthermore, it points out common similarities 
and common problems which appeared in the financial regulatory structures of different 
countries during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
As this chapter provides the bedrock for the analysis performed in subsequent 
chapters, it relys mainly on a report issued by the Group of 30 in 2008 under the heading 
                                                 
122 D. Masciandaro & M. Quintyn, ‘Regulating the Regulators: The Changing Face of Financial Supervision 
Architectures Before and After the Crisis’, (2009) 6/5 European Company Law 187, 189. 
123 D. Masciandaro  & M.  Quintyn, supra n. 122, p. 2-3. 
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“The Structure of Financial Supervision: Approaches and Challenges in a Global 
Marketplace” (the “Report”).  
As a consequence, this chapter does not intend to provide the reader with a thorough 
and in-depth legal analysis of the different jurisdictions, but mainly to lay down the 
groundwork for the discussion which follows. It is also important to mention that this chapter 
chooses to focus on a few specific countries, some of which were mentioned in the Report 
and some not, based on the following criteria:  
This chapter makes the choice of focusing on the top ten OECD jurisdictions by GDP 
for the year 2012125 on the assumption that the size of their economies coupled with shared 
patterns in the structure of financial industry and supervisory authorities make comparison 
less hazardous and thus more meaningful.    
Five more countries, Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, Australia, and Switzerland, were 
also added to the review based on different considerations such as: easy access, in terms of 
language, to the materials; the way in which some of these countries, such as Israel, survived 
the last financial crisis; and the fact that they share some similarities with regards to the 
structure of the supervisory authorities with the other jurisdictions studied under this 
chapter.126  
This chapter is organized as follows: following this introduction, the second part of 
the chapter examines the existing literature in the field; the third part presents the existing 
main supervisory structures in the world today; the fourth part brings factual data and 
compares the financial markets of the reviewed jurisdictions; and the fifth part concludes.  
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 Data taken from the official website of the OECD: < http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/gross-
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3.2  Literature review 
 
In their 2009 research, Masciandaro and Quintyn127 surveyed 102 countries over a 
period of eleven years. Their research found a worldwide trend towards consolidation of 
financial regulators outside the central bank. The authors also identified a trend towards 
specialization – namely, central banks tend to focus on monetary policy, while other 
regulatory authorities specialize in financial supervision. In jurisdictions where the financial 
supervisory structure is more fragmented, the authors found central banks were more 
involved in supervision.  
This chapter shows that, at least for the 15 Jurisdictions studied, this trend continues; 
Switzerland has moved to the Consolidated/Integrated model and the US and Canada have 
also begun moving towards consolidation.  
Even though this chapter does not focus on bank performance, one could look at the 
latest financial crisis as an indication of how well the banking system in each country 
performed. On this topic, this chapter reaffirms Barth et al’s findings,128 as change in the 
financial regulatory structures is visible in countries with diverse supervisory structures. This 
shows that countries with different supervisory models, the UK and Switzerland for example, 
were equally dissatisfied with the functioning of their banking system and their existing 
financial supervisory models, and the way in which they functioned during the crisis. 
A 2009 communication from the EU Commission, entitled ‘European Financial 
Supervision’, backs up these claims and states that: 
“Current supervisory arrangements proved incapable of preventing, managing and 
resolving the crisis. Nationally-based supervisory models have lagged behind the 
integrated and interconnected reality of today's European financial markets, in which 
many financial firms operate across borders. The crisis exposed serious failings in the 
cooperation, coordination, consistency and trust between national supervisors…”(p. 2)129 
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 D. Masciandaro  & M.  Quintyn, supra n. 122, pp. 187-196. 
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Melecky and Podpiera130 studied the development of financial regulatory structures 
since 2002 in 98 countries. One of their findings is that countries with a higher stage of 
economic development tend to consolidate their financial regulatory systems. In addition, 
according to their study, countries which have undergone a financial crisis will show a trend 
towards consolidation. 
As this chapter reviews only 15 jurisdictions, it is hard to make any affirmative claims 
with regards to the validity of Melecky and Podpiera’s aforementioned research. Their 
research might however explain some of the trends we see in the 15 jurisdictions examined in 
this chapter, such as the trend towards partial or full consolidation which is taking place in 
Switzerland and the US.  
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3.3  What types of financial supervisory structures exist in the 
world? 
 
In 2012 the world Gross Domestic Product amounted to approximately 72 trillion 
dollars.131 This massive flow of transactions and cash is supervised by a number of different 
financial regulators. The identity of the regulatory bodies varies from country to country and 
from region to region, but in general their responsibilities are divided between bank 
supervisory functions, insurance supervisory functions, and market supervisory functions.  
On October 6 2008, the Group of Thirty, an international body composed of central 
bank governors, private financial sector experts, and leading economists, released a report 
providing insights into current challenges facing the global financial system, and information 
with regards to future expected reforms in the structure of financial regulators. The Report 
compares and analyzes the financial regulatory approaches of seventeen jurisdictions in order 
to illustrate the implications of the four principal models of supervisory oversight - the 
Institutional Approach; the Functional Approach; the Consolidated/Integrated Approach; and 
the Twin Peaks Approach. These four supervisory oversight structures were also 
acknowledged by Masciandaro and Quintyn in 2009,132 who grouped the countries in their 
study according to a similar classification.  
The report rightfully states that: (a) no two jurisdictions are the same in the way in 
which they regulate financial institutions; (b) that no “pure” example of any financial 
supervisory model may actually exist; and (c) that a blurring between the approaches is 
prevalent.133  
Even so, it is useful to group the different models into one of the following structures 
in order to assess them:134 
(A) The Institutional Approach – This is the traditional approach to supervision. This 
approach assigns a regulator to a firm according to the financial firm’s legal status 
(i.e. bank, insurance company, etc.). Traditionally the firm’s legal status also 
determined the scope of the firm’s business activities. This situation changed with 
time when firms requested and received their regulator’s permission to go into new 
lines of business, thus causing two different types of entities to offer similar products.  
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It is perhaps the model under the most strain, given the changes in financial markets 
and players, and the blurring of product lines between sectors.135  
According to The Group of Thirty, agencies using the Institutional Approach to 
supervision can overcome its shortcomings, (i.e. mainly coordination problems 
resulting in overlapping regulation), via various coordination mechanisms such as 
information exchange, and supervisory board meetings in which delegates from the 
different supervisory bodies discuss and coordinate their supervisory work. 
This approach is prevalent in Israel and Mexico.  
(B) The Functional Approach – According to the Functional Approach to supervision, 
the supervisory oversight is determined according to the business performed by the 
regulated entity without regard to its legal status. Under this approach one regulated 
entity may be subordinated to a few different regulators, each regulating a different 
part of its activity.  
This approach to supervision is quite common and, according to the Report, appears 
to work well so long as coordination among agencies is achieved and maintained. 
However, coordination is not easily achievable and it is because of this that a number 
of jurisdictions are moving away from the Functional Approach toward the Twin 
Peaks or Consolidated/Integrated Systems. 
This approach is prevalent in France, Italy, and Spain. 
(C) The Consolidated/Integrated Approach - The Report finds some support for the use 
of a Consolidated Approach to supervision. According to this approach, one single 
regulator oversees the entire financial market.  
This approach can be recommended in smaller markets, where oversight of the broad 
spectrum of financial services can be successfully conducted by one regulator. It has 
also been adopted in larger, complex markets where it is viewed as a more flexible 
and dynamic approach to regulating.  
The Consolidated Approach is advantageous in that it offers a unified focus on 
regulation and supervision. It provides no opportunity for the development of debates 
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over supervisory powers which can occur under both the Institutional and Functional 
Approaches. However, this approach may create the risk of a single point of 
regulatory failure (i.e. the risk of a regulatory mistake which, due to lack of diversity 
in regulators, leaves the market unsupervised or offers the wrong regulatory solution 
to the identified market failure, thus negatively affecting all financial institutions in 
the market).  
This Approach is prevalent in Germany, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, The Republic of 
Korea and, until recently, the UK.  
(D) The Twin Peaks Approach - There is a growing interest in and support for the Twin 
Peaks Approach to supervision. The Twin Peaks Approach divides the regulatory 
tasks between two regulators; one of whom is in charge of supervising systemic risk, 
while the other is in charge of conduct of business regulation and consumer 
protection136.  
When prudential concerns conflict with consumer protection issues, the prudential 
supervisor in the Twin Peaks Approach takes precedence in order to insure financial 
stability.  
This approach still suffers from the problems of the Integrated Approach, i.e., there is 
risk for a single point regulatory failure with regards to consumer protection and 
market integrity regulation due to the fact that all CoB regulation for all market 
participants is consolidated into one regulator.  
This approach is prevalent in Australia, The Netherlands and the UK.  
The Report describes the current regulatory regime in seventeen different jurisdictions 
and offers a wide perspective on the current structuring of financial regulators in these 
jurisdictions. The Report also describes how each structure has its shortcomings and 
advantages, some of which derive from the way in which the regulators interact with one 
another.  
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48 
 
Since 2008, when the report was released, several changes have occurred in the 
regulatory structures of a few countries around the world, including some of the countries 
that were reviewed by the report.  
In the following pages, some of the jurisdictions reviewed by the report are revisited, 
and examples are presented of the changes they have undertaken since the publishing of the 
report.  
A few additional jurisdictions which were not included in the Group of 30’s report, 
namely Israel and the Republic of Korea, are also reviewed below. Israel was added to this 
research due to the fact that its financial markets survived the crisis with relative success, and 
the Republic of Korea was added due to the fact that it is one of the top ten OECD countries 
by GDP in 2012.   
  
49 
 
3.4  The financial markets of the reviewed jurisdictions 
 
According to the World Bank’s panel data137 of 2011,138 large differences exist 
between the different jurisdictions reviewed by this chapter with regards to market 
capitalization of listed companies, bank capital to assets ratios, deposit insurance, and the size 
of the financial markets; these differences are also partially responsible for the differences 
that can be found in the supervisory structure models in each country, as discussed in the 
following subchapters.  
As mentioned in Chapter Two of this research, deposit insurance has its drawbacks, 
the leading of which is its tendency to increase moral hazard problems. However, deposit 
insurance is needed in order to increase the liquidity of banks in times of financial distress, 
prevent bank runs, and protect household consumers from losing their life savings if or when 
their financial institution goes bankrupt.  
The jurisdictions reviewed in this chapter seem to care more about the benefits of 
deposit insurance than about its costs, as most of them have implemented some sort of 
deposit insurance scheme.139   
The surveyed countries also shared common problems with regards to financial 
regulation which affected their ability to react in a timely manner to the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. These problems include the following:  
Coordination problems – coordination problems between supervisory authorities 
were prevalent during the crisis both on the national and international level. The crisis has 
proven that modern financial crises cross markets, jurisdictions, and products,140 and that in 
order to prevent or stop a crisis from occurring there is a need for a quick and coordinated 
regulatory response.  
In an attempt to ensure cooperation and effective information exchange, several 
countries have formed coordinating bodies. These bodies are supposed to bring the different 
regulators together on a regular basis in order to exchange information and views.  
Macro Prudential supervision – the crisis brought forward the importance of 
supervising systemic risk. It is now clear that firms outside the financial markets could have a 
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 Data with regards to the different jurisdictions which was obtained through recurring observations over a 
period of time. 
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 Data taken from World Bank panel data on: < http://data.worldbank.org/country> accessed 21.05.2013.  
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 As can be seen in table 8 in the Appendix.  
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 A financial crisis crosses products due to the fact that in many cases financial products have an effect on, or 
are derivatives of, other financial products.  
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strong effect on the stability of firms within the financial markets. Therefore, most countries 
are considering ways in which they can increase and improve macro prudential supervision. 
Independence of regulatory bodies – independence of supervisory authorities has a 
direct effect on their ability to make professional decisions with regards to regulatory 
measures. Financial supervisory authorities need to be as independent as possible in order to 
make professional decisions with regards to financial regulation.  
True independence means that they have to be financially independent from 
government. This is usually achieved by imposing fees on the regulated bodies in the 
industry.141  
Deposit insurance – Lack of sufficient deposit insurance has a detrimental effect on 
bank liquidity in times of distress. Following the problems which occurred during the last 
financial crisis, the European Union recently amended its European deposit insurance 
directive in order to enlarge the minimum deposit insurance requirements from 20,000 Euro 
to 100,000 Euro.142  
These common concerns have brought countries to re-consider their financial 
regulatory frameworks and structures. Changes are being made, on the national and 
international level, in order to try and mitigate the problems listed above.  
The following pages offer a review of what has changed in several jurisdictions 
around the world as a result of the last financial crisis and, where needed, suggestions are 
made as to what should further be amended.  
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3.5  The financial regulatory structures in the reviewed 
jurisdictions  
3.5.1 The Institutional approach 
3.5.1.1 Israel  
 
General data143 
As of 2011 the Israeli financial market was composed of fifteen local banks, two 
mortgage banks and five foreign banks which held branches or representative offices in 
Israel.144 The market contained twenty four insurance companies and a number of financial 
management companies.145 
In 2010, 203 licensed financial advising firms and 5,600 licensed financial advisors 
were active in the Israeli market. The number of active mutual funds in the Israeli market 
amounted in that year to 1,247, which together held 156.6 Billion NIS. Seven groups issuing 
exchange-traded notes (ETN’s) were active in the market, operating through 32 companies. 
The public held 57.7 Billion NIS in ETN’s through these companies.  
The entire value of financial assets held by the Israeli public in April 2012 is 
estimated at 2600 Billion NIS.146 
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
Israel follows the Institutional Approach to financial supervision with some influences 
from the Functional Approach.147 The Israeli market is supervised by three financial 
supervisory authorities in addition to the competition authority: the Bank of Israel, which 
supervises banks; the Israeli Securities Authority, which supervises the capital market; and 
the Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings Department within the Ministry of Finance. The 
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 Data in this section is based on panel data taken from the web sites of the Israeli financial supervisory 
authorities: The Bank of Israel, the Israeli Securities Authority and the Department of Financial Markets, 
Savings and Insurance in the Treasury.  
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 Data taken from the Bank of Israel web site which can be found at: 
<http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/pikuah/snifim/snifhanh.htm> accessed 21.05.2013. 
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 Data taken from the web site of the Israeli Insurance supervisory authority which can be found at: 
<http://ozar.mof.gov.il/hon/2001/insurance/contactDetails.asp> accessed 21.05.2013. 
146
 Bank of Israel panel data which can be found at: 
<http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/monetar/shukhon/shon_heb.htm> accessed 1.08.2012.  
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and investment advisory activity lies with the Israeli Securities Authority based on the fact that investment 
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latter is divided into two sections, one of which is responsible for insurance supervision, 
while the other undertakes supervision of financial markets, which includes responsibility for 
the supervision of long term saving products like Provident Funds (see Figure 1). Due to the 
fact that each authority was formed at a different time and out of different needs, each 
authority emphasizes different supervisory goals.  
Only two of the supervisory authorities active in the market, the Israeli Securities 
Authority and the Bank of Israel, have their goals explicitly defined by law.148 The Capital 
Markets, Insurance and Savings Department within the Ministry of Finance defines its own 
goals in its financial statements, strategic plans and inner memorandums.  
As of 2010 there exists a special division of the courts which is dedicated to dealing 
solely with financial issues.149 The judges of this court are experts on securities and corporate 
law, and their judgments are supposed to reduce legal uncertainty and contribute to 
improving market conduct in the Israeli financial markets.  
The Bank of Israel in its role as bank supervisor receives its powers from: The Bank 
of Israel Law, 2010, The Banking Order of 1941; The Banking Law (Licensing), 1981; The 
Banking Law (customer service), 1981; and The Law of Checks without Cover, 1981.  
The Israeli Securities Authority (ISA) receives its powers from The Securities Law of 
1968. Other relevant laws for the operation of ISA are: Joint Investment Trust Law, 1994; 
Regulation of Investment Advice, Investment Marketing and Investment Portfolio 
Management Law, 1995; Companies Law, 1999; Financial Assets Agreements Law, 2006; 
Credit rating Agencies Law, 2014. Besides these laws a number of regulations dealing with 
all aspects of market conduct and rules have been enacted through the power of these 
statutes.150 
The Department of Financial Markets, Savings and Insurance receives its powers 
from the following laws: The Law for Regulating Insurance Business, 1981; the Law of 
Insurance Contracts, 1981; the Tax Order and Regulation (rules for approving and managing 
funds), 1964; the Law for Promoting Savings (income tax reductions, loan guarantees), 1956; 
the Law for Joint Investment Trusts, 1994; The Securities Law, 1968; and the Law of 
Government Loans, 1979.  
On the 24th of June 2007 the three supervisory authorities signed a MoU for 
coordination and exchange of information with regards to regulating the Israeli financial 
                                                 
148
 The Securities Law, 1968 and the Bank of Israel Law, 2010, sec.3 A. 
149
 The Law of Courts (amendment 59), 2010. 
150
 All laws and regulations can be found in their Hebrew and English version on the web site of the Israel 
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market.151 According to Section 2 of the MoU, the heads of the three supervisory authorities 
form a joint commission which gathers once a month and which facilitates the exchange of 
information between the different authorities. Sections 3 and 4 of the MoU facilitate 
cooperation and coordination between the three regulators on regulatory issues which might 
have an effect beyond the sectors of the financial markets which directly concern them.  
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
Israel went through the last financial crisis with relative ease due to a number of 
factors:152  
- With a few exceptions, the Israeli banking system is a conservative one and it is kept 
under tight supervision by the Supervisor of Banks.153 This fact contributed to the 
stability of the Israeli banking system as most of the banks invested in relatively safe 
financial products and their exposure to the asset-backed securities in the USA, which 
started the crisis,  was minimal;  
- The mortgage market in Israel is very conservative and is highly supervised; and  
- Complex products do not exist in the Israeli financial market.154  
For all these reasons the formation of a real estate bubble155 or a leverage problem156 
were prevented.157  
                                                 
151
 ‘Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation and exchange of information between the Supervisor of 
Banks, the Israeli Securities Authorities and the Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings Department’, 24 June 
2007.  
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 K. Broida, Z. Ardman & M. Shemesh, ‘Israel and the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2009’, (2011) Bank of 
Israel, 5, 49.   
153
 Prior to the financial crisis the biggest bank in Israel at that time, Bank Hapoalim, had invested in asset-
backed securities in the USA through its USA branch. The Supervisor of Banks in Israel conducted an 
investigation on exposure to risky assets by the foreign branches of the banks in Israel. Following the 
investigation Bank Hapoalim was instructed to double the capital requirements needed in order to hold 
mortgage-backed securities due to the riskiness of these assets. Due to the financial losses on these asset-backed 
securities and the regulatory demand, Bank Hapoalim chose to sell these assets, a move which retrospectively 
saved the bank from great losses during the outbreak of the crisis in 2007 (K. Broida, Z. Ardman & M. 
Shemesh, supra n. 152, pp. 57-58).  
154 Complex products contain more risk which is not easily quantifiable. Given the complexity of the products it 
is not easy to regulate and monitor them. Therefore, risky products pose a threat to the stability of the financial 
institution which holds them. In a world where financial institutions have a systemic effect on one another, the 
failure of one major bank due to the materializing of the risk has a negative effect on the financial stability of 
other financial institutions as well (United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, ‘Wall 
Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse’, (2011),  p. 17). 
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 When prices of real estate in a certain area peak first and decrease later in proportion to their former increase 
(B.M Roehner, ‘Spatial analysis of real estate price bubbles: Paris, 1984–1993’, (1999) 29/1 Regional science 
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As part of its conservative approach to banking regulation, the banks’ supervisor took 
steps in order to increase bank stability prior to the crisis. This approach was based on an 
understanding that a rapidly growing market may reach a point where growth is slowed 
down.158  
As part of its steps to increase bank stability, the Supervisor of Banks required banks 
to adopt a minimum of 12% capital reserves until the end of 2009. In addition a three year 
plan to implement Basel II, the second of the Basel Accords159 dealing with risk assessment 
and management, was adopted.160  
When the crisis broke in 2007, the Israeli banks’ supervisor focused on examining the 
exposure of the Israeli banks to the financial instruments which were at the heart of the 
financial crisis. It was found that the exposure was minimal. The Supervisor of Banks took 
steps to ensure banks were not exposed to complex financial products from abroad.  
With the Bear Stearns distress in March 2008, supervision of the Israeli banks was 
tightened even more. Banks were asked to be extra cautious, reevaluate risks, strengthen 
capital, and prepare a plan for raising capital if needed.161     
For the reasons discussed above, the Israeli market went through the financial market 
with relative success; no banking institution has failed and no bailout program was needed.  
Even though the Israeli supervisors responded well to the crisis, Israel is also in the 
process of re-evaluating its financial supervisory structure. In a report handed to the Israeli 
parliament, the Knesset, the following drawbacks, in comparison with other countries, were 
identified:162 
1. The Structure of the financial supervisory authorities – the Israeli supervisory 
structure still follows the institutional structure. However, the market players have 
outgrown their traditional roles. This leads to an undesirable phenomenon in which 
similar products are being supervised in different ways based solely on the fact that 
they are sold by different types of companies.  
                                                                                                                                                        
156
 When leverage levels go up they can trigger a financial crisis, as a fall in the price of the underlying assets 
may cause the borrowers to go bankrupt (see: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, ‘The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report’, (2011), U.S. Government Printing Office ).   
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Moreover, supervisory standards vary from one authority to another. For example, the 
Bachar committee which transferred the provident funds from banks to insurance 
companies, in order to reduce conflicts of interest in the market, did not likewise 
transfer the regulation.  
As a result, some time later, concerns were brought up with regards to the stability of 
provident funds163 and with regards to the ability of customers to monitor their 
investments.164  
Another example of distortions that arise from lack of harmonization can be found by 
looking at the Hodack committee report which came to investigate the investment 
rules in debentures and bonds for institutional investors. The result of the committee’s 
recommendations is that mutual funds which are under the supervision of the Israeli 
Securities Authority can invest in financial products which pension funds are 
prohibited from investing in. This distinction between mutual funds and pension funds 
is questionable from an economic point of view, and is a prominent example of 
distortions that can occur from lack of harmonization of regulation.  
Stability concerns call for harmonization of regulation where similar products are 
involved. Harmonization can be achieved by one of the following ways: consolidation 
of the financial regulators; giving the lead to a lead regulator; or adding a prudential 
regulator to the market.  
Another major drawback of the structure of the Israeli financial supervisory 
authorities is the fact that the Department of Financial Markets, Savings and 
Insurance is part of the Ministry of Finance. This exposes the Department to various 
conflicts of interest, including, most critically, between protecting consumers’ savings 
and enhancing the financial markets. Separating this Department from the Ministry of 
Finance and establishing an independent insurance supervisor is therefore long 
overdue.  
2. Enhancing cooperation between the different supervisory authorities – As the 
structure of financial supervision in Israel is dispersed, increased coordination is 
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required. The MoU mentioned previously in this subchapter is a step in the right 
direction, however, the regulators need to make use of this tool and develop a culture 
of regulatory cooperation.  
3. Financial independence of the regulatory authorities – with the exception of the 
Bank of Israel, all other supervisory authorities in Israel either receive their money 
from the Ministry of Finance, depend on the government to approve their yearly 
budget, or both.165 This impairs their ability to remain completely independent and 
increases the chance that they will be influenced by the government instead of by 
professional standards.  
4. Lack of Deposit Insurance – Out of all countries surveyed in this chapter, Israel is 
the only country lacking deposit insurance. As seen in most of the reviewed countries 
during the last financial crisis, deposit insurance is an important tool in order to 
increase banks’ liquidity and strengthen depositors’ trust in the banking system.166  
It is true that in the past, such as was the case with the bankruptcy of the Trade Bank 
(HaBank LeMischar), the government and the Bank of Israel acted as deposit insurers 
where needed. However, on that occasion they made it clear that the bailout did not 
reflect on their future willingness to insure depositors.  
Therefore, it is suggested that deposit insurance for small deposits should also be 
introduced in Israel. 
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Figure 1: the Israeli Financial Supervisory structure  
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3.5.1.2 Mexico 
 
General data167 
 The Mexican financial market accounted for 67% of the country’s GDP in 2008. The 
banking sector comprises over 40 banks, and the majority of the financial institutions active 
in the market belong to a financial group.168 In addition there are over 100 insurance 
companies and pension funds active in the market and over 30 regulated non-bank firms 
which operate along the same lines as banks.169  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
Mexico’s financial regulatory structure is an Institutional one. There are seven 
regulatory authorities active in the Mexican market: 
1. The Ministry of Finance and Public Debt (SHCP) is responsible for the design of 
the financial sector. The SHCP also acts as a coordinating authority between the 
different financial regulators active in the market. The president of the SHCP 
appoints the presidents of all other financial regulatory authorities, apart from the 
Bank of Mexico whose president is appointed by the President of Mexico and 
ratified by the Senate.170  
2. The Bank of Mexico serves as Mexico’s central bank and as lender of last resort. 
The Bank of Mexico acquires its own funds and its budget is not submitted to 
congress for approval.  
3. The National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) was formed in 1995. 
Its main responsibilities are to issue regulations for prudential supervision, and to 
supervise all financial intermediaries apart from insurance companies, bond 
companies, and pension funds.171 
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 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 76-82.  
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4. The National Insurance and Bond Companies Commission (CNSF) serves as the 
prudential supervisor for insurance and bond companies.172 
5. The National Commission for the Retirement Savings System (CONSAR) is the 
prudential supervisor for pension fund management.173 
6. The National Commission for the Protection of Financial Services Users 
(CONDUSEF) is responsible for consumer protection.174 
7. The Institute for the Protection of Banking Savings (IPAB) is in charge of 
providing deposit insurance of up to approximately 159,000 USD. The budget for 
IPAB comes from the government and is part of the government’s annual budget 
which is approved by congress.175 
Cooperation between the authorities is achieved through the fact that representatives 
from each authority sit on the board of all other authorities. In addition, representatives from 
the Bank of Mexico, the IPAB, the SHCP, and the other commissions attend several 
committees where regulatory ideas are exchanged and financial regulatory issues are 
discussed and coordinated.176  
There are other ad hoc committees, such as the Financial Stability Committee. This 
committee is formulated when a financial institution is “too big to fail” and comprises 
representatives from the CNBV, IPAB, the Bank of Mexico and SHCP. This mechanism 
exists although it has never been tested in reality.  
The Mexican financial market is riddled with regulation. The financial regulatory 
authorities receive their mandate from the following rules and regulations:  
The Law of the Bank of Mexico (1993) states in Article 1 that the central bank should 
enjoy autonomy. Article 2 defines its role in maintaining systemic stability and deciding on 
monetary policy.177   
The National Banking and Securities Commission Law (1995)178 establishes the 
CNVP as the leading supervisor for banks and financial institutions in Mexico. The law 
places the authority under the Ministry of Finance but grants it technical and operational 
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autonomy. In particular the law grants the CNVP with the power for the issuance of 
consumer protection regulation including regulating disclosure requirements.  
The Payment System Law (2002)179 aims at ensuring the smooth operation of the 
Mexican payment systems. The powers to regulate the Mexican payment systems are granted 
to the Bank of Mexico.  
The Credit Institutional Law (1990)180 is the main banking law in Mexico. The law 
covers banking and credit institutions, and is meant to regulate credit in a way which 
prioritizes public protection. The law also includes some anti-money laundering provisions.  
The Financial Groups Law (1990)181 regulates financial conglomerates in Mexico.  
The Auxiliary Credit Organizations Law (1985)182 regulates the activity of foreign 
exchange firms and other financial institutions which belong to banks and provide credit. 
The Law of Banking Savings Protection (1998)183 establishes the Institute for the 
Protection of Banking Savings (IPAB) in Article 2. The institute is in charge of the federal 
deposit insurance scheme and its budget is separated from that of the state.  
The Securities Market Law (2005)184 regulates all the activities and firms on the 
Mexican securities market. This authority is responsible for consumer protection and for the 
development of the market.  
The Mutual Funds Law (2001)185 regulates all mutual funds active on the market.  
The Law on Insurance Contracts (1935)186 regulates the operation and organization of 
insurance companies.  
The Financial Services and Transparency Law (2007)187 and the Law for the 
Protection and Defense of Financial Services Users (1999)188 concern themselves mainly 
with consumer protection.  
The Retirement Funds System Law (1996)189 establishes the authority responsible for 
regulating pension funds (the National Commission for Retirement Savings) and regulates the 
mandatory pension funds market.  
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What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
Mexico was hit by the last financial crisis but the financial system proved to be 
resilient. The market recovered by 2010, mainly due to the work of the financial regulatory 
authorities.190 
The banking market remains concentrated and regulatory work is being done in order 
to try and introduce more competition into the market.191  
 
 
Figure 2: the Mexican Financial Supervisory structure192 
                                                 
190
 International Monetary Fund Country Report, ‘Mexico: Financial System Stability Assessment’, No. 12/65 
(2012), p. 7. 
191
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p 81. 
192
 Figure 2 follows diagram in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p.80. 
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3.5.2 The Functional Approach  
 
3.5.2.1 France 
 
General data193 
The French financial market comprises over 9,000 financial firms which contribute 
approximately 4.6% to the country’s GDP. The assets in the French asset-management 
industry amount to over 1.25 trillion Euro.  
The French banking sector is a concentrated one, consisting of seven large local and 
international banking groups. Between them, these banking groups hold 80% - 90% of the 
French banking market.194  
The insurance market consists mainly of independent insurance groups which hold 
approximately 80% of the market. The French banks do not play a major role in the general 
insurance market. They do however sell life insurance.195  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
The French supervisory structure belongs to the functional approach, although it 
exhibits several characteristics of the twin peaks approach.196 For example, prudential 
supervision of banks and pension funds lies with the Banking Commission which is located 
inside the central bank, the Bank of France, and chaired by the Governor of the Bank of 
France, whereas responsibility for the conduct of business is given to the Financial Markets 
Authority, which is the French financial markets’ supervisory authority.197  
The most recent financial supervisory reform occurred in France in 2003 and was 
aimed at simplifying and reducing the number of financial regulatory authorities. Even so, 
France still maintains a large number of interconnected supervisory authorities relative to 
other countries. The structure consists of eleven supervisory authorities, each maintaining 
separate, but sometimes overlapping, supervisory powers (see figure 3).  
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The interconnectivity of the authorities is reflected by the fact that the heads of some 
of the supervisory authorities, as well as politically affiliated delegates, sit on the board of 
other supervisory authorities.198  
For example, the Director General of the Treasury, which is part of the Ministry of 
Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFI), the French body responsible for the issuance and 
approval of new financial regulation, is also a member of the governing boards of the 
prudential supervisor (the CB), the authority which is entrusted with licensing banks and 
insurance companies (CECEI), and the insurance supervisory authority (CEA). A 
commissioner is also provided by the government in order to sit on the boards of the 
insurance systemic supervisory authority (the ACAM) and the authority which supervises and 
regulates the public’s savings (AMF).  
The governing board of the prudential supervisory authority, the Banking 
Commission (CB), comprises the head of the central bank, the finance minister, the head of 
the ACAM, and four members who are appointed by the treasury.  
The governing board of the committee of Credit Institutions and Investment firms 
(CECEI), which is responsible for licensing credit providers, comprises the head of the 
central bank, a Ministry of Finance commissioner, the head of the securities authority (AMF), 
the head of the deposit guarantee authority (FGD), and eight other members appointed by the 
Treasury.  
The commissioner of the central bank (BDF) also sits on the board of the Insurance 
and Mutual Societies Supervisory Authority (ACAM) which is the main French insurance 
supervisor.  
Coordination between the authorities is maintained mainly through the Board of 
Financial Sector Authorities (CACESF) which is basically a committee of supervisors 
consisting of the heads of the Bank of France (BDF), the Financial Markets Authority 
(AMF), and the Insurance and Mutual Societies Supervisory Authority (ACAM).199   
From an economic point of view, this structure is questionable as it removes the 
independence of the regulatory authorities and makes them more vulnerable to political 
interference due to the fact that politicians sit on the board of directors of most supervisory 
authorities. In addition, having several regulatory agencies active in the same market with the 
same mandates for supervision is highly likely to produce overlapping regulation which is 
costly to the regulated industry. Such a structure also assists corruption. 
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On the other hand, several regulators acting in the same field allow for diversity 
which is beneficial for information-flow which is necessary in order to prevent a financial 
crisis.200  
The balance between having too many regulators and having too few is a delicate one. 
However, it is clear that a complicated, bureaucratic structure can impair information-flow 
and put a heavy burden on the industry. This is one of the reasons why, after going through a 
financial crisis, a trend towards consolidation is visible in most countries.201  
In contrast with the other countries reviewed by this chapter, France has yet to show a 
trend towards consolidation. Its financial supervisory system remains fragmented and 
dispersed. Such a trend might be something worth considering.  
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Figure 3: French Financial Supervisory structure202 
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 Figure 3 follows diagram in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p.101. 
    European Union (EU) 
Ministry of the 
Economy Finance and 
Industry (MINEFI) 
Includes: Deposit 
Guarantee Funds 
(FGDS) 
 
General Director 
of the Treasury 
Advisory committee 
on Legislation and 
Financial Regulation 
(CCLRF) 
Bank of France (BDF) 
Bank Commission 
(CB) 
Supervises: 
prudential regulation, 
banking, securities. 
Board of Financial Sector 
Authorities (CACESF) 
Financial 
Markets 
Authority 
(AMF) 
Supervises: 
consumer 
protection and 
market conduct 
in securities and 
investment 
products. 
Committee of Credit 
Institutions and 
Investment firms 
(CECEI). 
Supervises: licensing. 
 
Sanctions 
Committee 
Insurance and 
Mutual Societies 
Supervisory 
Authority 
(ACAM) 
Supervises: 
prudential 
regulation for the 
insurance market. 
Committee on 
Insurance 
Companies (CEA). 
Supervises: 
licensing. 
 
 
Note: arrows indicate a cooperative relationship  
  
66 
 
3.5.2.2 Italy 
 
General data203 
The Italian financial system consists of different institutions and is primarily 
dominated by banks, which are important players in all fields of the market. Since 2007, the 
five major banking groups have been Unicredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Monte dei Paschi, Banco 
Popolare, and UBI, which together hold 52% of the total domestic banking assets. Non-bank 
financial firms play an important role in the market and have increased in number over the 
past few years. However, the consumer credit market is still maintained mainly by banks.204  
The Italian asset management industry is based on a vertical integration between 
distributing financial companies (banks and insurance companies) and asset management 
companies which are owned by banks.  
The Italian insurance sector includes some big European firms such as: Generali and 
Fondiaria SAI. In total, over 170 firms have been licensed to act in the Italian insurance 
market.205  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
The Italian financial supervisory structure is the result of the post-Great Depression 
reshape of the 1930’s, and the reforms of 1980-90 which were driven by European 
integration and financial innovation.  
Until 2012 the structure consisted of four regulatory bodies:  
1. The Bank of Italy, the Italian central bank, whose powers to supervise the financial 
stability and sound management of banks, asset managers, and other financial 
intermediaries are mainly established in the Consolidated Law on Banking206 and the 
Consolidated Law on Finance;207 
2. CONSOB, the securities market regulator, whose powers to ensure securities market 
transparency and orderly functioning as well as investor protection are based on the 
Consolidated Law on Finance cited above; 
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3. ISVAP, the insurance industry regulatory authority, whose powers to supervise the 
financial stability, sound management, and market behavior of insurance firms are set 
out in the Law on Insurance;208 and 
4. COVIP, the pension fund supervisory authority, whose powers to supervise private 
pension funds are set forth in the Law on Private Pension Funds.209  
The supervisory structure is based on a combination of the Functional and 
Institutional Approaches. Coordination between the different supervisory authorities is 
ensured by a mandatory exchange of information, consultation, and cooperation on all 
subjects that fall within the competence of more than one authority.210   
In addition, several Memorandums of Understanding exist between the authorities 
themselves such as a memorandum between the prudential supervisor of banks (the Bank of 
Italy) and the securities regulator (CONSOB) defining their tasks, responsibilities and 
procedures for the exchange of information.  
Another memorandum which targets the prevention, management, and resolution of 
financial crises was signed in 2008 between the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, the 
Bank of Italy, CONSOB and ISVAP. The agencies created the Financial Stability Committee 
(FSC) whose main task is to enable the smooth transfer of information between the 
authorities in order to prevent and mitigate a future financial crisis. Each of the authorities 
established a unit which is tasked with supporting the work of the FSC if and when 
required.211   
As the FSC has only been established recently it has yet to be tested during a crisis. 
Moreover, as it is an initiative of the Italian financial authorities, it has no legal status.212  
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
During 2007 the Italian government brought forward a proposal to change the Italian 
supervisory structure into a Twin Peaks structure, much like the restructuring in the UK. 
According to the proposal the responsibility for supervision and the prevention of systemic 
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risks would be given to the Italian central bank, while the responsibility for consumer 
protection, transparency and market conduct would be managed under CONSOB. The 
proposal further suggested that ISVAP and COVIP would be eliminated. 
The proposal was brought before the Italian parliament but did not pass due to the 
untimely dissolution of the parliament in early 2008. A less ambitious and yet significant 
change to the structure of Italian financial supervision was ultimately brought by the 
Legislative Decree 6 July 2012, no. 95, converted into Legislative Decree No. 135 of 7 
August 2012, which suppressed ISVAP as from 1 January 2013, and replaced it with a new 
Authority named IVASS - Istituto per la Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni, which inherited all its 
powers, functions, and competences (see figure 4).  
What distinguishes this latter Authority from the former one is its dependence on the 
Bank of Italy. Although it is ostensibly autonomous and independent from any other power or 
authority, and exercises its functions under the direction of a Board of Directors appointed by 
the Government, the chairman and legal representative of IVASS is by statute the Managing 
Director of the Bank of Italy. Furthermore, the Executive Committee of the Bank of Italy, to 
this end comprising two members of the Board of Directors, is the one charged with 
supervising and coordinating the activity of IVASS.  
The reasons behind this structural change appear to be not so much related to the 
financial crisis as to the problem of cutting Italian public spending by reducing the number of 
staff employed in market authorities. Nevertheless, the official aim of the restructuring is that 
of integrating the supervision of the insurance industry into the supervision of the banking 
system, on the assumption that insurance companies, like banks, may be important to the 
stability of financial markets, given that they equally pose systemic threats. A closer 
coordination between the oversight of the banking system and that of the insurance market 
was well received by the European Central Bank.213  
  
                                                 
213
 See Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 July 2012  on the reform of supervision of insurance and 
retirement provision (CON/2012/61). 
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Figure 4: Italian Financial Supervisory Structure214 
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 Figure follows figure in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 110. 
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3.5.2.3 Spain 
 
General data215 
The Spanish financial system consists mainly of three kinds of institutions: banks; 
insurance companies and pension funds; and securities market institutions. As of 2008 the 
dominant share of the market belonged to banks which held 70 percent of all assets in the 
market. Insurance companies held 10 percent of the market and the rest was held by other 
financial institutions.216  
The market supports an abundance of credit institutions (over 360) who serve as 
financial intermediaries and retail banks.  The securities market comprises over 6000 firms, 
which includes money market funds, mutual funds, and other securities companies. During 
the period of 1991-2006 the financial market grew from 13 percent of GDP to 44 percent.217  
The insurance companies in the Spanish market are backed by a Public Insurance 
Consortium which is placed under the Ministry of Economy and Finance.218  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
Spain is in the process of transforming its current Functional supervisory model into a 
Twin Peaks model.219 Currently there are three main supervisory authorities active in the 
market: the Bank of Spain (BDE) which supervises banking products;220 the National 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CNMV) which supervises securities market 
products;221 and the General Directorate of Insurance and Pension Funds (DGSFP) which 
supervises insurance and pension products.222  
                                                 
215
 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 116-122.  
216
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 116. 
217
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 116. 
218
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 116. 
219
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 116. 
220 The objectives, functions and powers of the BDE are defined in Law 13/1994 of Autonomy of the Banco de 
España (see the following link: <http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/COM/funciones/ficheros/en/leyautone.pdf> 
accessed 09.11.2013) and in Law 26/1988 of Discipline and Intervention of Credit Institutions (see the 
following link:<http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SJU/normativa/eng/ficheros/en/l2688.pdf.> accessed 09.11.2013).  
221
 The two basic laws that form and set the objectives for the CNMV are: Law 24/1988 of Securities Markets 
(Ley 24/1988 del Mercado de Valores) and Law 35/2003 of Collective Investment Institutions  (Ley de 
Instituciones de Inversión Colectiva). 
222
 The regulation guiding the formation and operation of the DGSFP and the supervision of the Spanish 
insurance market  in general consists of the following pieces of regulation: Law 50/1980 of Private Insurance 
Contract, the Insurance Supervising Law (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Ordenación y Supervisión de los 
Seguros Privados, RDL 6/2004), the Insurance Intermediation Activity Law (Ley de Mediación de Seguros y 
Reaseguros Privados, 26/2006)  and the Pension Funds Law (Texto Refundido de la Ley de Regulación de 
Planes y Fondos de Pensiones,RDL1/2002). 
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In addition to these three national supervisors the Regional Governments 
(Comunidades Autónomas) have limited regulatory power over the financial firms active in 
their jurisdiction.  
While the Bank of Spain and the Securities and Exchange Commission are 
independent regulators, the General Directorate of Insurance and Pension Funds falls under 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEH).223 As part of the MEH, the DGSFP does not 
issue regulation but rather recommendations for regulation which are then issued by the 
MEH.  
The MEH also has a coordinating role, and its involvement in the financial markets is 
meant to ensure consistency of the regulation being issued by all three regulatory authorities. 
Up until recently the MEH was also responsible for issuing bank and insurance licenses 
following a recommendation from the BDE or the CNMV.224 Last, decisions taken by the 
BDE and the CNMV can be appealed before the MEH.  
Coordination between the financial supervisory authorities in the Spanish market is 
achieved through a series of MoU’s which include provisions for the sharing of confidential 
supervisory information. Cooperation is increased through cross-membership of the boards of 
the BDE and the CNMV.225  
Coordination and cooperation with regards to systemic risk is also achieved by a 
selection of senior officials from the supervisory authorities who compose the Committee for 
Financial Stability (CESFI), which was formed in 2006.226 
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
As was already mentioned, Spain is in the process of transforming its financial system 
into a Twin Peaks one.227 The last financial crisis exposed the shortcomings of the existing 
Spanish financial regulatory system and, following this crisis, several steps have been made 
in order to strengthen the BDE and provide it with greater supervisory powers.228  
                                                 
223
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 118. 
224
 Lately the power to issue a banking license was transmitted to the BDE (International Monetary Fund 
Country Report, ‘Spain: Financial Sector Reform: Second Progress Report’, No. 13/54 (2013), p. 4).  
225
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 120. 
226
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 120-121. 
227
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 116. 
228
 International Monetary Fund Country Report, see.supra n.224, p. 24. 
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The power to issue banking licenses was transmitted to the BDE as part of the 
reform,229 however the MEH remained the forum of appeal against sanctions issued by the 
BDE.230  
 
 
Figure 5: Spanish Financial Supervisory Structure231 
 
 
  
                                                 
229
 International Monetary Fund Country Report, see.supra n.224, p. 4. 
230
 International Monetary Fund Country Report, ‘Spain: Financial Sector Reform: First Progress Report’, No. 
12/318 (2012), p. 29.  
231
 Figure follows figure in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 120. 
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3.5.3 The Consolidated/Integrated Approach 
3.5.3.1 Canada 
 
General data232 
As of 2007 the Canadian banking sector consisted of approximately 70 banks, 
including local banks, international banking groups, and representative counters. The market 
is valued at approximately 2.5 trillion Canadian Dollars in assets.233  
The Canadian banking industry represents about 3% of Canada’s GDP and employs 
approximately 1.5% of all employees in the Canadian market. The main share of the banking 
sector is split between six banks: The Royal Bank of Canada, the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, the TD Bank Financial Group, the Bank of Nova Scotia, the National Bank of 
Canada, and the Bank of Montreal.234  
In 2007 the Canadian mutual funds sector amounted to 700 billion Canadian Dollars 
in managed assets, and its insurance sector, consisting of over 195 insurance companies, to 
413 billion Canadian Dollars in administered assets.235  
The Canadian securities market is dominated by bank-owned securities firms which 
are held by the six big Canadian banks and which together account for over 70% of the 
revenues in the Canadian securities market.  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
The structure of the Canadian financial supervisory authorities is a combination of the 
Functional and the Consolidated/Integrated approaches, and is the result of reforms made in 
the 1980’s.236 The Consolidated/Integrated approach is apparent at the federal level; the 
Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee is the main supervisory body responsible for 
supervising financial institutions. However at the provincial level, the financial supervisory 
system does have some aspects of the functional approach. For example, securities products, 
investment advisors, and dealers are all supervised under the provincial securities regulators, 
                                                 
232
 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 126-134.  
233
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 126.  
234
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 126. 
235
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 126. 
236
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 126. 
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whereas only some aspects of insurance products are under the supervision of the provincial 
regulator.237  
As Canada is a federal state, there is a difference between federal supervision and the 
supervision provided by each province and territory. Bank supervision is performed entirely 
at a federal level while securities supervision is left in the hands of the 13 provinces and 
territories.238   
Collaboration on matters pertaining to securities is achieved through a supervisory 
body, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), whose goal is to create a harmonized 
set of rules and regulations while maintaining flexibility in each province or territory.239  
The legal framework that governs financial supervision in Canada includes the 
following laws:240 The Bank Act (1871)241 which was reformed in 2007 is the main statute 
for regulating banks; the Insurance Companies Act (1991)242 regulates insurance companies 
to insure consumer protection; the Trusts and Loans Act (1991)243 which outlines the 
guidelines for trusts and loans; the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act (1967)244 
which aims to protect consumers and promote stability; the Cooperative Credit Association 
Act (1970)245 governing financial cooperative credit associations; the Canadian Payments Act 
(1980)246 which was updated in 2001 and which establishes and defines all matters regarding 
the clearing and settlement of financial transactions; The Financial Consumer Agency of 
Canada Act (2001)247 forms an agency (FCAC) which is entrusted with protecting consumers 
in the financial markets; and The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act 
(OSFI) (1987)248 which created a single authority responsible for all federally charted 
financial institutions. 
The Canadian authorities are coordinated through the Financial Institution 
Supervisory Committee which acts as a college of regulators and enables regulators to 
exchange information especially with regards to systemic risks and stability concerns of the 
financial firms which are active in the Canadian markets.  
                                                 
237
 J.K. Jackson, ‘Financial Market Supervision: Canada’s Perspective’, (2013) CRS Report for Congress, pp. 
12-16.  
238
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 126. 
239
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 127. 
240
 Data about relevant Canadian legislation taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 126 – 134.  
241
 Bank Act 1871 (S.C. 1991, c. 46) 
242
 Insurance Companies Act ( S.C. 1991, c. 47). 
243
 Trust and Loan Companies Act (S.C. 1991, c. 45). 
244
 Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-3). 
245
 Cooperative Credit Associations Act (S.C. 1991, c. 48). 
246
 Canadian Payments Act (R.S.C. , 1985, c. C-21). 
247 Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act (S.C. 2001, c. 9). 
248
 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act (R.S.C. , 1985, c. 18 (3rd Supp.)). 
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A second coordination committee is the Senior Advisory Committee which deals with 
issues relating to the Canadian market as a whole.  
The last coordination forum is the Joint Forum of Financial Market Regulators which 
was founded in 1990 and enables insurance, securities, and pension regulators to cooperate in 
order to harmonize their regulation.  
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
The calls for a single securities regulatory authority have long existed in Canada,249 
but have been accelerated by the 2007 financial crisis.  
In 2009 an expert panel on Canadian securities regulation was formed in order to 
issue recommendations. One of the panel’s major recommendations was to form one Federal 
securities regulatory authority: 
“The structure would consolidate all policymaking and rulemaking activities for 
Canada into the Canadian Securities Commission. This would provide for more 
cohesive and responsive securities regulation… Regulated entities… would only be 
subject to a single fee and comply with a single set of rules and regulations. This 
would reduce compliance burden and allow resources to be put to more productive 
uses. The enforcement of securities law would no longer be fragmented across 13 
different jurisdictions… This would facilitate the better use of enforcement resources 
and concentrate expertise. It would provide for uniform enforcement priorities and 
investor protection across Canada. Enforcement would be improved by advancing a 
more principles-based approach and building on the risk-based approach currently 
employed in Canada.” (p.47)250 
In 2010 the Canadian federal government made an attempt at changing the law in 
order to form a unified securities regulatory authority which was supposed to be established 
under the Securities Act.  
However, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that the Canadian government did not 
have the power to issue a unified securities act pertaining to all provinces and jurisdictions, as 
                                                 
249
 See for example: The Wise Person Report Committee, ‘It’s Time: Committee to Review the Structure of 
Securities Regulation in Canada’ (2003).  
250
 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation Report, (2009), p. 47.  
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these issues pertain to property and civil rights, which fall under the provinces’ authority. The 
suggested law has been scrapped.251 
 
 
Figure 6: The Canadian Financial Supervisory structure252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
251
 Supreme Court of Canada: In matter of a reference by the Governor in Council concerning the proposed 
Canadian Securities Act, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 2010-667, dated May 26, 2010, Reference 
re Securities Act 2011 SCC 66, File No.: 33718. 2011:  April 13, 14; 2011:  December 22. 
252
 Figure 6 follows diagram in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 132. 
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3.5.3.2 Germany  
 
General data253 
The German financial market consists of over 2000 banks, around 720 financial 
services institutions, approximately 650 insurance companies and pension funds, around 80 
investment companies, and about 6000 investment funds.254  
The supervised banks are categorized according to one of the following groups: 
lending banks; saving banks; cooperative banks; and special purpose banks such as mortgage 
banks, securities banks etc. The German banking system is the least concentrated of all 
European banking systems.255  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
In 2002 Germany moved away from the Institutional Approach and now follows more 
or less the Consolidated/Integrated Approach to financial supervision. The entire German 
financial market is supervised by a sole regulator, the BaFin.  
The exception is the banking system which is supervised both by the BaFin and by the 
Bundesbank, and in this sense banking supervision in Germany resembles the Twin Peaks 
Approach to supervision.256  
In Germany, banking supervision is regulated according to The Banking Act257 which 
authorizes the bank supervisors (the BaFin and the Bundesbank) to set the regulatory 
framework for banks without intervening directly in their transactions.  
The BaFin is composed of different departments supervising banks, insurance, and 
securities. These departments coordinate with one another through cross-sectoral departments 
that are separated organizationally from the supervisory departments.  
The legal framework for the work of the German financial regulator consists mainly 
of: The Banking Act,258 which is the main piece of legislation with regards to bank 
                                                 
253
 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 138-144.  
254
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 138. 
255
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 138. 
256
 Information taken from the official website of the Bundesbank : 
<http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Core_business_areas/Banking_supervision/banking
_supervision.html> accessed 23.05.2013.  
257
 The Banking Act, Gesetz über das Kreditwesen – Kreditwesengesetz – KWG, Kreditwesengesetz in der 
Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 9. September 1998 (BGBl. I S. 2776), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des 
Gesetzes vom 7. Mai 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1162) geändert worden ist. 
258
 Supra n.  257.   
  
78 
 
supervision and oversight; the Mortgage Bonds Act;259 the Securities Deposit Act;260 the 
Building and Loan Associations Act;261 and the Savings Banks Acts of the Federal States.262  
Securities are regulated through: the Securities Trading Act;263 the Securities 
Acquisition and Takeover Act;264 the Securities Prospectus Act;265 the Third Financial 
Market Promotion Act of 1998;266  and the Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act of 
2002.267  
The central bank (The Deutsche Bundesbank) cooperates with BaFin in all matters 
regarding supervision of banks as required by section 7 of the German Banking Act.268  
In 2008 BaFin and the German Central Bank signed an agreement of understanding 
which clearly defines each of their roles with regards to the supervision of banks in Germany. 
The agreement provides the central bank with day-to-day monitoring and supervisory powers 
over banks, leaving other issues - such as solving problems which can put the safety of the 
assets held by banks at risk, harm the normal conduct of the banking business, or adversely 
affect the German economy as a whole - in the hands of BaFin.269  
                                                 
259
 The Mortgage Bond Act, Pfandbriefgesetz (PfandBG, Pfandbriefgesetz vom 22. Mai 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1373), 
das zuletzt durch Artikel 10 Absatz 3 des Gesetzes vom 13. Februar 2013 (BGBl. I S. 174) geändert worden ist).  
260
 The Securities Deposit Act, Gesetz über die Verwahrung und Anschaffung von Wertpapieren (Depotgesetz - 
DepotG) Depotgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 11. Januar 1995 (BGBl. I S. 34), das zuletzt 
durch Artikel 5 des Gesetzes vom 31. Juli 2009 (BGBl. I S. 2512) geändert worden ist. 
261 The Building and Loan Associations Act, Gesetz über Bausparkassen – BauSparkG, Gesetz über 
Bausparkassen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 15. Februar 1991 (BGBl. I S. 454), das zuletzt durch 
Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 29. Juli 2008 (BGBl. I S. 1509) geändert worden ist. 
262
 The Savings Banks Acts of the Federal States (Sparkassengesetz – SpkG): this is not one law, but 15. Each 
Land, except Hamburg, has its own because the local savings bank is actually a publicly traded company (AG), 
usually called Sparkassengesetz (SpG or SpkG). 
263
 The Securities Trading Act, Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel/ Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG,  
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 9. September 1998 (BGBl. I S. 2708), das 
zuletzt durch Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 7. Mai 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1162) geändert worden ist. 
264
 The Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz (WpÜG),  
"Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz vom 20. Dezember 2001 (BGBl. I S. 3822), das zuletzt durch 
Artikel 2c des Gesetzes vom 28. November 2012 (BGBl. I S. 2369) geändert worden ist".  
265
 The Securities Prospectus Act, Gesetz über die Erstellung, Billigung und Veröffentlichung des Prospekts, der 
beim öffentlichen Angebot von Wertpapieren oder bei der Zulassung von Wertpapieren zum Handel an einem 
organisierten Markt zu veröffentlichen ist (Wertpapierprospektgesetz - WpPG), "Wertpapierprospektgesetz vom 
22. Juni 2005 (BGBl. I S. 1698), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 26. Juni 2012 (BGBl. I S. 1375) 
geändert worden ist" Implements 2003/71/EC.  
266
 The Third Financial Market Promotion Act of 1998, 3. FFG, Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, Gesetz 
zur weiteren Fortentwicklung des Finanzplates Deutschland.  
267
 The Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act of 2002, Gesetzzur weiteren Fortentwicklung des Finanzplatzes 
Deutschland (Viertes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, 4. FFG). 
268
 Supra n. 257, section 7.   
269
 The official website of the Bundesbank: 
<http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Core_business_areas/Banking_supervision/banking
_supervision.html> accessed 23.05.2013. 
  
79 
 
The BaFin, the Deutsche Bundesbank, and the Federal Ministry of Finance hold 
regular meetings through a forum for Financial Markets Supervision aimed at coordinating 
their supervisory and regulatory approaches and exchanging information.270  
In addition Germany has formed the Domestic Standing Group for Financial Market 
Stability, which developed a framework for crisis management which has not been 
published.271  
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
The German financial system is more conservative than the USA or the UK, and so 
was less exposed to the toxic assets which were at the base of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
Even so, Germany’s economy has been severely affected by the financial crisis of 2007. 
However, the German market has improved in the last two years and Germany made a 
complete recovery.272  
Given the drastic shock to the German economy following the crisis, there has been 
severe criticism of the BaFin for not foreseeing and preventing the crisis in Germany. In 2010 
it was resolved that the German central bank, the Bundesbank, would be responsible for 
macro prudential supervision, i.e. it would mitigate systemic risk, while BaFin preserved its 
micro-prudential supervisory powers, i.e. it retained responsibility for the well-being of 
individual financial institutions. Germany has agreed that further clarity is needed with 
regards to the cooperation between the BaFin, the Bundesbank, and the European 
Supervisory Authorities, and with regards to the distinction between micro and macro 
prudential supervision.273 
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 Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 143-144. 
271
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 144. 
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 International Monetary Fund, “Germany - Staff Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation”, June 2011.  
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 International Monetary Fund, supra n. 272.  
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Figure 7: The German Financial Supervisory structure274 
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 Figure 7 (with relevant adjustments) follows diagram in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 143. 
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3.5.3.3 Switzerland  
 
General data275 
The financial market is one of the largest markets in the Swiss economy; banks, 
insurance companies, investment firms, and other financial mediators contribute 
approximately 12% of the Swiss GDP. These financial bodies employ about 6% of the 
country’s employees and account for around 10% of the tax revenues paid to the state.276  
The market is dominated by two large banks - UBS AG and Credit Swiss Group, 
which together compose about one third of the financial market. In fact these two banking 
groups are such important players in the Swiss economy that the financial regulatory 
authority, FINMA, dedicated a unit solely to supervise them. In addition to these two large 
banks, a few dozens of small canton banks, held partly by the government, are active in the 
market.277 Generally speaking the Swiss banks are universal banks which provide services in 
the fields of banking, insurance and securities.    
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
Up until 2009, Switzerland followed the Functional Approach to financial 
supervision. In 2009 the country adopted the Consolidated/Integrated Approach and formed 
the Federal Financial Markets Supervisory Authority (FINMA) as a sole supervisory 
authority.278 The formation of FINMA meant consolidating the Swiss Federal Banking 
Commission (SFBC), the Federal Office of Private Insurance (FOPI), and the Anti-Money 
Laundering Control Authority into one authority. The consolidation was done according to 
the Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority279 which established 
FINMA as a single federal financial regulator.  
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 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 170-173.  
276
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 170. 
277
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 170. 
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 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 170. 
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 Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Financial Market Supervision Act, 
FINMASA) of 22 June 2007 (Status as of 1 January 2009).  
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Figure 8: The Swiss Financial Supervisory structure280 
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 Figure 8 follows the diagram on the FINMA web site: <http://www.finma.ch/e/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 
05.10.2012. 
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3.5.3.4 Japan  
 
General data281 
Japan’s financial market consists of over 600 financial institutions which are insured 
by deposit insurance. Over 140 of these institutions are banks. Four main banks282 hold 
together around 35% of the total assets held by banks. Non-bank financial institutions are 
abundant, some of which also lend money to the public.283 Securities companies in Japan 
operate mainly as dealers and less as investment bankers. The insurance market consists of 
over 40 life insurance companies and over 20 property and casualty insurance companies.  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
Japan’s financial supervisory system is a Consolidated/Integrated one. Following the 
deflation of the economic boom during the late 1980’s and the stagflation which followed it 
during the 1990’s, Japan undertook the Financial System Reform in the late 1990’s.284 The 
reform shifted the regulatory approach from ex ante regulation which limited the entry into 
the financial market to ex post regulation – barriers to entry were lifted and transparency 
demands were strengthened. In addition investor protection rules were put in place.  
Until the late 1990’s, inspection, supervision, and financial planning were all in the 
hands of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).285 The Financial System Reform resulted in the 
formation of the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA1) in 1998, which was given the role of 
inspection and supervision of banks. The Bank of Japan, which is Japan’s central bank, 
retained some of its banking supervisory functions via private contracts it had with 
institutions which maintained deposits with the bank.286 Even though the Bank of Japan does 
have a few banking supervisory functions, the system is considered to be a consolidated one 
and the FSA1 has the lead with regards to all supervisory matters of the financial market in 
Japan.  
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 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 146-152.  
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 Mizuho Bank, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and Bank of Tokyo – 
Mitsubishi UFJ.  
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 K. Ueda, ‘The Structure of Japan’s Financial Regulation and Supervision and the Role Played by the Bank of 
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The Financial Crisis Management Board is responsible for coordination between the 
government, the FSA1, and the Bank of Japan and is headed by the Prime Minister of Japan. 
The Prime Minister of Japan is responsible for convening the meetings of the Financial Crisis 
Management Board whenever a financial body is facing a solvency risk or liquidity issues.  
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Figure 9: The Japanese Financial Supervisory structure287 
 
  
                                                 
287
 Figure 9 follows the diagram on the FSA1 web site: < http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/about/about01_menu.html> 
accessed 02.11.2013 and figure in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 150. 
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3.5.3.5 The Republic of Korea 
 
General data288 
By the end of 2011 the Korean banking market consisted of 7 nationwide banks, 6 
regional ones and over 30 foreign banks. Bank assets amounted to KRW1,969.3 trillion in 
2011, an increase of 6.9% compared with the previous year.289 The number of mutual saving 
banks amounted to 93, even though their asset share fell by 30% due to the slump in the real 
estate market.290 There were 62 securities companies active in the market by the end of 2011 
and over 80 registered asset-management firms.291 The number of insurance companies in the 
market reached 53 and their asset management grew to KRW566.0 trillion, an increase of 
11.5% compared with the previous year.292  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
In 1999 Korea changed from the Institutional Approach to financial regulation it had 
been following to the Consolidated/Integrated Approach. The Act on the Establishment of 
Financial Supervisory Organizations brought together all supervisory authorities previously 
active on the Korean market to form the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).293 The FSS is 
responsible for regulating the Korean financial market and for examining the financial firms 
active on the market.294  
The FSS is guided by the Financial Supervisory Committee (FSC) which consists of 
nine commissioners. The FSS itself is headed by a Governor and consists of up to four Senior 
Deputy Governors, nine Deputy Governors, and a Chief Executive Auditor.295 The budget for 
the supervisory activities of the FSS comes mainly from fees levied on the supervised 
financial institutions and market participants.296  
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 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Financial Supervisory Service, ‘Financial Supervisory 
Service’, 2012.   
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 Financial Supervisory Service, supra n.288, p. 5. 
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 Financial Supervisory Service, supra n.288, pp. 6-7. 
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 Financial Supervisory Service, supra n.288, pp. 8-9. 
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 The official website of the Financial Supervisory Service: < http://english.fss.or.kr/fss/en/eabu/int/est.jsp> 
accessed 23.11.2013.  
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 Financial Supervisory Service, supra n.288, p. 24. 
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 Financial Supervisory Service, supra n.288, p. 25. 
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What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
In light of the last financial crisis, Korea took a few measures to increase global 
cooperation, On March 2009 Korea joined the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as a 
new member, and on October 2009 Korea became a member of the Financial Action Task 
Force, the international body for combating money laundering. In addition a few reforms to 
increase prudential supervision and consumer protection were introduced to the market.297  
Figure 10: The Korean Financial Supervisory structure298   
                                                 
297
 The official website of the Financial Supervisory Service: 
<http://english.fss.or.kr/fss/en/eabu/his/history_5.jsp> accessed 23.11.2013. 
298
 Figure 10 with relevant changes follows diagram on the official website of the Financial Supervisory Service: 
<http://english.fss.or.kr/fss/en/eabu/int/org.jsp> accessed 23.11.2013. 
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3.5.4 The Twin Peaks Approach  
 
3.5.4.1 The UK 
 
General data299 
The British financial sector comprises over 25,000 different financial firms, most of 
them licensed by the Financial Services Authority (the FSA), though others are licensed by 
different European supervisory authorities within Europe.  
During 2006 the British financial market accounted for about 10% of the country’s 
GDP, with 3.5 Trillion pounds worth of managed assets in 2005.  
According to the Report, as of 2008, the British financial market was responsible for 
34% of the global foreign exchange turnover, and around 43% of the global Over the Counter 
transactions turnover.300  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
During the 1990’s, the nature of financial conglomerates which grew beyond their 
traditional borders as banks, insurance companies, etc., motivated the UK to consolidate its 
fragmented financial supervisory structure and adopt the Consolidated/Integrated Approach 
to financial supervision. The move away from the Institutional Approach began in October 
1997 and ended in 2001, after the formation of the Financial Services Authority under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).301  
After the formation of the FSA the Bank of England (the BoE) maintained both its 
role as a lender of last resort, and its responsibility for financial stability through oversight 
powers over payment systems and market liquidity.  
The FSA was constructed from three supervisory departments (see figure 11) and had  
four objectives: maintaining investors trust in the financial markets; promoting public 
awareness about financial issues; protecting consumers; and combating money laundering 
and other financial crimes.  
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
                                                 
299
 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 176-182.  
300
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 176. 
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 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), (c.8).  
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After the 2008 financial crisis the UK decided to completely change its financial 
regulatory architecture, and has now transferred from the Consolidated/Integrated model to 
the Twin Peaks model. The reform was completed in 2013 (see figure 12).  
Under the new model the UK’s financial supervisory structure consists of the 
following:302  
- Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) – This institution is a subsidiary of the Bank 
of England and is supposed to replace it in its role of protecting financial stability. 
The PRA is responsible for maintaining stability in the market while allowing for 
“unhealthy” firms to leave the market.  
- Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) – This institution supervises all firms and/or 
activities which are not supervised by the PRA, such as cross-sector products. In 
addition, the FCA is charged with consumer protection, competition enhancement, 
and fair trade. The FCA’s strategic goal is to strengthen investors’ confidence in the 
financial markets.  
- Financial Policy Committee (FPC) – This institution is placed within the Bank of 
England and is in charge of the tasks of macro-supervision and systemic stability, 
focusing on risks that arise from the financial markets as a whole, as opposed to risks 
that arise from specific firms. The Financial Policy Committee advises the Financial 
Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulatory Authority on regulatory issues 
dealing with systemic stability.  
  
                                                 
302
 International Monetary Fund Country Report, ’United Kingdom: The Future of Regulation and Supervision 
Technical Note’, (2011).  
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Figure 11: The pre-2013 UK Financial Supervisory structure303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: The current UK Financial Supervisory structure304 
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 Figure 11 (with relevant adjustments) follows diagram in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 179. 
304
 Figure 12 (with relevant adjustments) follows diagram in: HM Treasury, ‘A new approach to financial 
regulation: the blueprint for reform’, (2011), p. 8.  
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3.5.4.2 Australia  
 
General data305 
In 2007 the Australian financial sector composed 7.3% of the country’s GDP.306 
Australian banking services are provided by Authorized Deposit-Taking Institutions (ADI) 
which include, apart from banks, building societies and credit unions. The Australian banking 
sector comprises over 50 national and international banks and, is primarily dominated by four 
banks: The Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited; Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia; the National Australia Bank Limited; and Westpac Banking Corporation, which 
control 67% of the Australian banking sector between them. Foreign banks control 11% of 
domestic credit. The remaining part of the ADI market is dominated by building societies and 
credit unions.307 
The Australian insurance market is composed of approximately 90 billion AUD in 
assets.308  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
Following a number of reforms which took place in the late 1990’s, Australia now 
follows the Twin Peaks Approach to supervision, dividing the supervisory tasks between two 
authorities: the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), responsible for stability and 
prevention of systemic risk; and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC), responsible for market conduct (see Figure 13).  
The Reserve Bank of Australia is responsible for monetary policy, stability issues, and 
payment systems.309  
The authorities coordinate their activities through the Council of Financial Regulators 
which is chaired by the Reserve Bank of Australia. This board comprises delegates from the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), and the Australian Treasury, and 
provides a forum to discuss policy issues and trends in the financial markets.  
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 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 188-196.  
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 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 188. 
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 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 188. 
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 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 188. 
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 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 189. 
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The Council is an informal forum which facilitates the exchange of ideas and 
information, provides the ability to divide labor where authorities overlap and, in the event of 
a financial crisis, facilitates coordination aimed at stopping the crisis.310  
The authorities also coordinate through a series of Memoranda of Understanding 
which clearly divides the responsibilities among them in case of overlapping authority.311  
The authorities’ powers are anchored in the following statutes: the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998;312 the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001;313 the Reserve Bank Act 1959;314 the Banking Act 1959;315 and the 
Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001.316 
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
Australia did not make structural changes to its supervisory structure, but rather 
focused on strengthening the coordination between the authorities and strengthening the 
stability of the financial market.  
As part of the efforts to increase cooperation and coordination between the 
authorities, the Council of Financial Regulators released a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Financial Distress Management in September 2008, further detailing the allocation of 
responsibilities for detecting and solving financial distress in the Australian financial 
market.317  
  
                                                 
310
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 194. 
311 The Memorandum of Understanding between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 12 Oct. 1998, The Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Securities and 
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18 Sep. 2008.  
  
93 
 
Figure 13: The Australian Financial Supervisory structure318 
  
                                                 
318
 Figure 13 (with relevant adjustments) follows diagram in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 193. 
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3.5.4.3 The Netherlands  
 
General data319 
The Dutch financial market consists of approximately 1,800 licensed financial firms 
which hold around 5 trillion Euro worth of assets. In recent decades the Dutch market has 
undergone a consolidation process, shrinking the number of firms operating in the market.  
The market is currently dominated by a few large banking groups which provide a 
range of financial products from banking to insurance. The Dutch pension market went 
through a similar process where the small firms were taken over by a few large ones.320  
The structure of the supervisory authorities 
The Netherland is currently following the Twin Peaks Approach to financial 
supervision, having two main supervisory authorities (see Figure 14):  
1. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) – the Dutch central bank performs a dual role; it is a 
member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as a central bank, and it is 
also an independent supervisory authority responsible for prudential supervision. The 
Financial Stability Division is part of the DNB and is responsible for assessing 
financial regulation which aims at promoting stability in the market. Among its roles, 
the division checks the degree to which the financial system can absorb a shock. This 
involves checking for risks, vulnerabilities and secondary risks.321  
2. The Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets (AFM) – this authority is 
responsible for market conduct and for enforcement of the requirements for provision 
of information by firms active in the financial market.  
The goals of this authority include orderly and transparent market conduct, increasing 
investors’ confidence, and protecting consumers. These goals translate into the 
following: promoting market access; ensuring fair, efficient and orderly operation of 
the financial market; and promoting confidence in the market. This authority is a 
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 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 198-202.  
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 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 198. 
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subsidiary of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance authorizes its budget 
and appoints its directors.322  
The statutory framework 
 The 1948 Banking Act323 defines the objectives of the DNB. Banking supervision is 
regulated in the Act on the Supervision of the Credit System of 1952.324 The Act on Financial 
Supervision (WFT),325 enacted in January 2007, helped complete the reform which 
transformed the Dutch financial supervisory structure from the institutional structure into the 
twin peaks structure.  
In addition to the WFT there are several statutes which still relate to specific segments 
of the financial system; the Pension Act (PW)326 and the Obligatory Occupational Pension 
Schemes Act327 regulate the Dutch pension market. The Act on the Supervision of Trust 
Offices 328 and the Money Transaction Offices Act329 provide the DNB with the ability to 
supervise the integrity of Trust offices and Money Transaction Offices.  
The AMF supervises audit firms and traded firms through the Audit Firms 
Supervision Act330 and the Act on the Supervision of Financial Reporting.331 Money 
laundering is combated through the Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and 
Financing of Terrorism of 2008. 332 
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
The Dutch financial market, like most financial markets in the west, suffered heavily 
from the 2008 crisis.333 The IMF country report of 2010 found that the regulators in the 
Netherlands were taking the right steps to help the market recover by acting to increase 
prudential supervision in the market. The DNB was criticized for not using its powers to 
perform strong prudential supervision.  
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Following the IMF’s initial findings, the DNB issued two reports - “DNB Supervisory 
Strategy 2010-2014” and “From Analysis to Action” - which indicate a change in culture 
towards more proactive prudential supervision.334 
 Currently there are no predictable changes to the Dutch financial supervisory 
structure.  
 
Figure 14: The Dutch Financial Supervisory structure335 
  
                                                 
334
 International Monetary Fund Country Report, supra n. 333.  
335
 Figure 14 (with relevant adjustments) follows diagram in Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 201. 
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3.5.5 The special cases of the USA and the EU 
 
3.5.5.1 United States of America 
 
General data336 
The USA financial market contributed 8% of the country’s GDP in 2008, and is one 
of the largest financial markets in the world. The market contains over 31,000 regulated 
bodies which provide a wide range of financial services in the fields of banking, insurance, 
securities, and investment management. Around 9,000 of these regulated entities are banks 
and around 7,600 of them are insurance companies.337  
The structure of the supervisory authorities338 
The structure of financial supervision in the USA is the greatest exception to the 
models of financial supervision presented at the beginning of this chapter. So much so that it 
is hard to place the USA in any structure in particular. The structure is complex due to the 
federal system, the regulatory changes that occurred as a result of past financial crises 
(especially the most recent crisis), and the attempt to adapt the regulatory structure to modern 
times.339 The USA financial supervisory structure can best be described as a mixture between 
the Functional Approach and the Consolidated/Integrated Approach (see Figure 15).  
The complexity in the US financial supervision is also a consequence of the different 
regulatory approaches taken with regards to different subsectors within the financial market 
itself. For example, banks and securities are supervised on the state as well as on the federal 
level. Insurance, however, was supervised only on the national level prior to the 2010 Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.340 Another example would be the 
choice of chartering; banks have a choice of whether to charter themselves on a state or 
federal level.  
Moreover, the regulatory structure varies from state to state, and often the same state 
contains several regulatory authorities with overlapping responsibilities. Such overlapping 
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 Factual data in this section is based on data taken from Group of 30, supra n. 133, pp. 208-225.  
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responsibilities also exist at the federal level. On the other side of the spectrum, some 
financial institutions are not supervised at all.341  
Another complication in the American financial supervisory structure results from the 
existence of private regulatory bodies which set industry standards. These bodies, consisting 
of representatives from the financial industry itself, set standards that are regarded as self-
regulation. Such standards include: ISDA standards which set the standards for SWAP and 
derivative transactions; and FASB which sets accounting standards, etc.342 This adds to the 
complication of the system, as parts of the market are supervised by state or federal 
regulators, while other parts are self-supervised by the industry itself. Thus, regulation might 
become incoherent.  
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
Following the 2007-2009 crisis, the July 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the Act)343 was enacted. The Act aims at strengthening supervision 
over all financial institutions active in the American market. One of its main goals is to 
extend supervision to institutions which were not supervised prior to the crisis. Other goals 
include: protecting consumers and investors; reforming the institutional framework of the 
financial supervisors; and strengthening prudential supervision over financial institutions.  
The Act was signed by the President of the USA on 21 July 2010 but the implementing 
measures which result from the Act are still being carried out in the American financial 
market. 
The Act contains 243 pieces of regulation which highly affect the work of the 
supervisory authorities in the USA. Among other things, the Act formed the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) which has the authority to advise the financial regulators 
on both the state and federal levels. FSOC also has the power to review all firms active in the 
US market, no matter what their business may be, which could have systemic effects on the 
financial system.  
The main changes to the USA’s financial supervisory structures, after the last 
financial crisis and the enactment of the Act, are as follows:344    
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- The formation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as part of the 
efforts to strengthen prudential supervision; 
- As part of an effort to address the problems which arise when a firm is “Too Big to 
Fail”, the Act formed the new Orderly Liquidation Authority, an authority which is 
meant to provide a framework for orderly liquidation in order to protect consumers 
and investors and to minimize the chances of a bailout. The authority, together with 
the Fed, decides when a company is financially distressed. Following these 
recommendations, a receiver is appointed by the Treasury.  
- Reforming the Federal Reserve and giving it more supervisory powers than before. 
For example, under title number III “Enhancing Financial Institution Safety and 
Soundness Act of 2010”, the Fed is given supervisory powers over certain holding 
companies which were previously under the supervision of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (which was abolished by the Act).  
- Bank prudential regulation – also referred to as the “Volcker” rules – preventing 
banks from dealing in business transactions and financial instruments which are 
considered too risky for banks such as proprietary trading, investing in hedge funds, 
and private equity management. The Act also imposes concentration limits on bank 
mergers and acquisitions.  
- General prudential regulation – enhanced capital requirements and risk-based 
standards for non-bank institutions which are considered systemically important.  
- Initiating supervision for hedge funds, credit rating companies, and other financial 
firms which were left unsupervised prior to the Act;  
- Providing comprehensive regulatory measures for: derivatives; swaps, including 
credit default swaps and foreign exchange, securities-based swaps; and mixed swaps; 
- Cancellation of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), as part of the attempt to 
reduce overlapping supervisory powers;  
- The formation of the Federal Insurance Office, which is formed inside the Ministry of 
Finance and reports to the government;  
  
100 
 
- The formation of the new consumer protection agency, the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection within the Fed, which supervises market participants offering or 
providing consumers with financial products and/or services; and 
- New consumer protection rules especially in the area of mortgages. 
While some of these steps are necessary in order to improve regulatory measures in 
the US financial markets, and are the reaction to the lack of regulation found in specific parts 
of those markets before the crisis (such as shadow banking etc.), the formation of more 
regulatory bodies whose areas of authority overlap with existing ones, may prove to be 
counterproductive to the market for reasons described in Chapter 4 of this research.  
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Figure 15: The USA’s new Financial Supervisory structure345 
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 Figure 15 (with relevant adjustments) follows diagram in Deutsche Bank Research, supra n. 344, p. 4. 
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3.5.5.2 The European Union 
 
General data 
The EU currently contains 27 member states, and its total GDP now exceeds that of 
the USA, amounting to approximately 12,270,000,000,000 Euro in 2010.346 The EU contains 
7% of the world’s population and is responsible for 20% of global trade. The unemployment 
rate in the EU has increased since the 2007-2009 financial crisis and is now fixed on 7.5%.347  
The crisis management mechanisms in the EU 
Following the introduction of the Euro in 1999, the EU’s policy makers have realized 
that crisis-management mechanisms are essential for the functioning of the European market. 
As the local financial markets of the EU member states became more and more 
interconnected, it became obvious that adverse effects can easily spread between these 
different local markets. Thus coordination and financial crisis management mechanisms 
became essential, and were put in place at an EU level. They include: 348  
• As part of the EU’s Financial Service Action Plan two directives were adopted: the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), which assigns coordinating powers to 
national authorities supervising banking groups on a consolidated basis, and 
strengthens information-sharing procedures between different national bank 
supervisors; and the Financial Conglomerate Directive (FCD) which mandates the 
flow of information between different regulators regulating conglomerates.  
• Four memorandums of understandings were adopted. The first one from 2001, relates 
to the transmission of information in cases of liquidity or solvency problems of banks. 
The second, from 2003, sets rules and procedures for information transmission 
between EU banking supervisors and central banks in order to ensure early detection 
of financial crisis. The third from 2005, was adopted by EU banking supervisors, 
central banks, and finance ministries, and deals with cooperation and information-
sharing once a crisis has already occurred. The last, adopted on June 2008, extends 
                                                 
346
 Data taken from the official European Union web site: < http://europa.eu/index_en.htm> accessed 
05.02.2011. 
347
 Data taken from the official European Union web site: < http://europa.eu/index_en.htm> accessed 
05.02.2011.  
348
 Group of 30, supra n. 133, p. 230. 
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the memorandum from 2005 and deals with cross-border and cross-sector 
coordination.  
• The European Central Bank (ECB) has a formal role in crisis management. Its role 
was defined in the Treaty of Rome, and includes contributing to financial stability, 
ensuring the smooth functioning of payment systems, and conducting monetary policy 
operations.349  
• Representatives of the member countries’ national central banks sit on the board of 
the European Central Bank. National central banks maintain their role and 
responsibilities as lenders of last resort.  
• Several EU committees interlink the various financial supervisors in different member 
states.  
What has changed since the last financial crisis? 
Prior to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, financial regulation in the EU was based on 
the assumption that making financial institutions safe at the micro-prudential supervisory 
level would ensure that the system as a whole was safe. Thus the emphasis was put on micro-
prudential supervision while macro-prudential supervision regarding systemic risks was by 
and large neglected.   
After the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the issue of systemic stability received priority 
importance and a general framework for Europe’s macro-prudential regulation was 
introduced (See Figure 16). 350  
It was recognized that risk identification and assessment within the European Union 
and the establishment of mechanisms for early risk warnings, were essential for crisis 
prevention and mitigation. The main recommendation in De Larosière Report was to form a 
European systemic risk regulator.351  
                                                 
349 The Treaty of Rome, March 1957, art. 3(j), Title IV art. 129-130. Given the weaknesses of the ECB as a 
banking supervisor which were exposed during the last financial crisis, Europe is now undergoing a change 
towards a Banking Union and a Single Supervisory Mechanism – for further information please see the 
discussion in the following pages of this research which relate to what has changed since the last financial crisis.  
350
 See supra n. 349.   
351
 See: The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the E.U, ‘De Larosière Report’, (2009).  
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In May 2009 the European commission released the Communication on Financial 
Supervision which formed two new regulatory bodies:352 the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) which was designed to function as a European systemic risk regulator, advising on 
macro-prudential issues; and the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), formed 
from national financial supervisors, which was intended to function as a European micro-
prudential supervisor and to work closely with the ERSB.  
The European Systemic Risk Board was finally established in December 2010353 and 
the European System of Financial Supervisors in September 2010.  
The European System of Financial Supervisors replaced three existing Committees of 
Supervisors with three new Authorities: the European Banking Authority (EBA);354 the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA);355 and a European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).356 
These regulators are coordinated mainly through the Joint Committee established by 
Articles 54 to 57 of the European Supervisory Authorities.357 The committee’s declared goal 
is consistency. It aims to reach joint positions among the different regulatory authorities on 
how to regulate financial conglomerates and other cross-sectoral issues.358 The effectiveness 
and efficiency of these institutions is further discussed in Chapter 5 of this research.  
Another major issue which arose in the EU after the last financial crisis relates to the 
need to form a unified Banking Union in Europe. The sovereign debt crisis which developed 
in Europe as of May 2010 resulted, among other things, from an inconsistency between a 
strong monetary pillar and a weak supervisory and economic pillar, as well as from a 
                                                 
352
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission, ‘European Financial 
Supervision’, Brussels, 27.5.2009, COM(2009) 252 final.  
353
 Established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board. 
354
 Established by: regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority (EBA)), 
amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC. 
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 Established by: regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (IOPA)), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC, and repealing Commission Decision 
2009/79/EC.  
356
 Established by: regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA)), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC, and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC. 
357
 The regulation is commonly referred to as “the European Supervisory Authority (ESA) Regulations” and 
consists of the pieces of regulation mentioned supra n. 353- 356. 
358
 Information taken from the ESMA web site: <http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/European-Supervisory-
Framework> accessed 27.05.2013. 
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weakness in the inter-linkage between those two pillars.359 Following the realization of this 
gap, several reforms have been suggested in order to address the weakness of the supervisory 
pillar360. All of these suggestions revolve around the concept of a banking union.361 
The European Banking Union is supposed to unify regulatory standards and 
monitoring across all member states. The first foundations of the Banking Union have already 
been laid by EU regulation which created a corpus of rules and regulations with regard to the 
operation of banks in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”).362  
This first layer of regulation proved to be incomplete in the last financial crisis due to 
lack of appropriate rules dealing with insolvency and cross-border coordination, and has led 
the EU to the realization that stronger consolidation of regulation is required at an EU 
level.363 External intervention by fiscal authorities during the crisis also sharpened the need to 
form some sort of fiscal union.364 This union was expected to encompass micro supervision, 
crisis management, lender of last resort, and macro prudential supervision.365 
As a first step towards the formation of the European Banking Union, the EU adopted 
two new pieces of regulation: the European Banking Authority (EBA) regulation366 and the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) regulation.367  
The SSM regulation is based on four principles that were suggested by the ECB:368 
independence, separation between supervision and monetary policy, accountability, and 
recourse to national authorities. The regulation goes beyond the De Larosiere report369 and 
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 R.M. Lastra, ‘Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship’, (2013) 36 Fordham 
International Law Journal, 1190, 1192-1193.  
360
 R.M. Lastra, supra n. 359, p. 1192.  
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 R.M. Lastra, supra n. 359, p. 1192.  
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 As of The Treaty of Rome, March 1957, art. 3(j), Title IV art. 129-130.and onwards.  
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 R.M. Lastra, supra n. 359, p. 1192. 
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 R.M. Lastra, supra n. 359, p. 1193. 
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 R.M. Lastra, supra n. 359, p. 1192.  
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 The EBA regulation was lately amended by Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of The European Parliament and 
of The Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.  
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 SSM regulation is based on article 127(6) of the Treaty of Lisbon (Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, C 83/47, March 2010) and assigns the supervision of major EU banks  to 
the European Central Bank (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013, conferring specific 
tasks on the European Central  Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions (OJL 287, 29.10.2013) ).  
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 European Central Bank,  Opinion on a proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION conferring specific tasks on 
the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions see < 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52012PC0511:EN:NOT> accessed 25.02.2014 
and European Central Bank, A  proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (EBA), 2012 O.J.C 
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accessed 25.02.2014.  
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the establishment of the European Supervisory Authorities, as it transfers the supervisory 
tasks of the Euro area banks to the European Central Bank. 
In addition, the SSM regulation sets out the supervisory mandate of the ECB to 
regulate credit institutions as part of the Banking Union, and clarifies its supervisory, 
regulatory and enforcement powers. The regulation also describes the role of the national 
supervisory authorities in the countries which belong to the Banking Union.370  
The SSM regulation was enacted on the basis of Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 371 which states the following: 
“The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank 
concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.” 
However, the decision to base the SSM regulation on the TFEU was criticized by 
some on the basis that it reduced the decision-making powers of the European Parliament to a 
merely advisory role.372 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
370
 See supra n. 367.  
371
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra n. 367, Art. 127(6)..  
372
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Figure 16: The EU’s new Financial Supervisory structure373 
 
  
                                                 
373
 Figure 16 (with relevant adjustments) follows supra n. 352, p. 17.  
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3.6  Summary  
 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis definitely put financial regulatory structures under the 
spotlight in all jurisdictions. As described in this chapter, a number of countries changed their 
financial regulatory architecture after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. From this we deduce 
that the countries which changed their supervisory structure were not happy with the 
functioning of their previous structure, and considered that a change was necessary.  
This chapter explored the different financial regulatory structures which exist in 
fifteen jurisdictions around the globe, and examined the changes which they undertook 
following the last financial crisis. As presented in the introduction to this chapter, ten of these 
jurisdictions belong to the top ten OECD countries by GDP for the year 2012 and thus 
represent strong and large economies, and the other five have specific attributes which made 
them interesting and led to their inclusion in this chapter.  
Some of the countries reviewed in this chapter belong purely to one of the four 
approaches to the structure of financial supervision which were presented at the beginning of 
this chapter, i.e., the Institutional Approach (followed in its pure form by Mexico), the 
Functional Approach (followed in its pure form by Spain which is now transferring into the 
Twin Peaks Approach) , the Consolidated/ Integrated Approach (followed in its pure form by 
Switzerland and the Republic of Korea), or the Twin Peaks Approach (followed in its pure 
form by the UK, Australia and the Netherlands). 
However, an important finding of this chapter is that over a third of the reviewed 
jurisdictions cannot be assigned to one of the four approaches to the structure of financial 
supervision. Rather they follow a different approach which can be referred to as a Hybrid 
Approach.  
In essence the Hybrid Approach means that jurisdictions generally follow one of the 
four approaches to financial supervisory structures, but are influenced by other approaches as 
well. This Hybrid Approach is not homogeneous. Some countries mix the Institutional 
Approach with the Functional Approach (Israel and Italy), or the Functional Approach with 
the Twin Peaks Approach (France), or the Consolidated/Integrated Approach with the 
Functional Approach (Canada, the USA), while we can also find examples of a mix between 
the Consolidated/Integrated Approach and the Twin Peaks Approach (Germany), and 
between the Consolidated/Integrated Approach and the Institutional Approach (Japan). 
Meanwhile, the EU with its banking union and three financial regulatory authorities can be 
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seen to be following a Hybrid Approach combining the Institutional Approach and the Twin 
Peaks Approach.  
Even in the small sample of jurisdictions reviewed by this chapter, we cannot point to 
one dominant Hybrid Approach, but rather a spectrum of combinations. These combinations 
are formed through the influence of other approaches on the financial supervisory structure, 
and come into play in areas where legal, political or practical reasons demand deviation from 
a jurisdiction’s original approach.  
A prominent example is the Canadian case presented earlier. In this case an expert 
panel was formed in order to express an opinion with regards to Canadian securities 
regulation. Following the recommendations of this expert panel an attempt was made to 
change the law in order to consolidate Canadian securities regulation under a single authority. 
This attempt failed due to a ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court which found that the new 
law was opposed to the right of the different provinces to deal with issues pertaining to 
property and civil rights.  
This case illustrates the fact that, even though in some cases a country might face a 
strong tendency to deviate from its existing structure, there may also be barriers which 
prevent it from doing so. In the Canadian example, these barriers were of a legal and 
constitutional nature, linked to the tension between the provinces and the federal state. It 
seems that the debate around the regulatory structure was taken hostage by the battle for the 
provinces’ powers and competences.  
Another finding which comes out of this chapter relates to the type of issues countries 
are concerned with after the last financial crisis. Although the sample of countries reviewed 
by this chapter is too small to make an empirical statement, we generally see that countries 
which were less damaged by the crisis and had a fast recovery from it (like Mexico for 
example) are increasing competition in their financial markets, while other jurisdictions 
which were damaged severely by the last financial crisis are more in search of stability. In the 
latter cases we can generally see that greater emphasis was, and still is, put on macro-
prudential supervision and on systemic risk. 
All in all, we do not see countries converging towards one type of financial regulatory 
structure. The UK, for example, is moving from a Consolidated/Integrated structure to the 
Twin Peaks structure while Switzerland has changed to the Consolidated/Integrated structure. 
Similar evolutions can also be observed in other countries. For some of the countries 
reviewed under this chapter, this is not the first time in the past decade they have changed 
their financial regulatory structure. The UK is the most obvious example; it has moved from 
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the Institutional Approach to the Consolidated/Integrated Approach and is now in the process 
of changing to the Twin Peaks Approach.  
Nevertheless, although we do not see countries converging towards one regulatory 
structure, we do see that countries care about coordination and cooperation mechanisms. 
Most jurisdictions reviewed in this chapter pay attention to such mechanisms, and put effort 
into enhancing cooperation between different authorities both on the national and 
international levels. These efforts have produced some visible results, including: a greater 
number of MoU’s signed between different financial regulators; the formation of 
coordinating bodies containing representatives from different financial regulators, for the 
purpose of increasing cooperation and information-sharing; and boards of financial regulators 
which include representatives from other regulatory authorities to better facilitate 
coordination. The crisis has shown that modern financial crises are not restricted to a specific 
territory. Thus the need for cooperation and coordination during the crisis has definitely 
shaped the way in which countries perceive the structure of their financial regulatory 
authorities.   
In this context, of non-convergence and of a desire for cooperation, the question 
should then be asked: why don’t countries converge into one type of financial regulatory 
structure? Is one structure preferable to others? The following chapters attempt to answer 
these questions.  
 
  
  
111 
 
4. THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: CONSOLIDATION OR 
FRAGMENTATION FOR FINANCIAL REGULATORS? A GAME THEORETIC 
APPROACH 
4.1  Introduction  
 
“Financial institutions are global in life but national in death”.374 The recent financial 
crisis has exposed this truth in its full meaning and has impelled countries to look for a 
perfect regulatory architectural design. Thus, the questions regarding the optimal structure for 
financial regulators, i.e. consolidated as opposed to fragmented, have resurfaced.  
The issue of consolidation v. fragmentation of the financial regulators is not restricted 
to the national markets, but is also relevant for the global market. The financial crisis of 
2007-2009 has provided us with an opportunity to view how market players respond to global 
regulatory competition.375 This semi-natural experiment provides us with the opportunity to 
make an affirmative claim with regard to the need for cooperation between states in order to 
solve systemic problems.376   
Moreover, in a study performed by Masciandaro and Quintyn on a sample of 102 
countries, the authors found that over a period of eleven years, 69% of the countries sampled 
by them have reformed their financial supervisory structure at least once.377 However, 
countries don’t seem to converge towards one type of model and the question is: why?   
This chapter aims to assess the existing structures of financial supervision using game 
theory insights. The main finding of the analysis presented in this chapter is that there is no 
"one solution fits all” model for financial supervision. Different models of supervision tend to 
do better or worse in different states of the world, i.e. in different political climates. Each 
model has its merits and shortcomings, and understanding those can help us improve the 
existing supervisory structures.   
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 T. Huertas, ‘The rationale for and limits of bank supervision’, speech given at the FSA London Financial 
Regulation Seminar on 19 January 2009, transcripts available at: 
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This also helps to explain why we see countries shifting, in what seems like a random 
move, from one supervisory structure to another. The changes in the financial structure are 
due to the fact that countries assume they got it wrong. They assume they got it wrong 
because, while a financial regulatory structure may do very well in dealing with a certain set 
of problems, it will at the same time neglect or even create a different set of problems. The 
discussion of some of these problems, namely, problems relating to the financial regulators’ 
incentives, are at the heart of this chapter.  
A key assumption throughout this chapter is that regulators are self-interested. The 
“self-interest approach” to regulation assumes that regulators are driven by their own 
personal interests when deciding upon regulating.  
These interests vary from a desire to increase their personal powers, their reputation, 
or their future potential career opportunities within the regulated industry. These interests are 
accompanied by the desire to reduce legal risk and risk to their reputation.378  
Thus, regulation may end in a sub-optimal result from a social welfare point of view, 
as it is affected by the self-interest of the regulators themselves.379 As pointed out by Boyer 
and Ponce, if supervisors were benevolent, as opposed to self-interested, then the allocation 
of supervisory powers would not make a difference.380  
As a result of the self-interest assumption when describing the way in which 
regulators interact, a non-cooperative game can be assumed.381 Self-interested regulators will 
view their own utility function irrespective of the other regulators utility function or that of 
the public. As cooperation is costly and difficult to achieve the regulators will cooperate only 
when they are given the right incentives to do so. Without the right kind of incentives each 
authority will seek to preserve its independence and autonomy.382  
Another assumption at the base of this chapter is that of a dynamic game. At T1, at 
the beginning of the game, each regulator decides for himself whether to regulate or refrain 
from regulating and at T2, after regulation has taken place, his actions trigger some sort of 
feedback from society, politicians, and the regulated industry. The regulators’ expectations of 
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the feedback at T2 will affect their decision to regulate or refrain from regulating at T1. This 
chapter examines the extreme and clear-cut cases in which the regulators can predict with 
certainty what will be the feedback they will receive at T2.  
The assumption behind the games described in this chapter is that the two separate 
regulators have identified a market failure and that both of them have a proper mandate to 
regulate in order to solve it.383  It is further assumed that regulators respond strategically to 
one another.   
An additional assumption is that of a world where overlapping regulation or lack of 
regulation is not desirable as it generates unwanted costs to the market and to the regulated 
firms, costs which do not contribute to stability or total welfare increase.  
On the other hand, there are situations in which overlapping regulation is needed as 
the market benefits from diversity in regulators. Such is the case when their existence 
contributes to the stability of the market,384 or where lack of regulation is desirable as it 
reduces costs to the firms operating in the market without harming their stability. In either 
one of these circumstances, the insights proposed in this paper can be used to steer the 
regulators’ actions in the desirable direction.  
This chapter is organized as follows: following this introduction, the second part of 
the chapter examines the existing literature in the field. The third part develops a game theory 
matrix describing how two regulators working in the same field are expected to interact with 
one another. Possible market failures and possible solutions are identified. The fourth part 
assesses the existing financial supervisory models described in Chapter Three of this study, in 
light of the solutions proposed in part 3 of this chapter. The fifth part includes an application 
which is connected to problems related to Public Choice Theory, namely “the economic 
theory of politics”,385 such as self-interested regulators and capture which results in lack of 
regulation.  
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4.2  Literature review  
 
This section reviews the existing literature which relates to the interaction between 
two or more regulators who are given a dual mandate to regulate a specific field or product. 
This phenomenon includes situations which the literature refers to as “Regulatory 
Competition”. Such situations occur when two regulators are active in the same field and 
compete with one another in order to attract more firms or players into their jurisdictions.386 
The outcome of such competition may result in a suboptimal amount of regulation vis-à-vis 
the amount of regulation achieved by a single regulator in the field.  
In their article discussing the interaction of two regulators, Parisi, Schulz and Klick 
come to the conclusion that when two regulators act independently, they will tend to exercise 
their power to a greater or lesser extent than is optimal from the point of view of regulators 
who have a sole mandate to regulate a specific field.387  
This chapter reflects the same results for two financial regulators and explains the 
reason behind them using the private interest approach to regulation. Furthermore, this 
chapter attempts to predict in which states of the world financial regulators will exercise their 
powers to a greater or lesser extent than optimal.388   
Klick and Parisi approach the issue of consolidation or competition for tax authorities 
through a model of tax authorities which seek to maximize revenue.389 The tax authorities in 
their model can choose whether or not to regulate. Likewise, this chapter assumes that 
financial regulators can choose whether to regulate or not.  
Their results show that when operating separately and non-cooperatively, tax 
authorities tend to over-regulate. This chapter shows that for financial regulation this result 
could be valid or not depending on how the regulators view the expected political reaction 
and public opinion to their proposed regulation.  
Espinosa-Vega, Kahn, Matta and Sole assume that the failure of a financial institution 
is politically costly to the financial regulator supervising it.390 This chapter uses their insight 
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to further explain how political considerations affect the financial regulator’s decision-
making when they have to consider whether or not to regulate. Moreover, this chapter also 
uses the private interest approach to regulation and assumes that regulators promote their 
private objective functions.  
The private interest approach is also used by: Itay Agur in his paper regarding 
competition between bank regulators in the USA;391 by Enriques and Hertig in their paper 
regarding mechanisms for improvement of governance over financial regulators;392 and by 
Boot and Thakor who show that the quest of supervisors to be seen as capable might lead to 
excessive perseverance in their approach to regulation.393  
Espinosa-Vega, Kahn, Matta and Sole’s findings show that a unified approach to 
supervision could reduce systemic risk relative to the fragmented regulatory structure.394 This 
chapter shows their findings to be true in a specific setting.  
However, it also shows that the unified model is not the only way to solve the 
problem of systemic risk. Providing regulators with clear sole mandates for supervising a 
product or a firm should work in the same way and help reduce systemic risks.  
Similar to Masciandaro’s paper from 2009,395  this chapter points out that there is no 
“one solution fits all” for a supervisory oversight structure and that in the end it is a political 
choice. Masciandaro claims that there is no strong theoretical argument in favor of one 
supervisory structure over another.396 This chapter takes these findings a step further and tries 
to explain, using game theory concepts, what type of problems the different structures of 
financial supervisory oversight models try to address and what solutions they propose to such 
problems.  
Finally, much like Enriques and Hertig, this chapter suggests an application in public 
choice which is aimed to incentivize regulators to make the right regulatory choice and take 
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Group, LSE, London; M. Cihak and R. Podpiera, ‘Experience with Integrated Supervisors: Governance and 
Quality of Supervision’, in Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and 
Governance, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2007, pp. 309-341; and M. Cihak and R. Podpiera, ‘Does more 
integrated Supervision mean Better Supervision?’ , (2007) Finlawmetrics, Bocconi University, Mimeo. 
396
 D. Masciandaro, supra n. 395, p. 125.  
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action where needed.397 It follows their lead by seeking the solution in the corporate 
governance mechanism used in the corporate world. The suggestion raised by this chapter is 
an extension to Enriques and Hertig’s arguments, proposing another way in which financial 
regulators can be governed. 
The arguments discussed in the present study build on the ideas discussed above, 
particularly that regulators are self-interested and do take into consideration the political 
opinion of the time and are in need of the right kind of incentives in order to align their 
interests with that of their agents, namely, the public.  
This chapter adds to the literature available on this topic by its novel approach of 
using insights from the interaction between two regulators to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing financial supervisory models. Such an assessment is yet to be 
discussed in the literature regarding regulatory structures.  
  
                                                 
397
 See L. Enriques & G. Hertig, supra n. 378. 
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4.3  Applying game theory concepts to describe two regulators 
acting on a market failure  
 
As mentioned in earlier in this research, regulators often follow their own interests, 
which might differ in some cases from what society believes to be socially optimal with 
regards to the level of regulation required. In order to understand how we can align the 
interests of the regulators to fit the needs of society, we must first examine the socially 
optimal situation, where the regulators’ incentives are aligned with the socially optimal 
regulatory activity.  
For the purposes of the following analysis,  simple payoff matrices are relied on, with 
two symmetric parties (two regulators), i = 1,2. Strategies available to both parties, s1 and s2, 
are either 0 or 1. The no regulation strategy is referred to as si = 0, while si = 1 represents the 
complete regulation strategy. Private benefits from regulating are denoted by b while the 
(positive or negative) effect imposed by the other regulator’s action is represented by a. It is 
assumed that both b and a are non-negative integers, and that the direct benefits from 
regulating are larger in absolute value than the indirect effect of the other regulator’s action, 
i.e. |b|>|a|.  
From society’s point of view, the only thing that matters is that only one of the two 
regulators regulates, regardless which one of the two. However, as will be discussed in the 
following pages, from the regulators’ point of view, each regulator would prefer to: be the 
first to regulate ("Overlapping Regulation" scenario); take no action at all ("Lack of 
Regulation" scenario); or wait for the other regulator’s action ("Chicken Game" scenario). 
The following analysis examines the relationship between social and private 
incentives to regulate, and the effects of these incentives on the way in which financial 
regulatory institutions should be structured.  
4.3.1  The socially optimal situation  
Consider the ideal situation where the regulators act according to what is socially 
optimal (Table 1a).398 In other words, this section relies on the reader assuming that 
regulators internalize not only the effects of their own action, but also the effects of the other 
regulator’s action or inaction on their payoffs. Thus, each regulator's payoff reflects the 
socially optimal payoff. From this social welfare perspective symmetric strategies are 
                                                 
398
 The first and second entries in each cell of the matrix refer to the payoffs to player 1 and player 2 
respectively. 
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inefficient since they lead either to overlapping regulation (s1 = s2 = 1) or to lack of regulation 
(s1 = s2 = 0). 
 
 
 
Table 1a 
   
  S2 = 1 S2 = 0 
S1 = 1 b/2 - a ; b/2 - a b + a ; 0 
S1 = 0 0 ; b + a - b - a ; - b - a 
 
 
 
Regarding the payoff matrix in Table 1a, as already stated, the social optimum 
requires that only one of the two regulators regulates, regardless which of the two, and 
whatever the strategy of one regulator may be, the other should prefer to behave in the exact 
opposite way, i.e., si ≠  s-i.  
In the case of asymmetric strategies (s1 = 1 ; s2 = 0 or s1 = 0 ; s2 = 1), the active 
agent399 obtains all the benefits from regulating, b. Moreover, the other agent's inaction has a 
positive effect on the active agent's payoff, the reason being that overlapping regulation 
which is potentially destructive for the economy has been avoided. Thus, the payoff for the 
active agent is b + a, while the inactive agent gets zero.  
In the case in which both regulators regulate, the benefits are shared among them 
(b/2) and the action of the other regulator causes a negative effect on the "socially-thinking" 
active agent’s payoff. In this situation, each regulator obtains b/2 - a.  
Assuming that the shared benefit b/2 falls below the negative effect that the other 
regulator’s action causes, i.e. b/2 < a, the joint regulation leads to negative payoffs for both 
regulators.  
In the opposite situation of joint inactivity, both agents lose the possibility of gaining 
benefits from regulating. The other agent’s inaction causes a negative effect on the payoff of 
each agent since the joint inactivity leads to a lack of regulation which is potentially 
detrimental for the financial system and the economy.  
Table 1b provides a summary of the scenarios explained above.  
To sum up, when the interests of the regulators align with those of society, both 
overlapping and lack of regulation leads to negative payoffs (b/ 2 - a  < 0 ; - b - a < 0 ), while 
                                                 
399
 The regulator who decides to regulate is denoted as the “active agent”. Similarly, the regulator who decides 
to stay inactive is called “inactive agent”. 
Table 1b 
   
 S2 = 1 S2 = 0 
S1 = 1 Overlapping 
Regulation 
Socially Optimal 
 Regulation 
S1 = 0 Socially Optimal 
 Regulation 
Lack of  
Regulation 
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asymmetric behaviors produce positive (active agent) and null (inactive agent) payoffs. The 
social optimum requires that only one party engages in regulation, with asymmetric dominant 
strategies, i.e. si ≠ s-i . 
Real-life cases of regulators’ behaviour rarely fall within the above-described 
situation of socially-thinking regulators; each of them is a self-interested agent who follows 
his own private incentives. In the most pessimistic case, a profit-seeking regulator does not 
pay suitable attention or does not care about the possible negative consequences of his 
choices on social welfare. Thus the question of how regulators' private interests can be 
aligned to social welfare objectives takes on acute significance.  
Following is an analysis of the different scenarios from the regulator’s individual 
perspective, assuming they are self-interested regulators who take into account solely their 
own private incentives. The analysis is followed by possible solutions to the problems 
identified in this chapter.  
 
4.3.2  The “Overlapping Regulation” game, in cases where the regulators would 
benefit from regulating 
 
In December 2010 the Israeli Law, Information and Technology Authority, which is 
established under the State of Israel Ministry of Justice,  published a position paper with 
regards to principles and rules regulating the collection and use of information 
about minors under the Protection of Privacy Law -1981 (hereinafter “the position paper”). 
The position paper did not exclude the Israeli banks from the application of its rules.  
Following the position paper, in February 2011, the Association of Banks in Israel 
published a response, in the name of banks operating in Israel, which explained that the new 
rules and principles mentioned in the position paper contradicted the Israeli Supervisor of 
Banks’ instruction number 416.    
According to the response issued by the Association of Banks in Israel an example of 
such contradiction may be found in clause 52 of the position paper which instructs that when 
it comes to minors between the ages of 14-18, parental consent must be granted in order to 
collect “sensitive information” about such minors. 
However, according to clause number 7 of the Israeli Privacy Protection Law 1981, 
the definition of “sensitive information” also includes information regarding the “financial 
situation” of a person.  
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As during the process of opening a minor’s account such personal financial 
information is obtained by the bank, it follows that under the instructions mentioned in the 
position paper, parental consent would be required in order to open and run a bank account 
for minors under the age of 18.  
However, the Supervisor of Banks’ instruction with regards to minors’ accounts 
(number 416) states that a bank is allowed, under certain limitations, to open an account for a 
minor older than 16 without parental consent. In addition, a bank is allowed to open an 
account for a minor between the ages of 15-16 without parental consent provided that the 
minor is at least 15 and receives a steady income in the form of a salary.  
This is an anecdotal example of overlapping regulation. From reading the explanatory 
introduction to both pieces of regulation it is clear that both regulators, the Supervisor of 
Banks and the Israeli Law, Information and Technology Authority, had the minors’ wellbeing 
in mind when issuing their instructions. Undoubtedly, both regulators also have a mandate 
under Israeli law to issue such regulation.   
Moreover it is highly likely that both regulators would have calculated that issuing 
these instructions would be viewed positively by the Israeli public, for the protection of 
minors is generally viewed in a positive way.  
However, such dual and contradicting regulation creates confusion on behalf of the 
regulated bodies and costs the industry a great deal of time and money in settling the 
discrepancy, while just one piece of regulation is enough to regulate the issue.   
In economic terms, issuing both pieces of regulation without excluding banks from 
the later piece of regulation, which relates to all transactions taking place in the market in 
general, is inefficient as it is a waste of resources which does not generate any kind of 
additional surplus for society, and which should therefore best be avoided. Moreover, from 
the government’s point of view this is an inefficient allocation of regulatory resources.  
The problem of overlapping regulation is not restricted to Israel, as “US financial 
institutions complain of higher compliance costs and inconsistent regulation and enforcement 
by competing regulators.”400  
These examples illustrate the “overlapping regulation” game which will now be 
discussed in detail.  
 
                                                 
400
 See E.J. Pan, ‘Structural Reform of Financial Regulation in Canada’, (2009) 250 Cardozo Studies Legal 
Research Paper, p. 6. 
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From the regulators’ point of view 
For this discussion, we must assume a scenario in which two regulators can identify a 
market failure and have the regulatory tools to fix it. We can further assume that regulating is 
beneficial for each of them as by regulating they gain personal power and prestige, for 
example the ability to ask for an increase in their budget from politicians.  
One further assumption is that this is a two step game; at T1 each regulator decides 
whether to regulate or refrain from regulating.  At T2 the results of the regulator’s actions 
bring him positive, negative or no feedback from society, politicians, and the industry.   
At T1, the regulators in the overlapping regulation game expect with one hundred 
percent likelihood that the end feedback at T2 will be positive.   
The worst case scenario for both of the regulators is to leave the market unregulated 
as this puts their careers or reputation at risk.  
We can further assume that each of them would like to be the only one to regulate 
because, as pointed out before, regulating brings prestige and power (they want to have 
something to show in order to convince politicians to further their interests).  However if they 
both regulate they will not get as much prestige and power, as the glory will be shared 
between them.  
Moreover, if they both regulate they could well suffer damage to their reputation 
because the regulated firms might complain about the overlapping regulation, or because the 
market will be less efficient under their term.  
If we further assume that all the relevant parameters of the game are common 
knowledge and that the regulators decide on their strategies independently and non-
cooperatively, the game may be characterized as a simultaneous-move game with perfect 
information. Accordingly, the solution of this game should be a Nash equilibrium.401 From 
the regulators’ perspective this game, referred to as the “Overlapping Regulation” game, is 
represented in Table 2. 
 Unlike socially-thinking regulators, self-interested regulators gain positive payoffs 
from overlapping regulation, although these payoffs are slightly lower compared with the 
payoffs they could get with the situation of alternate regulation.  
                                                 
401
 D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra n. 45, p.310 describe the Nash Equilibrium as follows: “…It 
is based on the principle that the combination of strategies that players are likely to choose is one in which no 
player could do better by choosing a different strategy given the ones the others choose. A pair of strategies will 
form a Nash Equilibrium if each strategy is one that cannot be improved upon given the other strategy. We 
establish whether a particular strategy combination forms a Nash Equilibrium by asking if either player has an 
incentive to deviate from it”.  
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 Table 2 
 S2 = 1 S2 = 0 
S1 = 1 b/2 ; b/2 b ; 0 
S1 = 0 0 ; b - b ; - b 
 
If regulator 1 regulates while regulator 2 does not, then regulator 1 receives all the 
benefits from regulating. In this case, regulator 2 has no benefits and no costs, thus his payoff 
is null. The opposite holds true when regulator 2 regulates (s2 = 1), while regulator 1 is 
inactive (s1 = 0). When both regulators regulate, the benefits from regulating are shared 
between them. In the opposite case of joint inactivity, both regulators stand to lose since the 
market will go unregulated. In this case, their payoffs are negative as they will be blamed by 
society and politicians for leaving the market unregulated.  
In this scenario, whatever the strategy of one party, the other prefers to regulate: si = 
1. Both parties will decide to regulate, and the overlapping regulation outcome remains in 
equilibrium, implying a definite worsening with respect to the socially optimal equilibrium 
established by a single active regulator.402 
Proposition 1: The strictly dominant strategy403 for both regulators, and the only pure 
Nash equilibrium in this game, is to regulate.404  
Possible solutions  
How can we solve this game in a way which will lead to the optimal level of 
regulation? This problem can be solved by changing one of two things: 
1. Changing the game – eliminating one of the players through the mandate for 
regulation – if only one regulator receives the mandate to regulate a certain product, 
regulatory competition over this product will be eliminated. 
2. Changing the payoffs – consolidating regulators and placing them as departments in a 
consolidated regulatory body changes the payoffs and aligns incentives to regulate as 
much as possible, since negotiations for budget will take place in the name of the 
                                                 
402
 Please note that the analysis of the payoffs in this game (and other games which will follow) is not meant to 
be used quantitatively but rather to illustrate qualitatively how regulators will react to the strategies of the other 
regulators in the game.  
403
 D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra n. 45, p.306 defined a dominant strategy as follows: “A 
strategy that is a best choice for a player in a game for every possible choice by the other player. When one 
strategy is no better than another strategy, and sometimes worse, it is dominated by that strategy. When one 
strategy is always worse than another, it is strictly dominated…A player will choose a strictly dominant strategy 
whenever possible and will not choose any strategy that is strictly dominated by another…” 
404
 There are no mixed strategies to this game.  
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consolidated regulator as a whole, and as the prestige in cases of “good” regulation 
will be shared between them. Furthermore as both regulators now work under the 
same boss, they will be prevented from producing overlapping regulation.  
If we change the payoffs and consolidate the two regulators into one, the new game 
from the regulators’ point of view is:  
Table 3 
 S2 = 1 S2 = 0 
S1 = 1 NA ; NA b + a ; 0 
S1 = 0 0 ; b + a - b ; - b 
 
It can readily be seen that, in the present case of a single mandate for regulation, the 
regulators' equilibrium strategies coincide with the social optimum. Consolidating the 
regulators solves the overlapping regulation dilemma, allowing parties to undertake socially 
optimal strategies in equilibrium.  
In this scenario the regulators are now departments in one consolidated regulatory 
authority. As they are now subject to the same boss, the probability for overlapping 
regulation is nonexistent.  
Proposition 2:  The two pure Nash equilibria of this game are now set on either one 
of the regulators regulating.405  
From a welfare perspective we are now left with two options: an optimal amount of 
regulation; or, in cases of a regulatory mistake, lack of regulation.  
  
                                                 
405
 There are no mixed strategies to this game. 
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4.3.3 The “Lack of Regulation Game” and the “Chicken Game” , in cases where the 
regulators could lose from regulating  
 
“The IMF blames inadequate regulation, rather than global imbalances, for the 
financial crisis…it argues, in new papers released on Friday March 6th, that the “main 
culprit” was deficient regulation of the financial system, together with a failure of market 
discipline…” (The Economist, March 6, 2009)  
Assuming that the IMF is correct in its observation that deficient regulation did lead 
to the last financial crisis, the question remains: why was there deficient regulation? Why 
didn’t the regulators stop the bubble from blowing up to such a large scale? Surely they must 
have seen it coming.  
Indeed the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report from 2011 states quite clearly that the 
regulators knew that there were market failures which needed to be addressed in the 
American financial markets but chose to ignore them:406 
“…Yet we do not accept the view that regulators lacked the power to protect the 
financial system. They had ample power in many arenas and they chose not to use it. To give 
just three examples: the Securities and Exchange Commission could have required more 
capital and halted risky practices at the big investment banks. It did not. The Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and other regulators could have clamped down on Citigroup’s excesses in 
the run-up to the crisis. They did not. Policy makers and regulators could have stopped the 
runaway mortgage securitization train. They did not. In case after case after case, regulators 
continued to rate the institutions they oversaw as safe and sound even in the face of mounting 
troubles, often downgrading them just before their collapse. And where regulators lacked 
authority, they could have sought it. Too often, they lacked the political will — in a political 
and ideological environment that constrained it — as well as the fortitude to critically 
challenge the institutions and the entire system they were entrusted to oversee…” (p. xviii) 
One of the reasons for such regulatory behavior may lie with the “Lack of 
regulation” or “Chicken” games, which are detailed below.  
This discussion is relevant to a different scenario from that described in the previous 
game.  In the current scenario two regulators have the mandate to regulate and they both 
identify a market failure, but they stand to lose if they regulate first, either because they will 
                                                 
406
 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, supra n. 156 , p. xviii.  
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have to take the blame if they make a mistake in regulating, or because the public and 
political opinion of the time is against regulation. This situation arises during the formation of 
bubbles; if the regulator tries to stop the bubble from forming when the market is going up he 
might be subjected to negative public opinion and to political pressure. 
Again we can assume that this is a two step game; at T1 each regulator decides 
whether to regulate or refrain from regulating. At T2 the results of his actions bring him 
positive, negative or no feedback from society, politicians and the industry.  The regulators in 
this game expect with one hundred percent likelihood that the end feedback will be negative 
if they choose to regulate.  
Similar to the “Overlapping Regulation” game, we can assume that all the relevant 
parameters of the game are common knowledge and that the regulators decide on their 
strategies independently and non-cooperatively. Thus, the game may be characterized as a 
simultaneous-move game with perfect information. Accordingly, the solution of this game 
should be a Nash equilibrium.  
From the regulator’s point of view the game, referred to later as the “Lack of 
Regulation” game, can now be described as one of the following games:  
 
Table 4 
 S2 = 1 S2 = 0 
S1 = 1 - b; - b - b ; 0 
S1 = 0 0 ; - b 0 ; 0 
 
If one regulator regulates while the other does not, then the active regulator will be 
sanctioned by the public and political opinion (there are no potential benefits from regulation 
in this case but rather potential sanctions). The regulator who refrained from regulating, on 
the other hand, will not gain or lose anything in the present. Such a regulator might benefit 
later from the possible prevention of catastrophe ensured by the regulation, but he will never 
be aware of this as he does not know what might have happened if the market had not been 
regulated.  
If both regulate then both will be exposed to public and political criticism and stand to 
lose (attributing - b to both of them, since each of them will be fully punished). In the 
opposite case of joint inactivity, they do not gain anything and they do not stand to lose 
during the time the decision is made.  
To sum up, in this scenario, whatever the strategy of one party, the other party prefers 
to refrain from regulating: si = 0. Parties will both decide to refrain from regulating and the 
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inefficient lack of regulation outcome obtains in equilibrium, yielding to a definite worsening 
compared to the socially optimal equilibrium established by a single regulator. 
Proposition 3:  The dominant strategy for both regulators, and the only pure Nash 
equilibrium in this game, is to not regulate.407  
Alternatively the regulators might view the situation as a “Chicken Game”408  
The assumption behind the Chicken Game differs a little from the one behind the 
Lack of Regulation Game; at T1 each regulator decides whether to regulate or refrain from 
regulating. At T2 the results of his actions bring him positive, negative or no feedback from 
society, politicians, and the industry.  The regulators in this game know with certainty that the 
market should be regulated and that leaving the market unregulated will bring a financial 
catastrophe and will subject them to being scrutinized by politicians, society, and the industry 
at T2. However, they are also very well aware of the fact that if they regulate while the 
market is going up in order to stop a bubble from forming, then at T2 they will be scrutinized 
for “putting the brakes” on the market. Therefore each of them will wait for the other to take 
on the task of regulating the market.  
These assumptions are backed by anecdotal evidence of financial regulators’ 
behavior. See for example the words of Alan Greenspan, the USA Federal Reserve chairman 
during the two decades leading up to the last financial crisis of 2007-2009: 
“History tells us [regulators] cannot identify the timing of a crisis, or anticipate 
exactly where it will be located or how large the losses and spillovers will be” (p.3). 
409
  
The interaction can be described as follows:  
Table 5 
 S2 = 1 S2 = 0 
S1 = 1 - b/2 ; - b/2 - b ; 0 
S1 = 0 0 ; - b - b - a ; - b - a 
 
                                                 
407
 There are no mixed strategies to this game. 
408
 D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra n. 45, p.303 defined the chicken game as follows:”A two by 
two normal form game that captures the following interaction: Two teenagers drive cars headlong at each other. 
A driver gains stature when that driver drives headlong and the other swerves. Both drivers die, however, if 
neither swerves. Each player’s highest payoff comes when that player drives head on and the other swerves. The 
second highest payoff comes when that player swerves and the other player swerves as well. The third highest 
comes when that player swerves and the other drives. The lowest payoff is when both drive. This is a game of 
multiple Nash equilibria…the pure strategy equilibria are ones in which each player adopts a different action 
(that is one swerves and one drives).” 
409
 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, supra n. 156, p.3.  
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As can be seen, the worst situation from the regulators’ point of view occurs when 
both agents decide not to regulate. If both refrain from regulating each of them will lose - b – 
a, because when the bubble explodes at T2 they will be heavily judged for not acting in time. 
If one agent regulates and the other does not, the active agent will lose - b for regulating 
against the public opinion of the time, while the inactive agent will lose nothing. If both of 
them choose to regulate, they will each lose - b/2, less if compared to the case of joint 
inactivity.  
Proposition 4: Under the Chicken Game there are two pure and one mixed strategy 
Nash equilibria.410  The meaning of this is that with some probability the regulators might 
find themselves in a situation where neither one of them regulates, even though it is clear that 
this situation is the worst case scenario for both of them.  
NE1: Regulator A regulates and Regulator B does not. 
NE2: Regulator B regulates and Regulator A does not.  
NE3: The mixed strategy equilibrium in which both regulators regulate solely with a 
positive probability, and there is a positive probability that both regulators will refrain from 
regulating.  
In this game we are concerned with NE3. Even though NE3 is not a stable 
equilibrium,411 the potential damage it may cause to society is inconceivable.  
Possible solutions  
How can we solve this game in a way which will eliminate the lack of regulation 
problem? 
 In order to solve this game we should first change the payoffs in order to get back to 
the “Overlapping Regulation Game”, which we can then solve as discussed earlier. In order 
to do so we should provide regulators with some sort of immunity for regulatory mistakes 
and somehow insure that their future will not be harmed if they make a “brave” choice and go 
against public opinion. One could think of early retirement mechanisms for regulators or 
some other sort of post-employment mechanisms. This issue is discussed in detail in Section 
4.5.  
                                                 
410
 D.G. Baird, R.H. Gertner & R.C. Picker, supra n. 45, p.313 defined pure and mixed strategy equilibrium as 
follows:”Pure strategy equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium in which each player adopts a particular strategy with 
certainty. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, one or more of the players adopts a strategy that randomizes among a 
number of pure strategies.” 
411
 A stable equilibrium is an equilibrium in which none of the players can improve their situation if they choose 
to pursue different strategies than those which are used to form the equilibrium. All other equilibria are unstable.  
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4.4 An analysis of the existing supervisory structures using game-
theory concepts  
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three of this research, all financial regulatory structures in 
the world could basically be divided between four main approaches to financial supervision: 
the Institutional Approach, the Functional Approach, the Consolidated/Integrated Approach, 
and the Twin Peaks Approach. This section now moves on to assess the existing financial 
supervisory models described in chapter 3 in light of the solutions to the different games 
which were described in part 4.3.  
4.4.2 An assessment of the existing supervisory structures 
 
The Institutional Approach: This approach tries to use the first solution to the 
“Overlapping Regulation Game” described above by dividing the market into clear regulatory 
segments leaving each regulator responsible for a certain type of financial institution. The 
problem with this approach is that markets have developed beyond the simple models of 
distinct financial institutions. The elimination of the traditional separation between specific 
types of firms and the vast number of products which have been developed in the financial 
markets over the years make it difficult to regulate on a functional basis, since the traditional 
functional approach is not compatible any more with the variety of products and the structure 
of the financial firms. Continuing to use the Institutional Approach without adjustments to the 
changes in the market might bring us to a lack of regulation regime, as the responsible 
supervisor might not have the relevant expertise to supervise all of the financial products sold 
by the financial institutions which are supervised by him. 
The Functional Approach: The Functional Approach to supervision also uses the 
first solution to the “Overlapping Regulation Game” described above by dividing the market 
into products. In a perfect market this might be the optimal approach to regulation. However, 
the problem with this approach in the real world is that it is very difficult to cover all the 
possible products in the financial markets; therefore there is always the risk of having 
unregulated “gray zones” in which no regulator has a mandate to regulate.  
The Consolidated/Integrated Approach: The Consolidated/Integrated Approach to 
regulation tries to use the second solution to the “Overlapping Regulation Game” described 
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above by consolidating the regulators and changing the payoffs, so that the regulators become 
departments who share the same boss. Therefore the option of overlapping regulation is 
eliminated. The difficulties with this regulatory structure is that not only does it fail to 
prevent lack of regulation, but it might even increase the problem, as under this regulatory 
model the blame for regulating (in cases where the regulator regulates against public or 
political opinion), will always fall on the shoulders of one regulator, so that there is no 
prospect of sharing the burden with another regulatory authority.  
The Twin Peaks Approach: Under this approach financial regulation is divided 
between a consumer protection regulatory authority and an authority which is responsible for 
the soundness of the financial institutions and for preventing systemic risk. This approach 
tries to combine the second solution to the “Overlapping Regulation Game” by consolidating 
regulators under the same roof with the first solution to the “Overlapping Regulation Game” 
by granting the mandate for prudential regulation to a single regulator. This is an interesting 
idea, but it still suffers from the flaws of the Consolidated/Integrated Approach.  
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4.5  Solving a problem related to Public Choice Theory  
 
During times of crisis, regulatory work is closely observed by the public and the 
press, usually resulting in demands for more regulation. During normal times however, public 
attention is less focused on regulatory work, and pressure groups are able to thrive and affect 
the regulatory results. This creates a Public Choice problem412 which is reflected by the fact 
that regulation is often lacking or missing.  
As discussed in the game theory models and the analysis above, we can establish that 
different supervisory structures try to solve the overlapping regulation or lack of regulation 
problems using different solutions. These solutions appear to be effective for solving some of 
the problems discussed in this chapter. However, most of the structures of the financial 
supervisors offer only partial solutions to the problems which have been pointed out in this 
chapter; therefore some improvements to the existing regulatory structures can be made.  
One such essential improvement would be providing regulators with the right 
incentives to regulate when they believe it is necessary to do so in order to stop a bubble from 
forming.  In other words, the state should give the regulators some sort of protection from 
political pressure and public opinion by protecting their personal financial future.  
Given that this is a known problem, different jurisdictions have tried to offer different 
solution to this problem by using different legal instruments. Such tools include: 
Financial independence of the financial regulatory bodies – in some countries 
around the globe the financial regulatory bodies receive their budgets from taxes which are 
imposed on the regulated industry or from profits made by the financial regulatory authority 
from running its own assets. Examples include the Insurance and Mutual Societies 
Supervisory Authority in France, The Bank of Italy, the Italian Insurance Industry Regulatory 
Authority, the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, the German Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin), the former British Financial Services Authority (FSA), the American 
Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), National Credit Union Administration, and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).413  
By separating the financial regulatory authorities from government budgets, the 
financial regulatory authority remains financially independent and less prone to government 
                                                 
412
 J.M. Buchanan & R.D Tollison, supra n.385, p. 19.  
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influence. Separating the budgets eliminates competition between regulators for resources, as 
the regulatory agencies’ resources no longer depend on government discretion.  
Nomination procedures – Some countries, such as Italy for example, have tried to 
solve the problem through nomination procedures. Namely, the government surrenders its 
responsibility for the nomination and/or termination of the heads of the financial regulatory 
authorities. By eliminating the ability of government to influence the nomination procedure, 
the amount of impact that future political pressure might have on the head of the financial 
regulatory body is decreased.  
Collegiality – In some countries the final decisions with regards to enacting a piece of 
financial regulation are not taken by the head of the regulatory authority alone but by a board 
consisting of several members. This is a way to share the responsibility for regulation among 
several members. One example can be found in France where the AMF, the French securities 
regulator, is run by a board consisting of sixteen members who have the power to make most 
of the regulatory decisions.414  
On the one hand, having shared responsibility may reduce the pressure and the fear of 
risk to reputation from wrong or unpopular regulation, and allow regulators to regulate 
according to what they believe is right. On the other hand however, it creates a different set 
of problems among board members which include free riding and moral hazard. As the 
responsibility is shared, personal accountability is decreased.  
Mandatory coordination by law – In an attempt to change the game into a 
cooperative one, some countries have enacted laws which oblige the regulators to cooperate 
and exchange information. One such example may be found in the Italian Legislative Decree 
No. 58 of 1998 which mandates cooperation under Section 4. Clause 1 in Section 4 of the 
said decree states as follows: 
“The Bank of Italy, Consob, the Commissione di vigilanza sui fondi pensioni, Isvap 
and the Ufficio Italiano Cambi shall cooperate by exchanging information and 
otherwise for the purpose of facilitating their respective functions. Said authorities 
may not invoke professional secrecy in their mutual relations”. 415  
Clause 2 – 2 to the Legislative Decree No. 58 of 1998 mandates cooperation between 
the Italian financial supervisory authorities and the European ones. These mechanisms are a 
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way to change the game from a non-cooperative game to a cooperative one, aligning the work 
of the different regulatory bodies active in the financial market of a country or region.  
Long, stable office terms, and immunity against early termination – In some 
countries the head of the regulatory authority enjoys a long, stable term in office and 
immunity against early termination. This is the case in several countries such as: Italy, where 
appointment periods vary from 4 to 5 years with the possibility for a single elongation of the 
appointment period; France, where appointment periods range from 3 to 5 years; and Canada, 
where appointment periods may be as high as 7 years, which is the designated term for the 
head of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions.416 
The idea behind these long office terms is to provide some sort of short-term 
immunity for the financial regulator, since he cannot be removed midterm even if he 
regulates against the public and the political opinion of the time. The problem with this tool is 
that it does have a limited time range after which the regulator might be subject to a vengeful 
termination by politicians.  
In some sectors additional solutions exist. These include: 
Deposit Insurance – Deposit insurance exists in several jurisdictions around the 
world, including France, Italy, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, Australia, The 
Netherlands, Mexico, Spain, Japan, Republic of Korea and the USA,417 and helps protect 
these countries’ economies from systemic risks.  
The existence of deposit insurance mitigates the problems which might result from 
lack of regulation or regulatory mistakes, by providing an external buffer, other than state 
resources, against the danger of a bank going bankrupt. In case the regulator makes a mistake 
and a bank goes bankrupt, household depositors are refunded.  
This mechanism removes some of the pressure from the parties involved, i.e., the 
regulators, the politicians, and the public, as the worst case scenario becomes more 
manageable.  
Basel III – risk management, capital adequacy, and liquidity rules – Basel III is a 
set of reform measures which contains a comprehensive set of rules and regulations with 
regards to banks. These rules transfer part of the responsibility for banks’ supervision from 
the national level to the international level. By doing so it also provides a solution to the 
problem of lack of regulation discussed in this chapter in the following way - it is more 
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difficult for local public opinion and political pressure in each jurisdiction to influence the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and impact its regulatory actions than it is to 
influence local regulators. The reason for this is that local politicians want to get reelected 
and therefore are more attuned to local public pressure than the experts sitting on the Basel 
Committee, who are appointed professionally. The ability to capture the regulators becomes 
more complex. In this way, unifying regulation on a global scale might be one way to deal 
with the problems of incentivizing local regulators to take action, as liquidity requirements 
and risk management are now dictated from an external source. However, moving the 
responsibility to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also has its flaws. As has been 
mentioned previously; lack of diversity in bank regulation between jurisdictions suggests that 
regulatory errors may lead to a global financial institution failure.418  
Another solution for mitigation of the problems raised in this chapter, i.e overlapping 
regulation or lack of regulation, is to transfer some of the regulatory responsibility to the 
market itself. Some markets contain market-based alternatives for regulation. An example 
is the USA’s market where several private regulatory bodies exist. These bodies set industry 
standards which are meant to replace government-based regulation. Examples of such 
standards are the International Swaps and Derivatives Association standards which set the 
standards for SWAP and derivative transactions, and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board which sets accounting standards.  
Having market-based solutions helps ease the problem of lack of regulation as it 
transfers some of the mandate for supervision to the industry itself. By doing so it narrows 
down the mandate for supervision which is given to financial regulators, thereby reducing the 
possibility of the regulator making a mistake or refraining from regulating.  
The obvious problem with market-based solutions is that the industry which sets these 
standards is the regulated industry itself. This may lead to the adoption of loose standards at 
the expense of externalities, and the creation of systemic risks.  
As can be seen, countries do try to reduce the possibility for lack of needed 
regulation. However, even though all these instruments exist and did exist at the time of the 
latest financial crisis, we still saw that regulators hesitated to intervene when the market was 
going up, therefore perhaps there is room to consider an additional incentive tool which will 
stimulate the regulators to act.  
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What countries are trying to achieve is for the regulator to take on more personal risk. 
In order to achieve this we need to look for legal solutions which incentivize agents to take 
on more risk in favor of their principals in situations where there is a principal-agent problem. 
In this respect the discussion can draw from the literature regarding managers’ remuneration 
schemes in the corporate environment. It has been argued in the corporate literature that 
compensation arrangements granted to managers can be used in order to mitigate agency 
costs by encouraging risk-taking behaviors and providing incentives to optimize the long-
term performance of the firm.419 The optimal contracting view acknowledges the fact that 
managers do not automatically seek to maximize shareholder value and therefore need to be 
incentivized to do so.420 Such incentives usually take the form of compensation packages and 
early retirement mechanisms.  
The golden parachute is used in the corporate world to provide the executives with 
insurance against being fired due to poor performance.421 In case of termination, the 
executive being terminated receives a large compensation bonus or an early retirement 
scheme to compensate him for the loss of his job and his personal financial future. Such 
compensation packages assure that executives can take on risks in order to increase 
shareholders’ value without fear for their personal future.  
In an analogy to the financial regulatory sphere, in order to incentivize regulators to 
take action and regulate in cases where they deem it necessary, even when the regulation goes 
against the public and political opinion of the time, it is important to provide them with a 
safety net which will guarantee that even if they are fired by the politicians due to their 
unpopular regulation, they will be compensated in a way which secures their financial future.    
This tool may also prove valuable against regulatory capture as it decreases the 
dependence of the financial regulators on the regulated industry with regards to their future 
career path.  
Granting regulators post-employment arrangements upon termination which is caused 
due to their regulatory decisions, might induce moral hazard problems on behalf of the 
regulators and cause them to regulate recklessly. However, it has long been known that the 
solution to moral hazard problems in a principal-agent relationship is observability422 and 
                                                 
419
 S.R. Gray & A.A. Cannella, ‘The Role of Risk in Executive Compensation’, (1997) 23/4 Journal of 
Management, 517, 517-518. 
420
 L.A. Bebchuk & J.M. Fried., ‘Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem’, (2003) NO. w9813 National 
Bureau of Economic Research  Working Paper, p. 1.  
421 L.A. Bebchuk & J.M. Fried., supra n. 420, pp. 11 - 12.  
422
 B. Holmstrom, ‘Moral Hazard and observability’, (1979) 10/1 The Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 74-91. 
 
  
135 
 
observability can be mandated through regulation. Therefore, the solution to the moral hazard 
problem which arises due to the proposed post-employment arrangements is to form some 
sort of monitoring over the regulators’ work. Such monitoring can be provided by a mandated 
peer review.   
By providing such a “safety net” to regulators we will eliminate the situation of lack 
of regulation which is caused by the regulators’ “fear” that if they regulate they will lose their 
jobs. Adopting this proposition changes the incentives of the financial regulators and should 
induce them to take action and stop bubbles from forming, as in doing so they will have 
nothing to lose and a lot to gain.  
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4.6  Conclusion  
 
As discussed above, the complexity of the financial markets does not allow for a “one 
solution fits all” regulatory structure. Different strategic interactions between regulators in the 
financial market call for different solutions, and different regulatory structures produce 
different mechanisms which can generally offer only partial solutions for the scenarios 
characterized by overlapping regulation or lack of regulation.  
This also helps us understand why countries keep changing their financial regulatory 
structure. As there is no one structure which brings remedies to all the problems discussed in 
this chapter, countries keep switching structures. However, every time they switch to a new 
structure they inherit the set of problems inherent to that structure.   
The strategic interactions between the financial regulators as presented above occur 
both on the national level and on the international level, and might help shed some light on 
the qualities and shortcomings of each of the supervisory models. 
Given the grave results of lack of regulation, it is important to understand the 
incentives which can prevent regulators from regulating when they identify a market failure 
and have the mandate to stop it. If the assumption is correct, and regulators abstain from 
regulating due to fear of public and political opinion, it would be wise to grant them some 
sort of safety net which will convince them to take action and do what they think is right for 
the market without being concerned about losing their jobs.  
Such safety nets can be mimicked from the solutions developed by the corporate 
world to incentivize managers to take on risk in order to benefit their shareholders.  
The solution to the Moral Hazard problems that can be caused by the suggested safety 
nets is to introduce monitoring of the regulators’ work. It is suggested that such monitoring 
could be done by peer review.  
Given that looking at regulators’ incentives does not provide a clear answer as to 
which supervisory model is preferable, using different tools to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the supervisory structures is called for.  
The following chapter attempts to analyze the quality of the financial supervisory 
structures from a different angle. Given that one of the most important things in order to 
prevent or stop a financial crisis once it has occurred is information, the next chapter will use 
analytical tools from the study of institutional design in order to determine whether there is 
an advantageous structure with regards to information-flow.  
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The results might improve the ability of decision makers to decide which financial 
regulatory structure they would like to adopt in their respective jurisdictions.  
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5. CONSOLIDATION OR FRAGMENTATION FOR FINANCIAL 
REGULATORS? A STORY OF INFORMATION-FLOW  
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter is aimed at assessing the different types of supervisory models that exist 
in the world using analytical tools from the field of institutional design.  
The ongoing economic and legal discussions about the role of the financial regulators 
in crisis prevention and mitigation, and about the efficiency of consolidating them versus 
leaving them fragmented, concern themselves with a positive analysis of the type of 
regulation needed. However these discussions tend to ignore operational problems. 
For economists working in the field of financial regulation, the question regarding the 
optimal structure of financial supervision is usually analyzed from the public choice angle, 
which implies dealing with different types of inefficiencies, such as agency costs, capture of 
the financial regulator, problems in monitoring, and self-interested regulators.423  
All this is true and worthy of discussion, but at the same time there is also a public 
administration problem, namely the problem of information-flow in and between the financial 
regulatory authorities, which is currently neglected in this dialog.   
Moreover, the public administration problem may have severe effects on the intensity 
of the problems raised by the public choice theorists. Imagine an opportunistic agent who 
exploits wrong or lacking information. In certain situations, the harm that can be caused by 
this agent is increased, which can have severe effects on the efficiency and credibility of the 
financial markets which rely on the monitoring and skills of the financial regulators to 
mitigate the abundance of market failures in this sector.   
As discussed in previous chapters to this research, financial regulators are expected to 
provide a cure for the agency and monitoring problems which exist in the financial markets. 
They are also expected to address issues such as consumer bias, and control the herding 
phenomenon which may lead to the creation of bubbles or runs on banks. In order to perform 
these tasks they are heavily reliant on information and on the information-flow inside the 
regulatory body itself.424  
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A recent example may be found in the latest financial crisis. This crisis has proven the 
need for fast flow of relevant information. Many countries undertook drastic measures to try 
and stop the financial crisis. These measures were based on information derived from the 
real-time advancement of the financial crisis. The analysis of this information was transferred 
to the decision makers, who took decisions based on the information they received.425  
Information is also needed on a day-to-day basis in order to perform the ongoing 
regulatory task itself. Take for example the reporting requirements from financial institutions. 
Some of these requirements are technical, i.e. they require financial institutions to report a 
number of things on a quarterly or yearly basis while others are material, i.e. they require 
financial institutions to report when a certain event takes place. The logic behind all of these 
requirements is to provide the regulator with a better understanding of what is going on inside 
the financial institution which it regulates. Having a better understanding implies being able 
to tailor the regulators’ response to foreseen problems prior to their occurrence.  
As information is such an essential part of regulatory work, it seems that without 
addressing the organizational issues concerning information-flow, the discussion surrounding 
the economic analyses of the optimal structure for financial regulators may be missing a 
crucial factor.  
A prime example would be the Central Bank. In many countries the role of bank 
supervision is consolidated with the role of determining monetary policy, and both roles are 
held by the central bank. By combining these two functions into one regulator the central 
bank is provided with a wider spectrum of tools in order to design and control economic 
policy.  
Moreover, studies have shown that confidential information collected through 
supervision of banks helps improve the conduct of monetary policy.426 This is especially true 
during times of financial crisis when the fast flow of the relevant information is crucial in 
order to block the crisis. It is precisely for this reason that a discussion of the optimal 
structure in order to facilitate information-flow is so important.  
The problem is not merely academic, since many countries have changed their 
financial supervisory architecture over the past fifteen years427. Masciandaro  and Quintyn 
claim that some of the reforms in the financial supervisory structures in the countries 
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surveyed by them were made based on economic analysis of the markets in each country.428 
But if those economic analyses did not refer to problems of information-flow, they might 
have left out a vital variable which could have changed the end result.  
The importance of information has not escaped researchers studying how legal 
institution structure effects public decision making. These researchers emphasise the 
importance of “institutional competence”, including access to information, in the allocation 
of authority among different potential decision makers.429  
However, these researchers pay little attention to the question of how information is 
transmitted inside the institution. They seem to neglect the question of information-flow and 
assume that certain decision makers must have all the information they need in order to make 
the decision, simply because they are better situated in the organization. The question of 
information-flow is left outside the borders of this discussion.  
The novelty of this chapter is in approaching the issue of the optimal structure for 
financial regulators from the standpoint of organizational design and information–flow, and 
in bridging the gap between the literatures dealing with organizational design, public policy, 
and financial regulation. It aims at pointing out the operational side of information-flow 
which needs to be taken into account when a country decides to change its financial 
supervisory structure.  
Looking at the question of consolidation versus fragmentation for financial regulators 
through the lens of information-flow provides us with an intuition as to which type of 
structure would work best in facilitating information-flow.  
As will be discussed by this chapter, it seems that due to the importance of diversity 
in collecting information, and due to the fact that it removes at least one layer of supervisor – 
subordinate relationship, and thus contributes to a less rigid structure and less dilution of 
information, it is advisable from an information-flow perspective to adopt the fragmented 
regulatory model.  At the same time it is important to make sure that all the regulatory 
institutions share the same physical compound, and that informal interactions between 
workers from different regulatory institutions and departments are enhanced to the maximum. 
The reasons for these recommendations will be discussed in detail in this chapter.  
Basically, this chapter lays down the theoretical framework for evaluating and testing 
the efficiency of the existing supervisory models in transferring information. However, this 
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chapter does not test the suggested framework empirically. Room for empiric research is still 
left using the general framework proposed by this chapter.  
Another issue which is left outside the scope of this chapter is the issue of 
information-gathering. This chapter refers to the problem of information-flow assuming the 
right kind of information was gathered and processed. 
This chapter is organized as follows: following this introduction, section two 
describes the link between organizational structure and information-flow as presented in the 
literature pertaining to information–flow, and lays down the theoretical framework which will 
be used in the following sections to analyze the financial regulatory structures. Due to the fact 
that financial regulators are public sector entities, section three examines the differences 
between public sector institutions and other firms, as these differences have an effect on 
information-flow and organizational design. Section four describes how information flows 
inside organizations. This section is divided into a discussion of how information flows 
within a consolidated pyramid structured entity and how information flows between 
fragmented entities. The last section of this chapter examines the existing financial regulatory 
structure in the EU, compares it to the structures of the financial regulators in Israel, the UK 
and Switzerland, and offers suggestions for improvement of that structure based on the 
previous sections.  
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5.2  The link between organizational structure and information-
flow 
 
Several scholars have acknowledged the effects of the organizational structure on 
information-gathering and flow. 430 As decisions are based on information, the link between 
structure and flow has a direct effect on the decision making process.  
Moreover, past research has argued that as much as 80% of organizational knowledge 
is contained within people’s heads, 16% is kept as unstructured data and 4% is organized, 
structured and stored.431 If that is indeed the case, the need for an organizational structure for 
financial regulators which will provide good information-flow and knowledge-sharing is 
imperative as this information cannot be obtained in any other way than by interpersonal 
communication.  
This sub-chapter aims to provide an overview of some of the existing literature on 
organizational structure and its impact on information-flow. By doing so it will also create a 
framework through which the different structures of financial regulators can be analyzed and 
evaluated.  
In his 2005 article, Rudalevige refers to the information which is needed by the 
president of the USA in order to make decisions. His conclusions are that a functionally 
based structure will provide the president with more useful information than a policy-specific 
structure. Meaning, a structure which supplies the president with expert opinion on technical 
issues (such as “legislative policy formulation”432) is more valuable for the decision making 
process than a structure which separates policy from specialization (such as “foreign or 
domestic”433). Furthermore, multiple sources of competing information will give a wider 
view than a single source of information.434  
These findings also seem to be applicable to the discussion of information-flow in the 
different structures of financial regulators. Choosing a structure for financial regulators which 
ties together policy and specialization, for example a regulatory department which specializes 
in disclosure rules and also has the power to enact the relevant regulation with regards to 
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disclosure, is more beneficial than a regulatory department with specialization in disclosure 
rules which provides the information to the legislative department in the financial regulator. 
Choosing a structure which ties policy and specialization is beneficial for taking the right 
regulatory decision and minimizing information gaps.  
Furthermore, a structure which allows multiple sources of competing information to 
reach the hands of the decision maker in the financial regulatory body is preferable to a 
structure which does not. 
Duncan approached the issue of organizational design from a different angle. In his 
article he analyses different types of organizational structures in order to decide which of 
them is best suited to different environments. He provides us with tools in order to try and 
adjust the structure to the environment.435 Derived from Duncan’s findings,436 a less rigid 
regulatory structure, (one in which employees from all levels of the organization take a 
greater part in the decision making process), would be beneficial over a rigid one (where 
management keeps tight control and does not delegate assignments which involve discretion 
to other employees), in a regulatory sphere characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, i.e. 
where the demand for information is great. 
Furthermore, a structure which enables and encourages cooperation between different 
regulatory departments and between different regulatory institutions is beneficial to a 
structure which inhibits cooperation.437  
In her 1987 article, Weiss used a study conducted on the schooling system in the US 
to try to answer the question - what pushes government authorities to cooperate? She found 
that cooperation is mainly induced by an external demand for cooperation, such as a law 
demanding cooperation or public opinion which pushes the authorities to cooperate.438 Weiss 
did not discuss the issue of distinct categorical institutional structures and did not suggest that 
one structure is preferable to others. She was more concerned with the question of what 
makes authorities cooperate. Even so, as information-flow is highly dependent on 
information-sharing and cooperation, her findings too point in the direction of increased 
cooperation, i.e., a structure which best facilitates cooperation will also facilitate information-
sharing.  
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Information-sharing within organizations depends on a number of factors which 
include employee motivation, organizational culture, structure, and how power is divided 
between employees.439  
Individuals may contribute or share knowledge within an organization in one of four 
ways;440  feeding the knowledge into a database; formal obligatory interactions dedicated to 
sharing knowledge; informal interactions which lead to sharing knowledge; and sharing 
knowledge within designated forums created in order to share and disperse information, such 
as creating social forums within the organization which are not obligatory, for example a 
forum for environmental protection which employees can choose whether to attend or not.  
Out of the four ways which have been identified, the greatest amount of information 
is usually transmitted during informal gatherings of employees, even though great efforts and 
resources are invested in order to facilitate formal ways for information-transfer in and 
between organizations.441  
Social networks further increase the capabilities of employees to share knowledge, i.e. 
employees who belong to the same social network or the same voluntary forums will tend to 
exchange more work-related information between each other, relative to the amount of 
information they exchange with people who do not belong to the same social network or 
forum.442 
Moreover, Kim et al. have found that knowledge-sharing is a dynamic learning 
process which occurs between employees, customers, and suppliers, and which is positively 
correlated to clear organizational goals.443  
From that we can deduce that an organizational structure which increases informal 
interactions between employees and which sets clear organizational goals should be preferred 
over any other structure.  
When we talk about financial regulation, given the fact that the collected information 
is collected and processed with coordination in line with the organizational goals of the 
financial regulator, it is important to define the goal of the organization and to make it as 
clear as possible for the employees of the regulatory body. 
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A recent example may be taken from the Israeli central bank; the Israeli government 
has realized the importance of defining clear goals for the regulatory work of its central bank, 
which is also responsible for supervising banks in Israel, and has enacted a new law, The 
Bank of Israel Law of 2010, replacing the former one from 1954.  
Section 3 of the new law defines the goals of the central bank as follows: maintaining 
price stability; supporting economic policies of the government such as growth, employment 
and the narrowing of social gaps, and; insuring the stability and accountability of the 
financial system as a whole.444 
Defining the organizational goals helps determine the type of information which will 
be collected and processed by the employees of the regulatory body and so helps focus the 
regulatory work and cuts down on irrelevant information.  
Another important point for information-flow considerations is the physical layout of 
the office. Studies have proven that the physical layout, also known as the “microgeography” 
of the office, matters. Scholars from Caplow445 to Hall and Tolbert446 stress that in order to 
increase information-sharing in and between organizations, the physical distance between 
employees should be brought down to a minimum and informal interactions should be 
increased.447  
From this we can conclude that a structure which allows more face-to-face interaction 
between employees should be preferred to one that isolates them from one another.  
Last, another aspect of information which is directly linked to information-flow is 
information-gathering. It is the source of the information that flows, and without the 
collection of the right kind of information, there is no information–flow to discuss.  
Stephenson referred to this issue and pointed out that agents’ incentives to collect and analyze 
data depends on the institutional design and environment. He further states that information 
may help reach better decisions, but it is costly. It costs the information-collecting agent time, 
resources, and effort to collect it.448 That is why the collection of information should be 
encouraged through incentives.  
Following Stigler, Stephenson stresses that from a total welfare point of view, 
research should be conducted until the point where the marginal benefits from acquiring the 
information is equal to the marginal costs of finding it. However, the problem is that these 
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social marginal benefits and costs do not always correlate with the personal marginal benefits 
and costs of the information-collecting agents. This will lead to a ‘socially suboptimal 
investment in information’ (p. 1431) .449  
He further points out that, although theoretically one could imagine that an 
information-collector would over collect information, there are a few very good reasons to 
think that in most cases he will under-collect information. A major reason is that most of the 
costs are borne by the information collector, while the benefits are shared among society as a 
whole. This reduces the incentives to collect information and might create problems in cases 
where society prefers the decision maker to make a slightly better decision, but it comes with 
a great personal cost of information search. Another reason might be a collective action 
problem which may develop when a number of different agents are responsible for 
information-gathering.450  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this chapter refers to the problem of 
information-flow assuming the right kind of information was gathered and processed. It does 
however make use of Stephenson’s analysis with regards to how agents think when 
encountering a strategic situation which relates to information. While Stephenson is occupied 
with information collection incentives, this chapter focuses on information-sharing problems 
inside financial regulators which are government institutions.   
To sum up the points brought up by the above mentioned-literature, when choosing 
between two different types of organizational structures for financial regulators, and if the 
main consideration is to increase information-flow, the following framework is the 
recommended one: 
- Where possible, vote for a structure which ties policy and specialization together, for 
example, a structure in which a supervisory department consists of specialists such as 
economists, lawyers etc. which also has the ability to enact regulation, rather than a 
structure in which specialists perform research and pass the research on to a 
department which has the power to determine policy and enact regulation.  
- Where possible, allow multiple sources of competing information to reach the hands 
of the decision maker. This point stresses the fact that a diversified regulatory 
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structure is preferable to a consolidated structure, as a diversified model contains 
more competing sources of information than the consolidated one.  
- A less rigid and hierarchical regulatory structure would be beneficial over a rigid one. 
As discussed in this chapter, a fragmented financial regulatory structure is beneficial 
to a consolidated one, as it removes at least one layer of manager–employee 
relationship - the last one before the top - thus making the structure less rigid.  
- A structure which enables and encourages cooperation is more beneficial than a 
structure which inhibits cooperation. In the context of financial regulation, having 
more joint meetings, forums and social networks in and between the different 
regulators, and forming platforms such as joint agreements for cooperation and 
Memorandums Of Understanding between different financial regulatory authorities, is 
beneficial for information-flow and should be encouraged.  
-  An organizational structure which increases informal interactions between employees 
and which sets clear organizational goals should be preferred over any other structure. 
For information-flow purposes, it is beneficial to have the goals of the financial 
regulatory body described in the authorizing laws.451 
- An organizational structure which allows more face-to-face interaction between 
employees should be preferred to one that isolates them from one another.  
Based on the recommended framework, an analysis of the existing financial 
supervisory structures can be made. However, prior to performing such analysis we should 
find out whether the fact that financial regulators are governmental institutions impacts our 
analysis.  
There is reason to believe that information-sharing inside government organizations 
will differ from information-sharing within private sector organization. Private sector 
organizations differ from public ones in a number of aspects which affect problems of 
information-flow. Basically, these differences make it more difficult for information to flow 
within and between public sector organizations as opposed to private ones.  
These differences further highlight the increased need for coordination and 
cooperation inside and between the different financial regulators and further stress the 
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importance of choosing the right structure for improving information-flow. These differences 
will now be discussed in greater detail.   
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5.3  The differences between public institutions and private sector 
firms 
 
The distinction between the private and public sectors has often been discussed in the 
academic literature on public administration.452 However, most articles in this field refer to 
public utilities while only a minority of articles touch on public sector institutions providing 
other types of services, such as regulators or ministries.453 Financial regulators belong to the 
latter group; they are service-granting public institutions which do not provide society with 
public utility services.  
Given the scarcity of articles referring to the differences between private sector firms 
and regulatory institutions, some insights can be drawn from the literature comparing private 
sector firms to firms supplying public utilities. These insights will be adjusted, where needed, 
to fit financial regulatory institutions and enable a better assessment of the existing financial 
supervisory models.   
Unless stated otherwise, the differences between public institutions and private sector 
firms highlighted in the following pages are also applicable to financial regulatory 
institutions.  
Scholars agree that the main difference between public institutions and private sector 
firms relates to ownership; public sector institutions are held by the government as opposed 
to private sector firms which are held by shareholders or entrepreneurs.454  
This difference yields two immediate results - the way the firms are financed, and the 
way in which the firms are controlled.455 Private firms and publicly traded firms are financed 
through revenues paid by their consumers, by credit which they borrow from banks, and by 
stocks they issue on the stock market whereas public institutions are funded mainly from tax 
payers’ money.456 The second factor, the control, refers to the fact that private sector firms 
are controlled by market forces, i.e. supply and demand, as opposed to public institutions 
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which are controlled by political powers and pressures.457 That is especially true when the 
public institutions are not financially independent from government, i.e. when their budgets 
depend on government decisions, which is the case for many financial regulatory bodies 
around the world.458 In such cases, the public institutions may be subject to political pressure 
which might undermine their professional judgment and lead to suboptimal decision-making.  
These three main differences, i.e. the identity of the controller, the way in which the 
legal entity is financed, and the way in which it is controlled, have an effect on the 
organizational behavior of the entity.459  
This goes back to the theory of the firm and to incentives to monitor; dispersed 
ownership, in this context - being owned by the government, leads to lower efficiency in the 
public sector.460 The reason behind this phenomenon is an incentives problem; in contrast to 
private sector firms which are supposed to maximize their shareholders’ profits, in the public 
sector no individual voter will directly gain from a more efficient organizational design for 
public institutions. This causes a difference in the amount of monitoring in each type of 
entity; in a private sector firm the shareholders are incentivized to monitor the managers and 
provide them with incentive schemes which will increase shareholders’ profits. This in turn 
provides a drive for innovation and efficiency as the manager’s salary is often tied to the 
company’s performance either through shares or through remuneration programs and 
bonuses. In contrast, when it comes to public institutions, managers do not usually get an 
increase in their salary if they opt for a better organizational design.461 As monitoring, or lack 
of, does not directly influence any particular individual, it becomes a ‘public good’ – very 
few people are induced to take part in the monitoring of a public agency as their efforts will 
very likely exceed their gains.462  
Even though financial regulatory agencies don’t produce tangible assets, problems 
can and do exist in monitoring financial regulators.  First, as mentioned in the second chapter 
to this research, monitoring financial products is a complicated task which requires 
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expertise.463 Derived from that, monitoring of financial regulation requires expertise and 
understanding both of the problems and of the solutions suggested by the regulator. Very few 
people have the expertise and knowledge to assess the regulatory work. Second, very much 
like the consumers serviced by a public utility firm, each individual consumer of the financial 
regulatory services gains nothing directly from a more efficient design for financial 
regulators, and so does not have the right incentives to push for a better designed regulator.    
Problems with monitoring in the public sector might also induce the problem of a 
captured agent. Where monitoring is lacking it is easier for the public official to consider his 
own utility function and be tempted by lucrative suggestions from the industry in exchange 
for helping with favors in the area he is in charge of. A captured public official will act for 
the benefit of the group which has captured him, rather than in accordance with the good of 
the public in general.464 This might include keeping information to himself or spreading 
partial information in order to tilt the end decision in the direction which is beneficial to the 
regulated firms.  
Another problem which is related to political as opposed to economic control is that 
of multiple sources of authority.465 Multiple sources of authority become a problem when 
those who have the authority contradict each other. It is very likely that in order to mitigate 
this problem, public institutions will develop complex bureaucratic mechanisms to make sure 
that all those who have the authority are satisfied. This of course has a direct effect on 
information-flow as information-flow is made more complex.  
Take for example the financial regulatory structure in France; France has many 
interconnected regulatory bodies, sometimes with overlapping responsibilities. The 
interconnectivity of the French regulatory bodies, which is reflected by the fact that the heads 
of a regulatory body can and do sit on the board of other regulatory bodies, might be partially 
explained by the need to satisfy all those who have the authority and political power.466 
According to Boyne, the three distinctions between public institutions and private 
sector firms are not just conceptual but also empirical. The empirical evidence on this issue 
suggests that they are not perfect proxies for each other. This implies that all three differences 
- ownership, funding, and control - should be taken into account when evaluating the effects 
of being a public institution.467  
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5.3.1 The impacts of being a public institution 
 
The literature on differences between public sector and private sector managers 
identifies four main theoretical effects of being a public institution: the connection between 
being a public institution and organizational environments, organizational goals, 
organizational structures, and the values of managers.468  
 
5.3.2 Differences in organizational environments 
 
There are several aspects in which public institutions differ from private sector firms. 
The organizational differences have been summed up by the literature as follows:469 
Complexity:  Public institutions are generally more complex than private sector firms 
as their managers are facing different stakeholders with contradicting demands. Furthermore, 
public institutions tend to be more bureaucratic due to a number of reasons which have little 
to do with efficiency, such as, their multiple sources of authority, and pressure to provide jobs 
for people who are close to politicians. See for example the French case which was 
mentioned earlier in chapter 3.5.2.1 of this research.    
Intrusion: Public institutions are easily influenced by external pressures and 
events.470 This is especially true when the budget of the public institution depends on 
government decisions such as the case with the Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets 
(AFM), the Dutch authority responsible for market conduct and enforcement of the provision 
for information, or with the Israeli Securities Authority.471  
Instability: Due to external political pressure, public institutions tend to change their 
strategies more frequently than private sector firms. This can be viewed in the frequent 
changes to the financial regulatory structures undertaken by countries across the world.472 
Lack of competition: public institutions usually do not compete with other public 
institutions in order to provide their services. It is usually the case that the state will want to 
minimize the public resources invested in the public institutions and so, in the name of 
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efficiency, will try not to form two public institutions which have overlapping responsibility. 
If the state succeeds in doing so, it means that consumers have no choice other than to 
engage with one specific public institution, no matter how bad its services are. In addition, as 
public institutions do not receive their revenues from the people to whom their service is 
granted, their willingness to be responsive to consumers’ demands drops. The consumers can 
not influence the quality of the service they receive473. 
This makes it difficult to create incentives for increasing efficiency in public 
institutions. Moreover, it creates differences in the nature, purpose, and scope of structural 
reform; in the private sector viable organizational reforms are selected by the markets. We 
therefore assume that such organizational reforms are efficient, or else they would not occur. 
A public institution reform, on the other hand, does not occur as a result of market power and 
competition but rather as a result of the political atmosphere of the time. It is therefore much 
harder to detect the reason behind such reform and evaluate whether it is efficient or not. This 
is one of the reasons why some scholars suggest that regulatory competition between 
different regulatory bodies might be beneficial. Others disagree as they claim that such 
competition undermines the goals behind the regulation that these entities are supposed to 
produce, and encourages unwanted behavior by the regulated firms, such as forum 
shopping.474 The answer is not conclusive and this question is still open for debate.475  
5.3.3 Differences in goals  
 
While private sector firms have one major goal, which is to maximize profits, public 
institutions have many different goals, such as pleasing the different stake-holders, and 
promoting values such as justice, equality, and fairness.476 Even though financial regulatory 
authorities are mainly concerned with efficiency considerations, they too have many other 
goals such as consumer protection, promoting competition, and promoting values of justice 
and fairness.  
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Take for example the consolidated Swiss financial supervisory authority, FINMA, 
whose goals are defined in Article 5 of the Financial Market Supervisory Act (FINMASA) - 
2007 as follows:  
“In accordance with the financial market acts, financial market supervision has the 
objectives of protecting creditors, investors, and policy holders as well as ensuring the 
smooth functioning of the financial markets. It thus contributes to sustaining the reputation 
and competitiveness of Switzerland’s financial centre.”477  
Another example containing a whole spectrum of goals may be found in Section 2 to 
the American Securities Exchange Act – 1934 which defines the goals of the Securities 
Exchange Commission as follows: 
“For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities as commonly 
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are effected with a 
national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of 
such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by 
officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports, to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for securities and a 
national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions and the 
safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to 
make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect 
interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more 
effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the 
maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions…”478 
This difference between public institutions and private sector firms results in a 
different type of managerial regime; managers of public institutions must be aware of the 
different, sometimes contradicting goals they are asked to achieve, and must navigate a 
golden line between them.  
According to Boyne public institutions, as opposed to private sector firms, are also 
vaguer with regards to their goals, since their organizational policies are dictated by 
politicians rather than by professional managers.479 This is especially true when the 
independence of the financial regulatory authority is weaker, such as the case where its 
budget is dependent on a political decision.  
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This creates a difference in the need for clarity; in order to get policies adopted 
politicians need to gain a wide support for the change from many diverse groups. In these 
surroundings lack of clarity is an asset as it is more difficult to object to a less clear 
change.480  
These political pressures hamper the work of public institutions, as performance 
targets and measurements are inherently unclear, and management according to objectives is 
discouraged.481  
 
5.3.4 Differences in organizational structures  
 
The organizational structures of public institutions and private sector firms reflect 
some of the same arguments that were already brought up when discussing the differences in 
goals. As a result of having many sources of authority and the consequent need for political 
compromise, public institutions tend to be more bureaucratic. The complex and bureaucratic 
structure of public institutions is also caused in part by demands set by monitoring bodies 
which are abundant in the public sector, and by requirements of accountability.482 As a result 
of the bureaucracy in public organizations, stagnation and formalization cause delays and 
inefficiencies which are referred to as red tape in the literature.483 
Last, managers of public institutions have less autonomy than their colleagues in 
private sector firms, especially when it comes to firing, hiring and promoting employees. This 
is due to the rigid rules of government employment contracts and due to the fact that they are 
in the public eye, and are thus subject to criticism by the public.484  
This of course makes it harder for managers in public institutions to control their 
employees, as there are no substantial “reward or punishment” tools. Moreover, and with 
regards to the need for information-sharing, public institutions have ambiguous performance 
measurements which make it hard to convince employees that sharing knowledge will be 
worth their while.485 
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5.3.5 Differences in employees’ commitment and values  
 
  The last difference between public and private sector entities has been identified in 
the literature as a difference in the values of employees and managers.486 However, the 
literature seems to disagree on the direction in which these differences go.487 While part of 
the literature considers managers in public institutions as manipulative agents who try to 
abuse the system in order to escape accountability and get around the monitoring systems put 
in place to control their actions,488 a different stream of the literature views these managers as 
less materialistic agents concerned with serving the public and promoting the public good 
with which they are entrusted.489  
The truth lies somewhere in the middle. In their research Mayer et al. analyzed the 
ethical behavior patterns of 904 employees and 195 managers in 195 departments. Their 
findings back up findings from the social learning and social exchange theories and suggest 
that ethical behavior is transmitted top down from one managerial layer to the one beneath 
it.490   
These findings suggest that managers of public institutions will behave, on average, in 
accordance with the ethics and norms dictated to them from the top.491  
Putting this debate aside, scholars tend to agree that the differences in pay, 
remuneration, and goals of public institutions attract employees of a different type to the ones 
who choose to work for private sector firms.492   
As public institutions, financial regulatory authorities are entrusted with promoting a 
public good, and they tend to have missions of broader scope and greater impact than those of 
private sector firms.493 Thus, employees who choose to work for the public sector are thought 
to be more altruistic and less concerned with financial remuneration in comparison with their 
colleagues in the private sector.494 This has been found true in a number of empirical studies 
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which tested the value employees attach to helping others as opposed to the value or utility 
they derive from financial rewards.495  
These differences between public and private sector entities dictate a need for a 
different type of management in public versus private sector entities. It also has implications 
with regards to information-flow and organizational structure; running an administrative 
body, such as a financial regulator, is not only about solving agency costs and giving the right 
kind of incentives to employees. It is also about identifying and solving the knowledge 
problems which may occur in such organizations, and between one organization and another. 
Even if the public officials working for the financial regulatory body are fully motivated to 
do their work, they need to receive the right kind of information in order to perform and bring 
results. The differences, to the extent that they exist, between public and private sector 
entities also call for a slightly different evaluation of problems relating to organizational 
design and structure.  
Knowledge-sharing is important both in the public and the private sector. Researchers 
have found that organizations which transfer knowledge efficiently are more productive than 
ones which do not.496  
For private sector firms, information-flow is essential in order to meet consumer 
demands and remain competitive. Even though public institutions are not subject to 
competitive market forces, knowledge-sharing is important for them as well. In the public 
sector there is a growing focus on result-oriented services and performance. These require 
greater information and knowledge-sharing capabilities.497  
Employee turnover makes it essential to collect, preserve, and share knowledge within 
the organization. Moreover, as the world becomes more complex, cooperation between 
different government institutions is needed. In order to do so, government institutions need to 
share their knowledge with one another.498  
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As Nonaka noted, it is the individuals within the organization who are collectively 
responsible for the creation and management of organizational knowledge and know-how.499 
Therefore it is important to identify the optimal environment for enhancing employee 
knowledge-sharing capabilities.  
Capabilities of knowledge-sharing with other institutions are also significant as they 
are often essential for the work of the institutions. Hence the importance of the discussion 
regarding the optimal structure for facilitating information–flow. These issues are at the heart 
of this chapter and are the focus of discussion in the following pages.  
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5.4 The story of information-flow 
 
Decisions are made based on information sourced from employees. In order to 
understand the work of an organization it is critical to understand what kind of information 
reaches the person or persons in charge of making the decisions.500  
Institutions are important for decision making as they help provide a set of rules for 
the interaction of employees, and by doing so provide them with an idea of the behavior they 
should expect from one another. This helps to mitigate the uncertainty inherent in strategic 
interactions, and provides the employees with some sort of commitment mechanisms which 
helps reduce information search costs.501 Institutions might also have a slight superiority with 
regards to maintaining and storing of information.  
The organizational structure affects the type of information that flows to the top and 
on which decisions are made. Therefore a prior decision must be made about how to structure 
the organization so that the right kind of information reaches those who have the power to 
make a decision.502  
When we talk about information-flow and about possible problems with information–
flow, we refer mainly to information which is analyzed and brought in an analyzed form to 
the decision maker, i.e., more complex information. There are other types of information such 
as statistics and data which are less vulnerable to being changed while traversing the different 
levels of management in the organization which lie beneath the decision maker.  
When we think of information-flow inside financial regulators it is crucial that the 
right kind of information will reach the decision maker in the shortest time possible.  
There are a few attributes which separate information in general from “the right kind 
of information”. Such attributes include the following: (a) the information is useful in the 
sense that it fits with real world problems; (b) it is comprehensive, meaning that it includes 
all plausible options and an estimation of the probability of their occurrence and; (c) it is 
diverse, i.e., different types of information which may lead to different end results reach the 
decision maker and enable him to see the whole picture and take a decision while being 
aware of all options.503  
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The literature suggests two ways of obtaining the right kind of information: choosing 
the right kind of employees, i.e., choosing agents who share the same views, values, and 
beliefs on the world as the principal in order to minimize the agency problem in collecting 
information;504 and choosing the right kind of structure. This chapter focuses on the latter, the 
reason being that financial regulators are public institutions.  
As discussed earlier, in public institutions it is difficult to change the employees. It is 
also difficult to change the personal attributes of the existing employees in order to make 
them more adept at information-gathering and sharing. It is much easier to change the 
organizational structure to a structure which facilitates better information–flow.505 
The current financial regulatory structures that exist in the world can broadly be 
divided into two types of organizational design: a pyramid hierarchal structure, or a 
fragmented one.  
In order to understand how to structure an organization, two things need to be taken 
into account: what does the person at the top need to know; and, derived from that, how 
should the organization be structured?   
It is important to keep in mind that there is no flawless structure; all structures might 
fail at some point. The trick is to try and reduce the costs and the frequency of such 
failures.506  
When we talk of financial regulators, it is clear that both structures, the consolidated 
and the fragmented one, have their pros and cons when it comes to information-flow. 
However, based on the organizational design literature and on the propositions mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, there seems to be reason to believe that the fragmented structure is 
better suited to information-flow than the consolidated one. The reason for believing so will 
now be discussed in detail.  
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5.4.1 The consolidated financial regulator 
 
When we think of a consolidated financial regulator, such as the English Financial 
Service Authority in its pre-2007 Financial Crisis structure, or the current structure of 
FINMA, the Swiss financial regulator, we think of a pyramid shaped hierarchical structure.   
Such hierarchical structure has its merits; it eliminates the option for overlapping 
regulation, it resolves the problem of gray zones, and it enables smoother and more frequent 
communication and interaction between the different departments of the financial regulator, 
as it increases the encounters between employees of different departments.  
As Bozeman at el put it: ‘Physical layout is important because communication 
declines rapidly with the distance between people’ (p. 393). 507 Therefore, it is suggested that 
physical interaction between employees increases the sharing of information and should be 
encouraged. 
Having said that, the hierarchical pyramid structure also has its down-side when it 
comes to information-flow; the problem with this structure is that information gets diluted as 
it flows upwards.  
Each level of employees takes out what seems to be unnecessary information, and this 
selective processing of the information changes the information as it moves up the ladder. By 
the time it reaches the top the individuals at the top might not have enough relevant 
information to take an informed decision in times of uncertainty.508  
The information which will reach the top depends greatly on what information has 
been passed up in each level. In the words of Rudalevige (p.338), “The sea of information at 
the bottom of any hierarchical pyramid is reduced to a puddle at the top.”509  
That is why having more subordinates participate in the decision making process may 
generate the right kind of information to deal with uncertainty as there are less screens on the 
way.510  
The notion of staff serving as screens of information is indeed one of the biggest 
problems with the consolidated model; disagreements among staff are hushed before they 
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reach the top. In addition, staff may choose to omit information either because they deem it 
irrelevant or because it might make them look bad.511  
This is not to say that screening information has only negative consequences. On the 
contrary, the phenomenon of diluted information also brings with it a positive effect; the 
consolidated model provides a wide potential for information-gathering and processing and 
extraneous data is eliminated during the process. At the end the information that reaches the 
top is easier to digest.512  
As a consequence, in some cases, the pyramid structure makes a lot of sense. 
However, as there are no guarantees that the information which flows up contains all the 
important facts in order to reach an informed decision, using this type of structure might be 
problematic in the area of financial regulation which is heavily dependent on information for 
crisis prevention and for a well-functioning market.  
One of the tasks of the organizational structure is to facilitate the information-flow 
inside the organization in order to allow for better decision making processes. When an 
organizational structure is formalized and centralized, information-flow becomes restricted. 
When this happens the organization is not able to cope well with uncertainty.513  
In one of the studies performed on information-flow in different types of companies, 
some of the companies had what can be described as a steep pyramid or a consolidated 
structure based on defined divisions with clear responsibility and a high degree of managerial 
control from the top.514  These types of companies displayed the need for high amounts of 
information which was required by senior management in order to control the company. 
However, it was found that top down information was very scarce. This created a problem for 
middle level managers who reported that they felt the need to receive more information from 
higher management. Access to the high level information was denied to them.515  
These findings are backed up by a later study516 which concluded that the hierarchal 
structure of government organizations limits information-sharing, and hinders the 
information-flow between employees and between employees and their managers. In the area 
of financial regulation these findings are alarming.  
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When we think of a financial regulator which is supposed, to the best of its abilities, 
to predict and stop a financial crisis before it has occurred, and to mitigate it once it has 
already started ,517 the lack of sufficient information in the middle level of management could 
create a serious problem.  
It is not easy to obtain and digest the information which helps to predict a financial 
crisis, as the ability to predict a crisis depends on seeing the broad picture and putting the 
puzzle together correctly. There is a wide potential to “get it wrong”, 518 and it is necessary 
that as many employees and mid-level managers as possible are exposed to the relevant 
information in order to minimize the chances of mistakes. According to White’s findings, the 
hierarchical structure does not enable that for middle level management.519  
Managers in organizations with flatter pyramids report that they are happy with the 
information they receive. As they have direct personal contact with senior management, they 
feel they have access to all forms of internal information.520 Such access is important as 
access to strategic information and operational data enables managers to respond quickly to 
any situation.  
Here an analogy can be drawn from a completely different field- Biology. In nature 
there are certain types of insects which are considered to be “social insects” such as bees, 
ants, etc. These insects organize their colony according to a clear division of labor. However, 
when external conditions change, a transformation in the division of labor inside the colony 
is visible. This indicates that some sort of information has been transmitted among members 
of the colony which causes them to react and change their roles inside the colony.521  
Division of labor inside social insect colonies is one of the most studied aspects of 
colony behavior.522 Such studies try to trace the connection between the individual worker 
behavior and the colony’s organization of labor. Some of these studies suggest that there is a 
stimulus which pushes the individual to work on a specific task. Each worker performs his 
job when the stimulus crosses its internal threshold.523 This means that the chemical 
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information must reach a certain level in order to cause a change in the behavior of the 
workers of the colony.  
Much like these insects, the financial regulator chooses to act and regulate based on 
accumulated information. The information must reach a certain level of validity or concern in 
order to trigger the regulator to act. The more sources of information point at a certain 
direction, the higher the probability for regulatory action.  
Moreover, the larger the number of information sources pointing at the same 
direction, the higher the chance for a correct regulatory action, i.e. providing the right 
regulatory “medicine” which solves the market failure in the most efficient way.  
As a result, exposing middle and lower level management to the right kind of 
information is crucial. It seems it is hard to achieve such exposure in the consolidated 
structure, as that structure is based on tight control which is reflected in the lack of sufficient 
information flowing from the top down.  
However, this is not the only problem with information-flow inside the consolidated 
model.  
It has been found that low formalization, which is usually found in less hierarchal 
structures, induces innovation and encourages new ideas.524 Derived from that, a hierarchal 
consolidated structure is likely to block regulatory innovation.525 In the area of financial 
regulation where the industry is constantly coming up with new ideas to bypass the 
regulation, there is a high need for the regulator to keep up with the industry and be at least as 
innovative. If the consolidated regulatory model blocks innovation, it might jeopardize the 
efficiency of the regulation.  
Moreover, the organizational structure also affects the amount of knowledge-
exchange between departments and between one organization and another. Centralization 
reduces the initiatives for knowledge-exchange with other units in the organization,526 
whereas an organizational design which promotes flexibility also encourages information-
sharing within and between the organization and other organizations.527 A centralized 
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organizational structure which emphasizes rules, regulations, and strict monitoring, may 
create barriers to knowledge-sharing within the organization.528  
These insights bring us to another point relating to information-flow inside the 
consolidated regulator - the definition of the units which construct it. The definition of units 
changes the type of information which will flow to the top. There is a difference between 
receiving information from units that are responsible for different products and receiving 
information from units that are responsible for different types of institutions.  
As the person at the top will learn mainly about the disagreements between the units, 
and as these will depend on the way in which each unit is defined, changing the categories 
around which choices are made impacts future decisions.529   
For example, the consolidated financial regulatory model usually contains 
departments which have certain regulatory responsibilities which are divided among them 
according to specific segments. If those departments are organized according to a product-
base type of model, i.e., different departments regulate different types of financial products, 
the head of the regulatory authority will receive information regarding a certain set of 
problems and issues. This set will be very different from the one which would be obtained if 
those departments are organized according to a firm-based model, i.e., each department 
regulates a specific type of financial firm. The different nature of problems which reach the 
top have an effect on the end decision.  
It could be argued that both structures should create information-flow to the top, and this 
would be true to some extent.  
However, glancing at reality it seems fair to assume that when departments are 
organized according to the firm-based regulatory model, more arguments will come up and so 
more information will float up and reach the head of the authority.  
This assumption is based on the fact that financial firms have moved past the clear 
boundaries of banking, insurance, and securities firms, and are now selling products which 
cross the boundaries originally set for a specific type of firm. By doing so, it is no longer 
clear which regulator has the mandate to supervise these financial conglomerates and their 
activities.  
We know from current behavior of financial regulators in the fragmented regulatory 
models that each of them strives to enlarge his or her mandate for supervision. Therefore we 
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have no reason to believe that supervisors will act otherwise if they become heads of a 
department in a consolidated regulatory body.  
Thus, due to the fact that the supervisory boundaries of the firm-based model are 
vaguer than those of the product-based model, we can assume that more arguments with 
regards to which mandate belongs to who will float up to the top if we opt for the firm-based 
model. 
Indeed the current structures of consolidated regulators which exist in the world today 
are constructed from different departments each in charge of regulating a specific type of 
financial firm, and are usually divided between banks, insurance companies, and securities 
market regulation.530 
Much like the president in Rudalevige’s 2005 example531, the head of the regulatory 
authority will only learn about what crosses the department’s jurisdictions as those border 
lines are likely to ignite a dispute and these disputes are what flows to the top.  As 
Rudalevige puts it:532 
  
‘When the very same people, with the very same preferences, are shifted from a 
functional to a product line-based decision-making structure, different outcomes 
occur…’ (p. 342).  
 
Essentially, based on everything said so far, we can conclude that information is 
important and the more information that flows upwards the better. However, forcing large 
amounts of information up the tube and into the hands of the decision maker who maintains 
full control over the decisions also has its downside; it may lead to a bottle-neck. The 
decision maker will need to invest a great amount of time in screening the information and 
managing it.533  
There is a fine line between encouraging information-flow and overflowing the 
system. Basically, different positions within an organization are faced with different 
problems which in turn depend on different types of information for solution. In general, 
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problem-solving is a combination of the right kind of information and personal skills and 
capabilities.534  
The problem related to information in organizations is usually not with regards to 
gathering the information but with regards to processing it. The ability to process large 
amounts of information goes down the further you move up the hierarchical structure of the 
organization.535  
One of the ways to deal with the problem of overflowing the system with knowledge 
is by picking the right kind of employees. The information which makes it to the top depends 
on the employees at the bottom. Their judgment colors what they report to the top; this 
phenomenon may also be referred to as bias omission.  
In order to solve this problem, regulatory institutions need to try and select smart 
people who are also highly motivated about their job.536 The idea being that if employees 
serve as screens, the better the screen the better the quality of information which will reach 
the decision maker’s hands.  
Therefore we can conclude that the way to increase information-search by 
government officials is by selecting smarter people or people who care greatly about the 
public outcome of their decisions.537 Picking employees who hold similar views to the head 
of the regulatory authority on the world and on problem-solving, is key to solving the 
problem of “colored” information.538  
This is also true for financial regulators; the quality of the financial regulatory body’s 
work depends on the quality of its employees. That is why recruiting the right kind of 
employees is essential, especially given the problems of firing employees of public 
institutions that were discussed earlier in this chapter.  However, the means to recruiting the 
right kind of employees are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
A separate issue concerns the possibility of overflowing the system with redundant 
information. Even though scholars acknowledge the problem of a possible overflow of 
information, they seem to be more concerned with the lack of information than with overflow 
of information. They seem to agree that the goal should be to push diversity of opinions up 
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the hierarchical structure and into the hands of the decision makers, as diversity of opinions is 
essential in order to make a well informed decision.539   
One way of doing so is indeed to find the right structure for the different departments 
in the consolidated financial regulator. An alternative, and perhaps better, way is “parallel 
processing” of information.540  
Parallel processing means encouraging multiple sources of information. This is indeed 
the plus side of the fragmented regulatory model which will now be discussed.  
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5.4.2 The fragmented financial regulatory structure 
 
When speaking of “parallel processing” of information in financial regulatory 
institutions in its pure form, the fragmented regulatory model comes to mind, i.e., a model 
containing more than one financial regulator. Such models include the institutional model 
(regulating according to the type of institution), the functional model (regulating according to 
the type of product), and the twin-peaks model (one regulator is responsible for consumer 
protection and the other is responsible for minimizing systemic risks). These three types of 
regulatory structures are prevalent in most parts of the world.541 The reason these financial 
regulatory models allow for parallel processing of information is due to the fact that some 
overlapping of regulatory mandates occurs .542  
The big plus of the fragmented model is diversity. As previously mentioned, if a CEO 
wishes to be well-informed, then the categories on which the firm is structured should cut 
across the different categories influencing the firm’s environment.543 Fragmenting the 
financial regulators achieves this outcome based on the fact that in reality financial regulators 
do have overlapping mandates for supervising parts of the financial conglomerates’ activities 
or products. Such overlapping mandates cut across different categories of the firm’s activities 
and so the chances that information is “lost” or unattended to are minimized.  
  As discussed before, when it comes to the social structure, organizational pyramids 
should be flattened.  
 
‘One of the best ways to increase horizontal communication is to increase the number 
of peer relationships while decreasing the number of subordinate-supervisor 
relationships’.544 (p. 402)    
 
From the point of view of decreasing subordinate-supervisor relationships, structuring 
financial regulators in a fragmented way, i.e., different regulatory bodies responsible for 
different supervisory tasks, is better than structuring them in a consolidated pyramid shaped 
regulator; it removes at least one layer of subordinate-supervisor relationship - the last one 
before the top of the pyramid.  
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But this is not the only advantage of the fragmented regulatory model. Nowadays 
scholars have moved past the notion that the solution to regulatory failures is to transform the 
financial regulators into a single consolidated authority. Instead they put emphasis on the 
advantages of having several agents collecting information rather than one.  
The benefits of having several agents collecting and processing information have 
already been highlighted by the Marquis de Condorcet in his Jury Theorem, proving that a 
group of lay jurors deciding by majority rule can reach the correct result more often than one 
expert deciding alone.545  
It is thought that multiple agents act as a sort of insurance – if one agent misses an 
important piece of information there is greater likelihood that another agent will spot it. Much 
like in nature, diversity is a natural way to mitigate risks.   
However, several scholars have pointed out that when agents have a correlated bias, 
vote strategically, or where there is no consensus on what is the right answer, the Jury 
Theorem may no longer hold.546  
The downside for having several agents, as has been demonstrated in chapter 4 to this 
research, includes greater costs associated with duplication, and socially unproductive battles 
over power and prestige caused by overlapping mandates.  
Increasing the number of agents involved in information-gathering and processing 
reduces the incentives each agent has to collect and process the information. This is a form of 
a collective action problem. As the number of agents goes up, so do their incentives to free-
ride. This is also known as the “rational ignorance” effect. Increasing the number of agents 
increases the quantity of the signals received, as there are more agents collecting and 
processing the information, but reduces the quality of these signals.547  
This does not hold true if the pieces of information collected by those agents 
complement each other. In such cases collecting a piece of information increases the marginal 
value of other pieces of information collected. Dividing information-gathering tasks among 
several agents may prove beneficial in these cases.548 
When the policy decision is based on aggregated information which streams from 
different agents, the timing of the agents’ inputs should be taken into account. The main issue 
here is whether the inputs are simultaneous or sequential. This makes a difference as it 
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determines whether agents can observe other agents’ inputs before taking the decision on 
how to act.549  
On the one hand, sequential information systems are useful as each agent can build on 
past knowledge and develop it instead of starting from scratch. On the other hand, sequential 
decision-making systems suffer from the phenomenon of “herding”, decision makers rely on 
past information which shapes their beliefs about reality and shapes the way in which they 
collect future information. In a sense it robs decision makers of their ability to make their 
own unbiased judgment of the reality.550  
If the information is complicated the problem becomes more complex. If the agent has 
new and better information he will use it, but if the information is complicated, as is very 
often the case with information relating to financial issues, the agent may simply choose to 
rely on the existing information and decisions instead of investing time to research and study 
the new pieces of information.551  
The major problem with the fragmented financial regulatory model from an 
information-flow point of view relates to coordination, communication, and cooperation 
between the different regulators acting in the financial markets.  
A decentralized organizational structure is effective when the tasks of the 
organization are self-contained. The decentralized organization is usually used when the 
organization is designed around different products. In such a structure, managers worry only 
about the products or services for which they are responsible.552  
This is useful when the environment is complex as it segments the environment into 
products and allows for specialization. However, the problems begin when these products 
affect each other, as happens with financial products or firms which have a systemic 
influence on each other and on the entire market.  
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One of the biggest problems is that each manager sees only his own product or 
geographic area, and knows that his innovations and actions are restricted to his area of 
specialization. The autonomy of each division makes it very difficult to coordinate the whole.  
Coordination is essential in times of crisis and uncertainty. Decentralized 
organizations have no formal way to coordinate and facilitate information-flow.  
This is exactly the problem of the fragmented financial regulatory model; it faces a 
coordination problem.  
In order to achieve coordination, an understanding of the obstacles in the way to 
cooperation is needed. The main obstacle is that each authority seeks to maintain its 
independence.  Other than that there are internal organizational procedures and cultures 
which are not easily synchronized. Moreover different organizations have different goals. As 
Van de Ven put it:553 
 
‘From an agency’s point of view, to become involved in an inter-agency relationship 
implies (a) that is loses some of its freedom to act independently, when it would prefer 
to maintain control over its domain and affairs, and (b) that it must invest scarce 
resources and energy to develop and maintain relationships with other organizations, 
when the potential returns on this investment are often unclear or intangible’ (p. 28). 
 
It is evident that cooperation only begins when a perceived problem is shared across 
agencies. Moreover, the agencies have to frame the issue as something that can be solved 
through cooperation. Unless cooperation is grasped as the solution to the problem, 
cooperation will not move forward. Once cooperation is considered to be the solution, the 
process is ignited.554  
The second step is to determine whether there are enough resources to handle the 
problem jointly. A recruitment of staff might be needed, money should be raised upfront, and 
budgets need to be allocated.555  
The third thing that needs to exist in order for agencies to cooperate is a capacity in 
each agency to accept cooperation. This depends on each agency’s routines, infrastructure, 
etc. Another issue that seemed to matter is the legality and legitimacy of the cooperation.556  
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If agencies have all of these preliminary requirements, cooperation can be achieved. 
Cooperation is greatly induced when there is external demand for cooperation, be it 
public pressure or an explicit legal demand.557  
 
‘Problems, by themselves, did not trigger the search for new solutions. Nor did 
performance demands by themselves lead to cooperation….Problems coupled with 
demands for improved performance in the domain of the problem did launch districts 
on the path to participation in cooperation...” (p. 112) 
 
Without demand for cooperation, it is likely that each financial regulatory authority 
would take measures to preserve its independence, which in turn would result in keeping 
information to itself.  
As each player in the information-transferring game is interested in increasing his 
marginal benefits from information-sharing, each player would ask himself what is his 
expected utility from sharing the information with an external authority. Meaning, each one 
will ask himself; “If I do not share the information, what will the final decision be, and what 
is my expected utility from the expected decision?” Then he will ask himself the opposite 
question, i.e.; “What will happen if the information is shared, and what is the personal 
expected utility that will come from sharing the information?”  
The player’s marginal benefit from sharing one more piece of information is the 
difference between the two questions,558 i.e. the difference between his expected utility if the 
information is shared versus his expected utility if the information is not shared. This leads to 
the conclusion that in order to induce information-sharing, there is a need to increase the 
incentives for people to share the information they hold.  
This goal can be achieved by doing one of two things: try to incentivize agents in the 
right direction by enlarging their marginal information-sharing benefits; or threaten them 
with punishment in order to enlarge their costs for not sharing information.559 Either way we 
are in need of legal mechanisms which will induce information-sharing between agencies.  
In the absence of a legal coordination mechanism to facilitate information-exchange 
between the two regulatory authorities, we are relying on the personal assessments of the 
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559 This discussion is similar to the discussion proposed by Stephenson with regards to the question of 
information gathering, see M.C. Stephenson, supra n. 429, p. 1430 and onward. 
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regulators as to the personal or organizational benefits they might incur if they do share the 
information. Often the result of this assessment will not equal the efficient level of 
information-sharing considered sufficient from a total welfare point of view. That is why an 
external legal demand for information-sharing is essential.  
Indeed when we talk about cooperation between different financial regulatory 
authorities, we find that each country or jurisdiction has embraced legal mechanisms which 
demand or enable such cooperation.  
An example of an obligatory legal demand for exchange of information may be taken 
from Italy; Article 4 to the Consolidated Law on Finance mandates the exchange of 
information, consultation, and cooperation between different authorities on subjects which 
fall under their overlapping mandates and competence.560  
Another example may be found in the USA where Section 24 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934561 which was later amended and expended by the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act – 2010.562 The act dictates coordination between 
authorities including the exchange of information. After such demand for cooperation exists 
there are a few ways in which cooperation may be organized; lateral relations can be used to 
form joint forums where managers interact and share information, or by nominating liaisons 
to connect between two separate departments. When the level of coordination has to go up, 
an integrator may be used.  
In extreme cases where cooperation is essential for adequate and stable functioning of 
the regulatory body and the markets, consolidation is required. This is the case of the central 
bank and the banks’ supervisory function. As cooperation between these two bodies is vital, 
and as the well functioning of the market as a whole is heavily dependent on the said 
cooperation, many countries have decided to bring the risk of lack of cooperation to a 
minimum and merge these two functions into one regulatory body. It is a clear case in which 
society refuses to accept the risk of lack of coordination as the expected results of lack of 
coordination are too dire.  
Having said that, we should keep in mind that consolidation sits on the extreme 
spectrum of the possible solutions for making financial regulatory authorities cooperate with 
one another.  
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 Article 4 to the legislative decree no. 58, supra n. 210.  
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 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra n. 478.  
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 Dodd-Frank  Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act – 2010, supra n. 340.  
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Another softer cooperation enhancing tool is having different authorities signing 
agreements for cooperation, also known as Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). These 
MOUs define the interaction between the authorities and the ways for cooperation and 
information-exchange.  
An example of a softer legal mechanism for information-exchange may be taken from 
Australia where a number of MOUs have been signed by the different financial regulatory 
authorities;563 for example: Article 5-10 to the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority facilitates the 
sharing of information between the two authorities.564  
Joint forums or committees, such as the EU’s Joint Committee, which was formed by 
Articles 54 to 57 of the European Supervisory Authorities,565 are also very helpful to induce 
information-flow between organizations as they create physical interactions between people 
from different authorities.  
When we discuss cooperation, we should also consider the physical interactions 
between employees. Even the physical structure of the office matters; the office should be 
designed in such a way that people who need to share information interact with one another 
frequently.566 Having people use the same space for coffee breaks or meals further increases 
the chance for information transmitting between employees based on informal conversations.    
The reason that the physical distance affects information-sharing has to do with the 
costs of collecting information. The greater the distance between employees, the higher the 
efforts and the costs they have to invest in collecting certain types of information. The type of 
information which is difficult to obtain from afar is described in the literature as “soft” 
information.567 Such information may include, for example, face-to-face impressions of the 
decision-makers gained from talking to the employees of the regulatory body, or inferences 
with regards to the regulated firms which cannot be transmitted accurately from far away.568 
The greater the importance of soft information to the regulatory process, the more severe are 
the consequences of keeping a long distance work relationship.569  
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 See section 3.5.4.2 to this research.  
564 Article 5 – Article 10 to the Memorandum of Understanding between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, supra n. 311.  
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 The regulations are commonly referred to as “the European Supervisory Authority (ESA) Regulations” and 
consist of the following pieces of regulation mentioned supra n. 353- 356. 
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 See generally: B. Bozeman, K. Roering & A.E. Slusher, supra n. 507, pp. 384-405. 
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 M.A. Petersen, “Information: Hard and Soft.” (2004) Working Paper, Northwestern University. 
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 Z.S. Alam, M.A. Chen, C.S. Ciccotello & H.E. Ryan., infra n. 583, p. 2.  
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176 
 
The literature has long recognized the value of “tiger teams” - teams which dedicate 
their efforts to solving specific problems while not delaying the project as a whole - to 
information-flow.570  
These “teams” could be a partial answer to the problem of cooperation between 
different authorities especially if team members are required to meet regularly and have 
multiple close encounters with one another. 
As informal communication networks are the best source of scientific knowledge for 
managers, and as organizations which are more flexible facilitate information gathering and 
sharing,571 forming “tiger teams” could be useful in enhancing information-sharing and flow.  
What we sometimes see in reality is that the organizational structure of the regulatory 
body begins with a forming law of the authority which does not say much about how the 
authority should be structured, i.e. it does not say much about the different departments 
which the authority should have. What we then find is organizational charts which, even 
though not dictated by law, soon rule with the authority of law, since the law is silent on this 
issue.572  
These organizational charts coupled with organizational routines and procedures have 
an influence on the information-flow inside the organization. This is where tiger teams come 
in, even though in most cases the formation of tiger teams is not dictated by law they can be 
used to facilitate cooperation and information-flow between different regulatory bodies.  
In general it is safe to say that the physical distance between different people who 
have to work together and exchange information should be brought to a minimum. This 
understanding should affect the regulatory structures in place today in several jurisdictions 
around the world including the EU’s newly founded financial regulatory institutions. This 
structure is discussed below as a test case regarding the revision needed in order to facilitate 
information-flow. It is compared to the structure of three other jurisdictions, representing 
three out of the four regulatory structures which exist in the world today: the UK which 
follows the Twin Peaks Approach; Israel which follows the Institutional Approach; and 
Switzerland which follows the Consolidated/Integrated Approach. The fourth approach, the 
Functional Approach, is very similar to the Institutional Approach with regards to the 
physical design of the financial regulators and for this reason, in order to avoid duplication, it 
is left outside this comparison.  
                                                 
570
 See as early as: T.J. Housel, C.J. Morris & C. Westland, ‘Business process reengineering at Pacific Bell’, 
(1993) 21/3 Strategy & Leadership, 28, 28 – 33.  
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 B. Bozeman, K. Roering & A.E. Slusher, supra n. 507, pp. 384-405. 
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 See chapter 3 of this research for examples of organizational charts.  
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5.5 The EU’s financial regulatory structure and information-flow 
 
This subchapter seeks to analyze the existing EU financial supervisory models in light 
of all that has been said throughout this chapter. It seeks to point out the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing EU financial regulatory structures and to offer a remedy for the 
structural weaknesses which are indentified.  
It is therefore important to briefly remind the reader of the regulatory institutions 
which are active in the EU market. 
Since January 2011, regulation of financial services across Europe has been done by 
three European supervisory authorities: the European Banking Authority,573 the European 
Securities and Markets Authority,574 and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority.575 
An additional institution, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),576 was formed 
in order to function as a European systemic risk regulator, supervising macro-prudential 
issues.  
These supervisory authorities play a role in setting down common guidelines for local 
European supervisors in each state. They have the power to investigate, and if needed, to 
issue suggestions for action to the local European supervisors in each member state.577  
As for their physical presence, the European Banking Authority (EBA) is based in 
London, the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) is based in Paris and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) is based in Frankfurt.  
These regulators are coordinated mainly through the Joint Committee established by 
Articles 54 to 57 of the European Supervisory Authorities.578  
The committee targets consistency between sectors and aims to reach joint positions 
on how to regulate financial conglomerates and other cross-sectoral issues.579  
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 For the establishing law see supra n. 354.  
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 For the establishing law see supra n. 356. 
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 For the establishing law see supra n. 355. 
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 For the establishing law see supra n. 353. 
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 As of 2012, the European Central Bank has received more powers with the formation of the Banking Union 
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pp. 1194 – 1196).  
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Given the findings presented in this chapter, it seems that dividing the financial 
regulatory tasks among several European supervisory authorities each specializing in a 
specific market segment is essential in order to increase information-flow.  
As the division of supervision according to the nature of the supervised firm is likely 
to produce arguments over mandates for supervision, more information will flow upwards in 
each regulatory institution, eventually reaching the decision makers and the Joint Committee. 
Such information may come from the lower levels of employees in each regulatory body, but 
it might also come from the industry.  
Overlapping regulation creates hardship for the regulated firms. In turn regulated 
firms will bring the issue of overlapping contradictory regulation to the attention of the 
regulators who issued the regulation. This is likely to ignite a discussion between the 
regulators and the regulated firms in order to adjust the regulation and make it coherent. 
Creating a dialog between different regulatory institutions is very good for information-flow.  
In addition, having a few regulatory bodies with somewhat overlapping 
responsibilities minimizes the chances that a market failure can be overlooked. As discussed 
before, due to the fact that regulation of financial markets is a complicated task, and given the 
fact that sometimes the prediction and prevention of a financial crisis lies in the small details, 
it is beneficial to have a few regulatory bodies examining the market and offering different 
solutions for supervision. Diversity in this case is a wanted phenomenon.  
The fact that the establishing laws of the EU’s financial regulatory authorities have 
clearly defined their goals580 is another plus for the new EU financial regulatory structure, as 
each authority can adjust its information-gathering efforts to fit its goals.  
There is however a problem with the current structure of the European financial 
supervisory institutions; the problem of inadequate information-flow in the current structure 
might come from lack of sufficient cooperation. It is not at all clear that having a Joint 
Committee is sufficient to ensure information-flow.  
Committees usually do not meet on a day-to-day basis, and small coordination issues 
may not even reach the committee but rather be solved one way or another on the spot. 
Having a committee in order to solve major coordination problems is essential, but there is a 
need to solve information-flow and everyday coordination problems in order to allow for 
                                                                                                                                                        
579 Information taken from the ESMA web site: <http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/European-Supervisory-
Framework> accessed 27.05.2013.  
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better information to reach decision makers. As discussed before, having a full picture of the 
situation in all financial markets is essential. The biggest weakness of the current European 
financial supervisory structure is the physical distance between the different regulators.  
As previously stated, close physical presence is important in order to increase 
information-flow. In fact informal gatherings of employees are the greatest enhancement tool 
for the transmission of information.581  
Several studies have shown that the amount of communication between employees in 
organizations and the ease of communication affect task performance as well as personal 
satisfaction in the work place.582 Several others have acknowledged the importance of the 
physical space in which the work place is organized. These scholars have studied the effects 
of physical dispersion on the organization’s performance and have made recommendations as 
to the “microgeography” of the office.583 All of these studies point in one major direction; in 
order to increase information-flow within and between organizations, you must minimize the 
physical distance between the employees and allow them to interact formally and informally 
with one another. The current physical presence of the different European financial 
regulators, each situated in a different country, does not allow these interactions between 
employees to occur. Therefore it clearly harms information-flow between the different 
regulators.  
It is understandable that there might be internal EU political reasons for distributing 
the regulators among different member states, but a solution may be found in rotating the 
authorities between the different states while keeping them together in the same physical 
space. In such a way the political balance between member states will not be harmed and 
information flow will improve.  
Obviously this solution depends on the costs of rotation and should only be used if the 
benefits from such rotation outweigh its costs.  
In addition, in order to increase information-flow and allow for innovative regulatory 
ideas to sprout, more opportunities for employee interaction must be created. Based on the 
solutions to the cooperation problems discussed earlier, it might be advisable to encourage 
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 W.R. Truran, supra n. 441, p. 17.  
582
 See as early as: W.H. Form, ‘Technology and Social Behavior of Workers in four countries: A sociotechnical 
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the establishment of “tiger teams”, mission-specific oriented teams, which are constructed 
from members of different regulatory entities.  
The advantage of forming such teams does not end with information flow. As one of 
the obstacles for cooperation is lack of capacity in each agency to cooperate, depending also 
on each authority’s infrastructure and organizational culture,584 having several “tiger teams” 
containing employees from several different authorities helps bridge the organizational 
culture gaps between the different supervisory authorities, enabling them to work better in the 
future and increase cooperation.  
When comparing the EU’s financial regulatory structure to that of the Israeli structure 
the UK’s structure and the Swiss structure from the point of view of information-flow, the 
following similarities and differences are apparent:  
Table 6 
 The European 
Union  
The United 
Kingdom  
Israel  Switzerland  
Number and 
nature of main 
supervisory 
authorities active 
in the financial 
markets 
3: the European 
Banking Authority 
(EBA), the 
European 
Securities Market 
Authority (ESMA) 
and the European 
Insurance and 
Occupational 
Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA). 
2: the Financial 
Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and the 
Prudential 
Regulation 
Authority (PRA). 
3: The Bank of 
Israel, the 
Israeli 
Securities 
Authority 
(ISA) and the 
Capital 
Markets, 
Insurance and 
Savings 
Department 
within the 
Ministry of 
Finance. 
1: the Swiss Financial 
Market Supervisory 
Authority (FINMA).  
Type of structure   The Institutional 
Approach.  
The Twin Peaks 
Approach.  
The 
Institutional 
Approach. 
The 
Consolidated/Integrated 
Approach. 
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 The European 
Union  
The United 
Kingdom  
Israel  Switzerland  
Coordination 
mechanisms  
The Joint 
Committee formed 
by Articles 54 to 57 
of the European 
Supervisory 
Authorities. 
No coordination 
mechanisms in 
place. 
A joint 
committee 
formed by a 
Memorandum 
of 
Understanding 
from the 24th 
of June 2007 
signed by the 
heads of the 
three financial 
supervisory 
authorities.585  
The Financial Market 
Supervision Act 
(FINMASA) 
establishes a Board of 
Directors as a strategic 
management body 
composed of seven to 
nine independent 
experts which issue 
organizational 
regulations regarding 
also to coordination 
between the different 
departments of the 
authority.586  
Room for 
overlapping 
supervisory 
mandates 
/diversity in 
regulation  
Room for 
overlapping 
mandates is 
present.  
Room for 
overlapping 
mandates is 
present. 
Room for 
overlapping 
mandates is 
present. 
None existing. 
Clear 
organizational 
goals 
Defined in the 
forming laws.587 
Defined in the 
forming law.588 
Defined for 
the Israeli 
Securities 
Authority589 
and for the 
Defined clearly by the 
governing law and by 
the Board of Directors 
which submits the 
strategic goals of the 
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 MoU for Cooperation and Exchange of Information, see supra n. 151. 
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 Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Financial Market Supervision Act, 
FINMASA) of 22 June 2007 (Status as of 1 July 2013), Chapter 2, Section 1, Art. 9(1)(i).  
587
 See supra n. 353- 356.  
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 The Financial Services Bill of 2012, Part 2 - Amendments of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
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Bank of 
Israel.590 Not 
defined by law 
for the Capital 
Markets, 
Insurance and 
Savings 
Department 
within the 
Ministry of 
Finance.591  
authority to the Federal 
Court for approval.592  
 The European 
Union  
The United 
Kingdom  
Israel  Switzerland  
Physical presence  The authorities are 
distributed between 
three different 
countries and 
cities: London, 
Paris and 
Frankfurt.  
Both authorities sit 
in London, but not 
in the same 
compound.  
All authorities 
sit in 
Jerusalem in 
the same area 
and all have 
branches in 
Tel Aviv 
which are a 
short walking 
distance from 
each other.   
All of the departments 
of the authority sit in 
Bern in the same 
confounded area.  
 
Comparing the EU to the UK, Switzerland and Israel, and considering all that has 
been said in this subchapter, highlights the following results:  
 The EU, Israel, and the UK divided the responsibility for financial regulation among 
several authorities and in all of these three jurisdictions the authorities maintain somewhat 
overlapping responsibilities for regulating the markets. From an information-flow point of 
                                                 
590
 Defined in Section 3 A to the Bank of Israel Law – 2010 
591
 See chapter 3.5.1.1 for details.  
592
 See the Federal Act on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Financial Market Supervision 
Act, FINMASA) of 22 June 2007 (Status as of 1 July 2013), Chapter 2, Section 3, Article 21 (2).  
  
183 
 
view, this is superior to the consolidated structure followed by Switzerland which decreases 
the amount of parallel processing of information. The EU and Israeli structures are more 
fragmented than the structure of the UK and thus are expected to be more beneficial for 
information-flow.  
In most cases the authorities in the four jurisdictions reviewed above have their goals 
and objectives defined by law, which is beneficial for information-flow. The only exception 
is the Israeli Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings Department within the Ministry of 
Finance which defines its goals in its financial statements, strategic plans and inner 
memorandums.593 
The EU, Switzerland, and Israel have coordinating mechanisms in place in order to 
facilitate cooperation and exchange of information, while such mechanisms have not been 
found for the UK.  
In addition, there are differences in the physical presence of the regulatory authorities 
in each jurisdiction which, as has been discussed in this chapter, impact the amount and speed 
of information-flow; according to the theoretical framework discussed in this chapter, when 
looking at the physical presence of the regulatory bodies we would expect to find that 
information-flow in the Israeli system and in the Swiss system is better than in the UK, and 
all three are superior to information-flow between the EU regulatory bodies.  
These results are even stronger when we rate the jurisdictions according to the 
framework which is presented at the beginning of this chapter. The intuitions from this 
framework can be put into a comparative table, keeping in mind that the following analysis is 
based on the intuitions in this chapter and not on empirical data.  
For the purpose of the next table, a plus sign represents a positive relationship to the 
suggested framework, where two pluses represent an even stronger relationship, and a minus 
sign represents a negative relationship to the suggested framework.  
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 See chapter 3.5.1.1 to this research.  
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Table 7 
Compatibility with the 
framework presented at 
the beginning of this 
chapter 
The 
European 
Union 
The United 
Kingdom 
Israel Switzerland 
Where possible, vote for a 
structure which ties policy 
and specialization 
together.  
+ + + + 
Where possible, allow 
multiple sources of 
competing information to 
reach the hands of the 
decision maker.  
++ + ++ - 
A less rigid and 
hierarchical regulatory 
structure would be 
beneficial over a rigid 
one. 
++ + ++ - 
A structure which will 
enable and encourage 
cooperation will be 
beneficial to a structure 
which will inhibit 
cooperation.  
+ - + ++ 
An organizational 
structure which increases 
informal interactions 
between employees 
should be preferred over 
any other structure. 
- - + + 
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Compatibility with the 
framework presented at 
the beginning of this 
chapter 
The 
European 
Union 
The United 
Kingdom 
Israel Switzerland 
An organizational 
structure which sets clear 
organizational goals 
should be preferred over 
any other structure. 
++ ++ + ++ 
An organizational structure 
which allows more face-to-
face interaction between 
employees should be 
preferred to one that isolates 
them from one another.  
- + ++ ++ 
 
The above comparison between the different jurisdictions strengthens the intuition 
that the main problem with the EU’s new regulatory structure is the fact that the authorities 
are dispersed between different cities and countries.  
No empirical research has been conducted in this analysis, but in future empirical 
work one can expect to find faster and more significant information-flow in the Israeli 
structure as compared to that of the UK, Switzerland, and the EU.  
To sum things up, through the analysis of the European structure and by comparison 
with three other jurisdictions, the pros of the fragmented structure are emphasized; its main 
benefits relate to diversity, less dilution of information and a less rigid structure resulting 
from the fact that the supervisory relationships are reduced by at least one layer. As discussed 
in this chapter all these are beneficial for better information-flow and help increase the 
chances that the right kind of information will reach the hands of the decision makers.  
On the other side, the cons and weaknesses of the EU’s current financial regulatory 
structure with regards to information-flow are also exposed, especially with regards to 
problems of cooperation and coordination between authorities.  
In the current EU structure, problems of coordination are expected to be even more 
severe than usual as the physical distance between the EU regulatory bodies makes it much 
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harder to exchange informal and “soft” information which is very much needed in the 
ongoing regulatory work.   
This is why, as suggested earlier, it is recommended that the different regulatory 
institutions be concentrated in one country and in one physical compound. If political 
concerns make this solution unfeasible, then rotation should be considered, depending on its 
costs.  
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5.6 Conclusions  
 
This chapter set out to investigate different types of organizational structures in order 
to find the one which best facilitates information-flow within and between different financial 
regulatory institutions.  
The pros and cons of the consolidated structure with regards to information-flow were 
reviewed and compared with those of the fragmented structure, to reveal that in the field of 
financial regulation, the option of a fragmented regulatory structure is better equipped to 
facilitate the kind of information-flow needed in order to prevent or stop a financial crisis 
once it has occurred.  
This conclusion results from two major attributes of the fragmented versus the 
consolidated model. First, having diversity of regulatory bodies minimizes the chances that 
market failures will go unnoticed; and second, the structure itself is less hierarchical by at 
least one layer as compared with the consolidated structure, and thus helps reduce dilution of 
information and rigidity. As discussed in this chapter, the flatter the organization’s pyramid, 
the easier the flow of information.  
The problem of cooperation between several different regulatory authorities was 
brought up in this chapter as a shortcoming of the fragmented structure. However, several 
solutions to reduce this problem have been made, including signing agreements between the 
different regulatory bodies, legal demands for cooperation, and the formation of “tiger 
teams”.  
As emphasized by this chapter, the consolidated structure is best used in financial 
regulation in cases where full cooperation between the different authorities is detrimental for 
the authorities’ work, such as the consolidation of the banks’ supervisory function and the 
central bank responsible for monetary policy.  
Next, this chapter reviewed the structure of the new EU financial regulatory bodies, 
compared them to the structure in the UK, Israel and Switzerland and to the general 
framework suggested by this chapter, and concluded that although having several different 
EU financial regulatory institutions is beneficial, the fact that they are not situated in the same 
country and physical space might be detrimental for the cooperation and information-
exchange which are essential for the prevention of a financial crisis.  
It is therefore advisable to locate all authorities at the same physical compound. 
Depending on costs, rotation of the European financial regulatory bodies between the 
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different member states, while keeping them together in the same country and physical space, 
might be a reasonable solution. 
This suggestion is more applicable in circumstances where regional coordination 
already exists, such as the case of Europe. However regional coordination might not be 
enough. The last financial crisis taught us that global cooperation and coordination are 
needed, due to systemic risks arising from the activity of financial conglomerates and the 
interconnectivity of global financial markets. The question then is: how can we coordinate 
regulators on a global level? The answer to this question is precisely the topic of the last 
chapter of this research.  
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6. CONSOLIDATION OR FRAGMENTATION FOR FINANCIAL 
REGULATORS? INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND NETWORK 
EFFECTS 
6.1  Introduction 
 
In the globalized world of today, financial markets can have profound effects on one 
another. This means that international coordination between financial regulators of different 
jurisdictions becomes more and more important.   
Up until now this research has dealt with the question of the preferred structure for 
financial regulators on a national and regional level. When we turn to examine the issue on 
the international level, a different set of problems seems to emerge.  
Some of the factors which make it difficult for states to cooperate and reach global 
financial standards include: differences in languages; differences in culture; divergent 
perceptions of what might constitute a problem which could lead to a global financial crisis; 
and the sheer variety of deeply-held views about what is the right regulatory answer to 
market phenomena such as bubbles, herding, and other market failures which require 
regulatory intervention.  
If a state has to give up some sovereignty by adopting international standards, the 
question is then why would it do so? What is it that can help push states to interact with one 
another in a way which will cause them to agree and adopt a global financial regulatory 
standard? One answer might be: positive network effects.  
This chapter examines the question of global coordination between financial 
regulators through the lens of network effects.594 In essence the question that this chapter 
addresses is: are there network effects which justify international harmonization of financial 
regulation? And if so, what are the obstacles in the way of achieving such harmonization?  
Network effects in the context of financial regulation come into play in two instances. 
The first is when a regulated firm would benefit from having some sort of compatibility with 
other firms or platforms operating in the global markets so that it can easily interact with 
them.  
A recent example may be found in the new International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) which were designed in order to make companies’ accounts understandable 
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 Network effects can be defined as a phenomenon where the profits of the firm selling the product are 
influenced by the number of people or firms using the service or product (see: O. Shy, infra n. 603, p. 119-120).  
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and comparable across different jurisdictions. This in turn enables investors to invest in 
companies which have a different domicile than themselves with greater ease, as they can 
rely on the common reporting standards when they come to analyze the firms’ financial 
situation.595   
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA) which provides a 
common standard for the trading of swaps and derivatives can also be used to provide an 
example of network effects derived from financial standards. Having a common standard 
reduces information asymmetries and search costs, and allows for smoother interaction 
between the different market participants.  
Another example is the European Union’s single market;596 by allowing the free 
movement of people, services, goods, and capital between the different member states, and 
by forming a common market, local regulatory barriers are lifted. Traders, workers, and firms 
are free to enjoy, along with other benefits which stem from market integration, the network 
effects of belonging to a greater network. In all of these examples, network effects of 
regulation in general and of financial regulation in particular, be it public or private 
regulation, do create economies of scope597 and scale598 among the different participants of 
the financial markets. These economies of scope and scale make market participants sensitive 
to the actions of other market participants when deciding how to act.  
This phenomenon can have a positive side, such as establishing common ground for 
enabling and enhancing competition in the financial markets. But it can also have negative 
consequences in global financial markets, such as increasing the severity of herding, which 
can lead to destruction of value.  
The reason that the severity of herding may increase relates to the fact that market 
participants influence each other’s decisions, and that this influence has a first order effect 
which can lead to sub-optimal choices, and ultimately to the destruction of wealth.599 Once 
barriers are lifted, the market becomes more integrated, and standards are harmonized, 
herding is no longer restricted to a specific jurisdiction and can spread to other parts of the 
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 See: K. Ramanna & E. Sletten, ‘Why do countries adopt International Financial Reporting Standards?’, 
(2009)  No 09-102, Harvard Business School Working Papers. 
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 See: The Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, supra n. 89, article 3, paragraph 3 and the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra n. 367, articles 21, title 
I, 26, 28,29, title IV, title V, articles 114,115. 
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lines in one firm than to produce them separately.” (J.C. Panzar & R.D. Willig, ‘Economies of Scope’, (1981) 
71/2 The American Economic Review, 268, 268).    
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market. If a herding phenomenon starts in one jurisdiction, it no longer stops at the national 
border.  
The rapid and insidious spread of such phenomena makes them prime examples of the 
negative side of network effects, and also means they are of great relevance to discussions 
about the optimal structure for financial regulators. As such they are the focus of this chapter.  
The second instance where network effects come into play is when a financial 
regulator enjoys the benefits of belonging to a network of regulators. If there is 
harmonization of global standards, unwanted occurrences of forum-shopping on behalf of the 
regulated firms can be prevented.  
An example of positive network effects for regulators, which relates to international 
enforcement but also has an impact on the commercial relationships between states, can be 
taken from the field of anti-money laundering regulation and the recommendation of the 
Financial Action Task Force (the FATF);600 during the early 1990’s the FATF released a 
number of recommendations aimed at combating money laundering. These recommendations 
have been adopted by most states around the world, which incorporated them into their local 
legislation.  
States which have not incorporated the recommendations have been “black listed” by 
the FATF and, as a result, financial institutions which operate in states which do comply with 
the recommendations are instructed to refrain from doing business or interacting with 
financial institutions in non-compliant states.  
This acts as a sort of “sanctioning” mechanism on non-compliant states; other states 
which do comply and adopt the FATF’s recommendations simply refuse to do business with 
them.  
Therefore, companies registered in compliant states enjoy the network effects derived 
from the fact that their state complies with the recommendations of the FATF, and the 
financial regulators in those states enjoy the network effects of being able to dictate a high 
standard of compliance for the regulated firms, for whom forum-shopping becomes more 
difficult.  
As network effects which stem from belonging to a network of regulators seem to be 
present both on the regulators’ side and on the regulated firms’ side, it is suggested that they 
play an important role in the decisions of countries to adopt or reject a global financial 
standard.  
                                                 
600
 The current recommendations may be found at: <www.fatf-gafi.org > accessed 03.06.2013.  
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Although many issues come to mind when we think of global coordination of 
financial regulators, such as inter-jurisdictional externalities, free riding, and other issues 
explored by the literature referring to economic analysis of international law,601 this chapter 
chooses to focus on the theory of network effects. As said above, it seeks to locate the 
network effects which might justify global harmonization of financial regulatory standards, 
and to point out the obstacles which stand in the way of such harmonization.  
This chapter is organized as follows: following this introduction, section two gives a 
brief review of the literature dealing with network effects and standardization; section three 
discusses the pros and cons of regulatory standardization in the global financial regulatory 
context, namely network effects and congestion; section four provides an application for 
coordination of global financial regulators; and section five concludes.  
                                                 
601
 See for example: J.L. Dunoff & J.P. Trachtman. ‘Economic analysis of international law’, (1999) 24/1 Yale 
Journal of International Law, 1, 1-.59. 
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6.2  Literature review  
 
Much like standard contracts or private standards, regulation too may produce 
network effects on its consumers, i.e. the regulated firms and the markets which the 
regulation is meant to monitor and regulate. In addition, it can also have network effects on 
the regulators producing it.   
The literature with regards to network effects dates back to the 1990’s and deals 
mainly with contracts. More specifically, it deals with the consumer side of network effects, 
assuming that the consumer is an individual or a firm subjected to the externalities of a 
network.602  
Shy defines network effects as an externality phenomenon, meaning the number of 
people or firms using the service or product has an effect, which might be positive or 
negative, on the utility of the consumers or on the profits of the firm selling the product.603  
Network effects can be direct, i.e. a consumer directly benefits or loses from being 
able to interact with an additional consumer of the product or service, or indirect, i.e. a 
consumer benefits or loses from having another consumer use the service or product without 
being able to interact directly with the other consumer.604 Such is the case with credit cards 
for example; the more people use a certain brand of credit card the more businesses will 
accept that card, and the more variety the single consumer will have.605  
When studying contracts, Kahan and Klausner identified two sets of benefits which a 
firm can incur should it choose to use standard contracts: “learning benefits” which arise 
when a firm chooses to adopt a contract or a charter which has already been used in the past 
by other firms; and “network benefits”.606  
The “learning benefits” appear where a firm has a choice between drafting its own 
new contract or term as opposed to using a draft which has already been prepared by another 
firm, and it opts for the latter. If the firm chooses the option of using a contract term which 
was already used in the past by other firms, it may enjoy the following benefits: it is very 
likely that the term has already been tried out in court; drafting is more efficient as a template 
                                                 
602
 See M. Klausner, ‘Corporations, corporate law and networks of contracts’, (1995) 81 Virginia Law Review, 
757, 757-2607 and M. Kahan & M. Klausner, ‘Standardization and innovation in corporate contracting (or “the 
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has already been drafted before; and the industry, lawyers and relevant parties are probably 
already familiar with the term.607  
The other type of benefit identified by Kahan and Klausner with regards to the 
analysis of contract law, is the network benefit;608 network benefits of contract terms arise 
when the use of a contract term becomes more widespread. Such benefits include: reducing 
information costs with regards to the price of the contract; developing expertise among 
lawyers and accountants; and building up a body of judicial precedents which make it easier 
to evaluate the validity of the term.609  
Although financial regulation differs in many ways from contract law, and although 
the reason we need financial regulation stems from the fact that contracts are not enough to 
solve all the market failures identified earlier in this research, there are some parallels which 
can be drawn between the drafting of financial regulation and the drafting of a contract. 
These parallels are presented in the next subchapter of this research.  
So far we have discussed the positive side of network effects and standardization. 
However, in order to make the discussion complete, we should keep in mind that 
standardizing regulation also incurs costs. 
Mason610 analyses tax regulation and claims that US states incorporate Federal tax 
regulation into their local regulation, and by doing so they adopt Federal tax policies which 
reflect national, rather than state, politics. This, according to Mason, has the potential to 
undermine democratic principles, and is an argument against standardization of regulation on 
a regional and global level.611  
Romano suggests that adopting global financial risk-management standards is not 
sensitive to the local needs of each country and market. She argues that states could be 
pushed to adopt a unified standard which causes financial firms to lose their diversity, and 
thus causes them all to have the same weaknesses. Furthermore, as these standards are a 
global political compromise, they may not actually be high enough for regulating the local 
financial markets.612  
Both Romano and Mason agree that harmonization hurts diversification, and as has 
been discussed in previous chapters of this study, lack of diversification with regards to 
financial regulation may actually cause the next crisis.  
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Van Alestine draws our attention to the fact that any change in law or in the legal 
system is costly. Legal systems incur switching costs when having to adjust to a new law or 
standard; the greater the change the greater the adjustment costs.613 This is relevant because 
any move to standardize regulation implies that some regulatory change will take place.  
Ramanna and Sletten discuss the adoption of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) through the prism of network effects. Their study surveyed 102 non-EU 
countries in order to find out what motivates those countries to adopt the IFRS.614  
Their findings show that more powerful states tend not to adopt the global standards. 
This finding is consistent with the claim that adopting a new financial regulatory standard is 
costly to the market.  
Ramanna and Sletten further find that countries are more likely to adopt the IFRS if 
other neighboring countries have also adopted the standard. This point will be relevant to the 
discussion of global coordination and cooperation which will be presented later on in this 
chapter.  
These pros and cons of standardization are discussed below in greater detail, paying 
special attention to network effects and congestion. 
  
                                                 
613
 M.P. Van Alstine, supra n. 16, pp. 789-870.  
614
 K. Ramanna & E. Sletten, supra n. 595. 
  
196 
 
6.3  Network effects and congestion in setting new global 
regulatory standards 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, standardization of financial 
regulation is becoming more and more visible in the global financial markets. Committees 
such as the Basel 2 and 3 committees615 are dictating mandatory global regulatory standards, 
thereby pushing countries in the direction of harmonization.  
Such harmonization is beneficial in many aspects such as “drafting efficiency”616 and 
“learning benefits” which are derived from using standardized terms. Here a parallel analysis 
can be drawn between contract terms and financial regulation: 
When a financial regulator chooses to issue a piece of regulation which already exists 
elsewhere in the world, he enjoys “learning benefits”, as he can estimate whether or not the 
regulation has been successful in achieving its goals in the country of origin. This reduces 
expected costs of error on behalf of national regulators. Given that the harmonization process 
usually leans on the experience of state efforts to regulate, the ‘harmonized’ regulation has 
probably already been tried out somewhere in the world, with the likelihood that any 
necessary changes have already been made. When it is adopted worldwide, the costs 
associated with errors are potentially avoided.617 
Furthermore, judicial decisions of foreign courts may be used to further clarify the 
law or regulation and, in some judicial systems such as the Israeli one, may be brought before 
the local courts as a recommendation on the way in which the law should be interpreted.  
                                                 
615 The Basel committee on Banking Supervision is a joint forum which deals with issues relating to banking 
supervision. The objectives of this forum are to highlight major supervisory issues which concern the global 
community and improve the banking supervisory standards worldwide.   
In order to achieve its objectives, the committee enables different jurisdictions to exchange information relating 
to their local banking supervisory standards. Where it deems necessary the committee also develops 
recommended regulatory standards which are, from a legal point of view, merely recommendation. Such is the 
case of setting international standards with regards to capital adequacy or the issuance of the Concordat on 
cross-border banking supervision (see the official web page of the Bank for International Settlements at:< 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm> accessed 07.06.2013) .  
In addition there exists a Joint Forum which was established in 1996 under the auspices of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). This forum is meant to deal with issues relating to 
more than one financial product and to deal with regulating financial conglomerates (see the official web page 
of the Bank for International Settlements at: <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jointforum.htm> accessed 07.06.2013). 
Both of these institutions have gained prestige over the years and their recommendations are generally adopted 
by states worldwide.  
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Much like contracts, adopting regulation or coordinating regulation may also reduce 
transaction costs and information asymmetries, as lawyers and professionals do not have to 
invest the time and resources to study and adapt to new regulation in a different jurisdiction. 
This makes it easier for firms to cross borders and for investors to invest in foreign firms.  
Furthermore, as financial regulation is complicated and costly to produce in terms of 
the time the regulators need to spend studying the problem and coming up with optimal 
solutions, a dictated regulatory standard should save on costs. In other words, there are 
economies of scale and scope associated with drafting regulation on a global level.  
As with contracts, another major plus of harmonization comes from its network 
effects; it is beneficial for a financial regulator to belong to a network of regulators which 
uses the same standards, as it may save time and money. An example may be taken from the 
agreements between different stock exchanges around the world; in many cases one stock 
exchange will demand more lax requirements when listing a firm’s securities if they are 
already traded on credible stock exchanges elsewhere (exchanges where the level of 
regulation and disclosure requirements seem high enough, essentially the OECD).618  
For the second stock exchange, belonging to a network of credible stock exchanges 
around the world saves time and money, as the due diligence requirements and demands have 
already been covered by the primary stock exchange on which the firm issued its stocks.  
The firms active on the markets also benefit from this positive network effect as they 
do not have to go to the trouble of disclosing and meeting regulatory standards twice. 
Furthermore, the more players are active on a stock exchange, the greater the chances to 
easily find counterparties for trade.619  
Without standardizing regulation, the market becomes fragmented, and the choice of 
where to trade is made not only according to what the parties think is best for their firms, but 
also by regulatory barriers.620  
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Standardizing regulatory demands basically removes a large amount of the switching 
costs, and allows the players to choose the trading platform which they view as right for 
them.621 This increases competition in the markets and is naturally beneficial for consumers, 
as lack of competition in financial products or firms often harms the “weaker” consumers, 
such as household customers of banks, who are held "captive" by the few financial firms 
active in their small market.  
From a purely economic point of view, the removal of barriers which create 
transaction costs and which decrease competition in the markets is efficient, and thus should 
be encouraged.  
Given the fact that there are now more global standards, such as the IFRS, than ever 
before, we can deduce that many countries are able to see the network effect benefits of 
joining a global standard and believe that these benefits outweigh the costs.622 This is 
consistent with the assumption that adopting international standards in the field of financial 
regulation can bring with it positive network benefits. An additional benefit from regulatory 
harmonization lies in the development of legal expertise which can transcend borders and 
minimize transaction costs. Common standards also increase competition among professional 
advisors, such as law and accounting firms, bringing their prices down and reducing 
transaction costs.623 This of course is beneficial for the market and for the firms using these 
experts’ services.624  
The adoption of new rules can also mean great amounts of knowledge are lost, as 
people possessing the “old” knowledge discard it in favor of a new set of rules, or become 
redundant. However, standardized regulation facilitates the specialization of experts, and this 
cuts costs due to economies of scale and scope.625 
One illustration can be taken from the IFRS, which completely changed a large part of 
the old accounting standards which existed in the world. Thus, accountants, auditors and 
other professionals dealing with financial reporting had to adapt to the new standards or 
abandon their profession when their accumulated knowledge became void.  
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It is generally true that any change to regulatory standards involves switching costs, 
and it takes time for the market to adapt. 626 On this basis, some scholars argued that the old 
accounting standards had developed over years with adaptation to specific market conditions, 
and that changing these standards without allowing the market to adapt slowly might cause 
market shocks which are very costly to the market.627 
However, changing regulatory standards may also be very beneficial for the market. 
The adoption of the IFRS standards allows for specialists to give advice across borders. The 
marginal costs of giving the advice to each additional customer declines. Another positive 
aspect of adopting common accounting standards is that the efficiency and proficiency of the 
experts goes up as more firms use their services.628  
Moreover, these standards allow investors to invest in companies which are far away 
from their home countries, as due diligence becomes less costly.629 The time it takes to 
perform due diligence checks is cut down and, in a world of fast moving transactions, this 
may be crucial to closing deals or recruiting more necessary funds.630  
A reduction in harmful regulatory competition is another major network effect 
resulting from standardized regulation on a global level. If standards are equal across the 
globe, regulators feel more comfortable to strictly monitor firms and make sure that they 
comply with the standard. They can act with new-found vigilance, being no longer afraid that 
strict regulation will cause some firms to find another jurisdiction which will be less strict. 
This increases compliance across the globe and helps reduce systemic and other risks.  
So far it seems that consolidating regulation on an international level might be very 
beneficial both to the regulated firms and to the financial regulators. This might very well be 
the case, but in order to complete the analysis, we should first acknowledge the fact that 
consolidation of standards also comes with a cost.  
One of these costs relates to the distribution of regulatory mistakes. As discussed in 
the previous chapter of this research, when information becomes difficult to collect and 
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analyze, regulatory authorities prefer to rely on information already collected by other 
authorities., Thus a mistake may be copied across the board.631  
Another unwanted consequence could be a possible reduction in innovative solutions 
to regulatory problems; if all countries adopt the same standard and if innovation is deterred, 
some great solutions might be lost simply due to the fact that people are not putting effort 
into finding them. In this way the financial regulators may become “lazy” thinkers and rely 
on others to come up with the solutions for them.632  
Furthermore, due to the fact that harmonized standards often reflect political 
compromises, they may well be too weak. Weakness of global standards may lead to one of 
two possible results: either the different countries will adopt the weak standards and leave the 
local market under-regulated and vulnerable to systemic risk;633 or they will set the global 
standards at minimum levels and add more standards of their own, making the market 
differentiated again, and thus defeating the original purpose of standardization.  
Moreover, global financial regulatory standards may also be vulnerable to the same 
constitutional accusations of undermining democratic principles which were mentioned in 
this chapter’s literature review.634 Even though Basel 2 and 3 only produce recommendations, 
and are different in this way from the US Federal Tax Law which is compulsory, some states 
around the world are being pressured by other states to adopt the global standards set by the 
Basel committee, and indeed most of them acquiesce. By adopting international standards or 
rules such as Basel 2 and 3, which are intended to standardize regulatory demands with 
regards to liquidity rules and risk-taking activities of banks, states basically choose to give up 
sovereignty over these issues, since they end up incorporating regulation which is the product 
of global political compromise, rather than local political views and interpretations. 
As the real decisions are taken at a global level at which some countries have more 
influence than others, the citizens of the states which “cave in” under the pressure of adopting 
the new regulatory standards are subjected to rules which the majority in their countries 
might not approve of. 
Another cost which is connected to the adoption of global financial standards is 
referred to as ‘switching costs’. As financial regulation is complicated and requires expertise 
in implementation and monitoring, switching from local to international standards is very 
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costly both to the regulators and to the financial firms. It is for this reason that, when a 
change is being discussed on the global level, each jurisdiction commonly prefers the others 
to adopt its own standards, and not vice versa.  
This also implies that adopting a standard which is closer to the standard of a certain 
jurisdiction provides that jurisdiction with an advantage – it is able to extract some rent over 
the other jurisdictions which have to comply and adjust to a completely new standard or 
norm.  
Another negative consequence of having a global standard is that it might lead to 
problems of congestion. Congestion may have unwanted side effects, also known as negative 
network externalities. For example, if all firms can choose to be traded on any stock 
exchange they wish, and if there is competition between different stock exchanges around the 
globe, the result of such competition could lead to congestion of firms into one stock 
exchange. The reasons for this are diverse and may include: proximity to headquarters; 
specialization of courts; better IT which increases the speed of transactions, etc; or just a 
plain herding phenomenon - if everyone is traded there, we want to be traded there as well.  
This can cause problems: first, the stock exchange on which the firms are congested 
may become over-loaded and thus give a slower treatment to each firm wanting to register; 
and second, other countries may lose a core of their business as firms choose to register 
elsewhere, creating localized unemployment, etc.  
Furthermore, concentrating power in the hands of an already powerful jurisdiction 
gives it the capacity to further dictate global standards, which makes it even more specialized 
and helps it exclude other future possible competitors. This might be an additional 
explanation, other than political economy, as to why the EU takes care to distribute its 
financial regulatory institutions among several member states instead of concentrating them 
all in one state.  
On the one hand, as has been shown in past chapters of this research, distributing, 
rather than concentrating, regulatory institutions among different geographical areas harms 
coordination. On the other hand, in the EU it decreases local accusations against one state 
having all of the regulatory bodies concentrated in its territory and thus having a larger 
amount of power and influence over the regulatory situation in all other EU states.  
When we talk about setting global standards on the international level things get even 
more complicated, as the differences between states grow bigger. History has shown that the 
way Americans view a certain problem in the financial markets usually differs from the way 
in which Chinese or Europeans view the same problem. The cultural differences might even 
  
202 
 
suggest that what one country considers a problem is not a problem in the eyes of another 
country.  
Even if different countries agree on the identification of a problem, they may have 
very different ideas on how to solve such a problem. Add to that the political problems and 
the old rivalries between states around the globe, and coordination becomes well nigh 
impossible.  
The following pages contain suggested ways to overcome these problems, taking into 
consideration the fact that different states have different goals and different problem-solving 
mechanisms.  
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6.4  Coordination of global financial regulators: what are the 
difficulties and how can we try to overcome them? 
 
The need for global coordination with regards to financial regulation has been 
emphasized by the last financial crisis. In the world of today it is clear that what happens in 
one country probably has an effect on other countries as well. The existence of global 
financial conglomerates further increases the need for coordination and cooperation with 
regards to financial regulation.  
As emphasized earlier in this chapter, coordinating regulatory demands can have a 
positive influence on financial markets, as it allows for greater network effects which in turn 
make the financial markets more efficient. 
However, as discussed earlier, financial regulatory coordination on a global level is 
very hard to achieve. Coordination between authorities can only start if there is mutual 
identification of a common problem which the parties believe can be solved through 
cooperation.635  
When we look back at global standard settings, such as anti-money laundering 
standards or the ISDA agreements, we see that countries will only cooperate if it is in their 
own financial interest to cooperate. It seems that the last financial crisis brought the issue of 
the need to coordinate global regulatory standards to the attention of most countries, 
including the most influential ones, and there is an understanding and a general agreement 
about the necessity for such coordination, at least with regards to financial firms’ risk-
management requirements and liquidity rates.  The crisis has shown that lack of cooperation 
between states may lead to an escalation of the crisis and put obstacles in the way of a fast 
response to the crisis once it begins.  
The crisis raised huge political and public pressure for international coordination and 
cooperation. Such pressure is known to be the main driving force behind cooperation and 
coordination of authorities, as without such pressure each authority seeks to preserve its 
independence. 
Once countries understand that coordination and cooperation with regards to financial 
regulatory standards is required, the question at hand is: what is the best way to achieve such 
coordination and cooperation?  
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The following paragraphs scan through a few optional mechanisms for cooperation 
and coordination between financial regulators of different states: 
 
6.4.1 Recommendations rather than mandatory standards 
 
When we look at global coordination mechanisms that have already been used to 
achieve successful standardization of regulation, it seems that at the first stage, countries find 
it easier to accept recommendations rather than obligatory standards. As was presented earlier 
in this chapter, these recommendations, if coupled with a “soft” sanction mechanism for 
those states which do not adopt the recommendation, (such as refusal by compliant states to 
do business with non-compliant states), might at a later stage turn into law.   
Looking back at the adoption of anti-money laundering regulation teaches us that 
setting recommendations at the first stage might actually lead to the formation of laws in each 
jurisdiction.636 The steps in this process are listed below. 
The first stage of the recommendation process begins with an identification by a 
number of states of a common problem and the recognition that the problem can only be 
solved through cooperation.  
The second stage is forming an international body or forum in order to discuss 
possible solutions to the problem. At this stage suggestions are brought up and discussed 
within the forum. Once there is an understanding of the problem, its possible solutions, and 
the pros and cons of each prospective solution, the forum issues a set of recommendations 
which are adopted, or not, by the international community.  
If the forum manages to receive the support of the most influential states in the world, 
its recommendations then become the norm and are implemented in each country in the way 
that country sees fit, in light of its own market conditions. 
The international forum then needs to develop a monitoring department which can 
assess the different jurisdictions and issue reports as to which country or jurisdiction needs to 
improve and how.637 These reports are helpful in spreading information with regards to 
compliance with the recommendations, and with aiding the creation of a “soft” sanctioning 
mechanism.  
                                                 
636
 The fight against money laundering started with the issuance of forty recommendations by the FATF. The 
current recommendations may be found at: www.fatf-gafi.org 
637
 Take for example the IMF country reports which assess market conditions and failures in different countries 
around the globe and issue a set of recommendations for improvement where needed.  
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There is at least one very big advantage to adopting recommendations as opposed to 
obligatory standards - room for implementation is left with each jurisdiction. In this way 
some diversification among the different jurisdictions is maintained.  
If we think that diversification of regulation might be beneficial, for reasons discussed 
in previous chapters of this research, then using recommendations allows us to coordinate 
states while leaving room for interpretation and diversification. This might be a way to enjoy 
both worlds; on the one hand it achieves coordination and cooperation, and on the other hand 
it allows for some diversification between different markets.  
In order to adopt such recommendations, there needs to be a joint forum where 
proposed recommendations can be discussed. This is indeed what the Basel 2 and Basel 3 
committees aim to achieve with regards to risk-management and liquidity rules. 
When we examine the driving forces behind the setting of global standards, it is quite 
clear that the large influential jurisdictions have an interest in coordinating financial 
regulatory standards on a global scale, as lack of coordination hurts their economies first. But 
what about smaller and less influential countries and jurisdictions? Do they too have an 
interest in complying with global standard settings? 
In practice, smaller countries with smaller markets have an interest in making 
themselves compatible with larger states or regions such as the USA and the EU; therefore 
they tend to be in favor of adopting global regulatory standards which allow for network 
effects, as by doing so they enhance the global competitiveness of their own markets or 
firms.638   
Furthermore, if a country is geographically situated in an area which adopted the 
global standards, it will be more likely that this country will adopt the regulatory standard as 
well.639 The reason for this lies in the increased network benefits enjoyed by all member 
countries in the region when new countries join in.640  
In a way this makes things easier as it reduces the number of parties who have to 
agree on a given standard. It is reasonable to assume that if the EU and the USA manage to 
agree on a set of recommendations between themselves with regards to financial regulation, 
then other countries are likely to adopt these standards as well.  
                                                 
638
 M. Bojanowski & V. Buskens, ‘Coordination in dynamic social networks under heterogeneity’, (2011) 35/4 
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 249,  249–286 show that people also choose their social relations based on 
their preferred behavior. This can also be true for states.  
639
 K. Ramanna & E. Sletten, supra n. 595, p. 3. 
640
 K. Ramanna & E. Sletten, supra n. 595, pp. 3-4. 
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The problem is that even though coordination is wanted, each jurisdiction would like 
to adopt standards or recommendations which are closer to its already existing standards or 
recommendations, as this gives the companies and regulators active in its market an edge; 
fewer changes will be required from them in order to meet or supervise the new standards.641 
Countries may well end up playing a sort of a “Chicken Game” similar to the one discussed 
in Chapter Four of this research; each side will hold his ground and wait for the other side to 
give in first.  
The solution might be to start with standards which are at the heart of the consensus 
and gradually move on to discussing and negotiating on the standards which are debatable. 
As we have seen in Chapter Five of this research, there is value in regulators meeting each 
other on a regular basis, as this encourages exchange of information.  
Through such information–exchange, the parties could find that some of the obstacles 
in the way of coordinating and deciding on a regulatory standard are either nonexistent or 
easily solvable.  
However, the question remains, what can we do with the standards which countries do 
not agree on?  
6.4.2 Consolidation 
 
As discussed in Chapter Five of this research, if coordination is absolutely necessary 
then it makes sense to consolidate the regulators. This is also true from an information-flow 
point of view. 
Indeed, where the political and geographical conditions allow it, we find that states 
sometimes do form new jurisdictions which are combined from several smaller jurisdictions, 
thus enjoying the network effects of consolidation to the maximum. This is the case of the 
European Union.  
The fact that most states which are located in Europe have joined the EU provides all 
European states with several benefits resulting from belonging to the EU and to the common 
market, benefits which they could not achieve on their own, or without the EU’s existence.  
These benefits are reflected in the single market and its four freedoms - the free 
movement of people, goods, services, and capital.642 Following the creation of a single 
                                                 
641
 K. Ramanna & E. Sletten, supra n. 595, pp. 3-4. 
642
 The Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec 2006, Official Journal 
of the European Union C 321 E/39, Art. 3 (1) C.  
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market, it is logical to have some sort of standardization for financial regulation as it 
promotes the idea of the aforementioned four freedoms.  
The new Banking Union initiatives coupled with the new EU financial regulatory 
bodies - the European Banking Authority,643 the European Securities and Markets 
Authority,644 the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority,645 and the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)646 - are an example of consolidation of regulation 
from the state level up to the regional level. This regional consolidation may also yield 
positive network effects and advance the idea of a single market.647 How so? 
The formation of one EU authority responsible for supervising one type of financial 
firm across Europe is supposed to completely remove all barriers to entry which might have 
been created by a country’s financial regulation, knowingly or unknowingly, with the effect 
of deterring the entry of financial firms from other EU countries.  
For example, if one country demands specific requirements from firms wishing to 
receive a banking license, (which is needed in order to open and operate a bank in that 
country), and if those requirements are very different than those which are required by 
another financial regulator in a different EU country, then having a central EU banking 
regulatory authority may help standardize the requirements. This would remove a barrier to 
achieving a single market and allow banks to enjoy the network effects created by the fact 
that the requirements for receiving a banking license are standardized.  
Indeed the European Banking Authority itself declares it has vast competence which 
includes:  
“…preventing regulatory arbitrage, guaranteeing a level playing field, strengthening 
international supervisory coordination, promoting supervisory convergence and providing 
advice to the EU institutions in the areas of banking, payments and e-money regulation as 
well as on issues related to corporate governance, auditing and financial reporting.”648 
                                                 
643
 Established by: Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010, supra n. 354. 
644
 Established by: Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010, supra n. 356. 
645
 Established by: Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010, supra n. 355.  
646
 Established by Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010, supra n. 353.  
647
 As established in EU legislation starting from The Single European Act of 1986. 
648
 See the official homepage of the European Banking Authority at: <http://www.eba.europa.eu/Aboutus.aspx> 
accessed 07.06.2013  
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If indeed the new authorities are successful in standardizing financial regulation 
across Europe, they will open up the possibility for greater network effects, for reasons 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  
However, there is always the risk that such a regional regulator will miss part of the 
picture with regards to the local jurisdictions. Even though the EU does have a single market, 
not all EU states are the same and different states suffer from different problems which need 
to be regulated accordingly.  
Things get even more complicated at the global level. Obviously complete 
consolidation on the global level is very difficult to achieve due to the differences between 
jurisdictions and the different market structures. However, it may be a good idea to establish 
some sort of international organization which will set the standards for all jurisdictions in the 
form of recommendations, not only for systemic risk and stability concerns but also for 
consumer protection and competition enhancement. For this task, information exchange is 
crucial, and some coordination mechanisms, such as joint forums or college of regulators, are 
and should be used in order to bridge information gaps.   
 
6.4.3 Market-based mechanisms 
 
Another interesting solution might be to encourage market-based mechanisms. After 
all, adopting a common standard is also in the interest of many of the firms active on the 
financial markets. These firms can benefit from adopting a common standard as it may give 
them easier access to new markets and consumers.  
Furthermore, a common standard makes it easier for them to know what legal 
demands exist in the market and to obey them. Having such knowledge enables them to 
reduce the number of compliance employees and cut down on litigation costs.  
All this is especially true for large conglomerates active in many jurisdictions. These 
firms are the greatest “winners” under standardized regulation, as economies of scale come in 
to play with regards to the ability to penetrate new markets and enjoy network 
externalities.649  
Take for example a credit card company, such as Visa or MasterCard; on the one hand 
the more consumers use their card, the more businesses accept the card; having more 
                                                 
649
 O. Shy, supra n. 603, p. 120.  
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businesses accepting the card leads to more consumers wanting to join the network and use 
the cards.  
For the consumers this is an indirect network effect gain,650 but for the credit card 
companies it is a direct network effect gain; the more businesses choose to respect their cards, 
the more consumers choose to be their clients. If they manage, as they do, to go global, they 
have an increasing edge over other smaller, and perhaps local, brands of credit cards.  
It is therefore in the interest of large global companies active in the worldwide 
financial markets, to agree on common regulatory standards. Furthermore, as they like to 
avoid regulatory intervention in standard setting, they know that self-regulation would have 
to reach an acceptable level in order to please the regulators and prevent them from 
intervening.  
There is evidence in some areas of the financial markets in which global standard 
setting was done voluntarily by the industry. An example is the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) which is a voluntary trade organization of participants in the 
market for over-the-counter derivatives (OTC’s). This organization has successfully managed 
to standardize the contracts used in order to trade in derivatives. Even though OTC 
derivatives are also regulated by financial regulators651 in order to ensure stability and protect 
against systemic risk, the contracts themselves were standardized by the industry as a result 
of the industry’s need for standardization. This is an example of how the industry itself may 
come to realize the network effects hidden within standardization and work towards 
achieving it.   
Even though market-based mechanisms of regulation incur some costs, such as the 
risk for setting the regulatory standard too low, or moral hazard on behalf of the regulators 
who rely too heavily on the industry to regulate itself, it is important to support such 
initiatives. This support is important because a solution agreed upon by market participants is 
likely to be more efficient to the market, as long as it solves the market failure which it comes 
to regulate, than a solution dictated by an external regulator.  
Going back to the issues discussed in Chapter Two of this research, regulation is 
always costly as it disrupts the market and should only be used when its benefits outweigh its 
costs. If there are market-based solutions providing a satisfactory answer to the market 
failure, it is advisable to use them over obligatory regulation dictated by financial regulators.  
                                                 
650 O. Shy, supra n. 603, p. 120. 
651
 See for example: Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties (CCPs), and trade repositories (TRs) (EMIR), 16 August 2012. 
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To sum up, the financial crisis has provided us with an opportunity to leverage public 
and political pressure in order to coordinate financial regulatory standards that exceed those 
needed to preserve stability and prevent systemic risk, and to enjoy the benefits of network 
effects in other areas of the financial sector.  
However, even though countries understand that global standard settings for financial 
regulation is important, they still face problems of coordination and cooperation in setting 
and maintaining these standards.  
As mentioned in this subchapter, the way to move forward and solve these problems 
may be through recommendations, consolidation (where needed), and market-based 
mechanisms where possible.  
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6.5  Summary and conclusions 
 
Coordination and cooperation between financial regulators on a global scale is not 
only important due to the obvious need to mitigate and prevent systemic risk and correct 
other market inefficiencies and failures, but also due to the positive benefits arising from 
network effects. Such network effects are present when regulatory standards are coordinated 
and some of the local regulatory barriers to entry are removed, as this allows firms to 
penetrate new markets with greater ease.  
Standardizing financial regulation also makes it easier for professional advisors to 
specialize, and reduces the price of their services. Specialization reduces prices as it reduces 
the marginal cost of providing advice to a new client. 
This is beneficial both to the clients seeking expert advice, as they now get the advice 
they need for less money, and also for the specialists, as their market of potential clients 
grows larger with the removal of fragmentation of standards in the markets.  
Even though standardization also incurs costs such as congestion and loss of 
diversification, it can also be very beneficial. This is especially true for weaker states. 
As there is a global understanding of the need to enhance cooperation and to 
coordinate financial regulation on a global scale post the 2007-2009 financial crisis in order 
to solve joint problems, it seems advisable to use this momentum in order to coordinate 
regulatory standards not only in the area of liquidity requirements and risks, but also in other 
areas, in order to reap the network effect benefits that are likely to follow such coordination.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, once the influential jurisdictions are able to agree 
on an acceptable standard, it is very likely that all other jurisdictions will adhere and adopt 
the standard as well.   
The way to move forward and advance cooperation and coordination goes through 
one (or more) of the following stages: recommendations, consolidation, and market-based 
mechanisms.  
In order to get the influential jurisdictions to adopt a common standard, it is advisable 
to form a global forum for discussions. Looking back at successful standardization in the 
field of anti-money laundering, it is recommended that such a forum issues recommendations 
rather than obligatory standards, coupled with some sort of pressure mechanism which is 
translated into sanctions for non-compliant states, such as the refusal by compliant states to 
trade with non-compliant states.  
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Where cooperation is absolutely vital consolidation of regulators should be considered 
as it decreases problems of coordination.   
Another road to standardization is the adoption of a global standard based on market-
based solutions. As regulation is costly to the industry it is advisable that whenever possible, 
and as long as the standards meet a high enough level, we leave it to the industry to regulate 
itself.  
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
Since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, issues regarding financial supervision and its 
structure have received greater public attention. Seeking to escape the turmoil which swept 
the financial markets, many countries around the globe, including the UK, Germany, 
Switzerland, and the USA, have been rethinking and changing the structures of their financial 
regulators in an attempt to reach an “optimal” structure.  
As was presented in this research, countries change their financial supervisory 
models, but they don’t seem to converge towards one type of model. This research project 
was designed to find reasons for this ongoing divergence. It set out to find whether there is an 
“optimal” structure for financial regulators, i.e. a structure which minimizes the occurrence of 
financial crises, and which functions better when such a crisis needs to be mitigated, and if 
so, what attributes need to be taken into account when trying to reach such an optimal 
structure.  
However, as presented in this research, the complexity of financial markets does not 
allow for a “one solution fits all” regulatory structure. Different markets and different 
strategic interactions between the regulators in the financial market call for different solutions 
with regards to the optimal regulatory structure for financial supervisors and lead to different 
costs and benefits. This reasoning is also reflected in the spectrum of structures which exist in 
the world today.  
The answer to the question of consolidation versus fragmentation for financial 
regulators, which is also the primary research question of this dissertation, depends largely on 
political choices with regards to states of the world that society would like to create or avoid.   
In order to answer the primary research question, this research first examined the need 
for financial regulation, what the supervisory authorities are meant to achieve, and its related 
costs. For this reason Chapter Two of this research provides a thorough understanding of the 
need for financial regulation and of its costs.   
Chapter Three of this research described the types of regulatory structures which exist 
in the world. This chapter surveyed the regulatory structures in 15 jurisdictions around the 
globe, comparing them and discussing their strengths and weaknesses (when such 
weaknesses were identified). An important finding of this chapter was that over one third of 
the reviewed jurisdictions do not follow one of the pure approaches to financial supervision 
but rather a Hybrid Approach, which is a combination of more than one approach. These 
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combinations are formed through the influence of other approaches on the financial 
supervisory structure, and come into play in areas where legal, political or practical reasons 
demand deviation from a pure approach. This chapter shed light on the processes which 
different jurisdictions underwent after the 2007-2009 financial crisis and served as a platform 
for the theoretical discussions in the following chapters of this research. 
In an attempt to answer the above-mentioned primary research question, this research 
analyzed the possible regulatory structures using three methodological tools, as further 
explained below: (1) game theory concepts, (2) institutional design, and (3) network effects. 
The incentives for regulatory action were examined in Chapter Four using game 
theory concepts. This chapter predicted how two regulators with overlapping supervisory 
mandates will behave in two different scenarios (i.e. where they stand to benefit from 
regulating, and where they stand to lose). Not surprisingly, when regulators assume they 
stand to benefit from regulating, an overlapping regulation problem will develop, whereas in 
cases where the regulators believe that they stand to lose from regulating, a ‘lack of 
regulation’ problem may occur.  
The insights derived from the games described in this chapter were then used to 
analyze the different supervisory models that exist in the world, and to analyze their 
weaknesses and strengths.  This chapter concluded by offering solutions to the problems it 
identified using game theory tools. 
The problem of information-flow was discussed in Chapter Five of this research using 
tools from institutional design. The rationale for this lies in the need for the right kind of 
information to reach the hands of the decision maker in the shortest time possible in order to 
predict or stop a financial crisis from escalating.  
This chapter divided the different regulatory structures that exist in the world into two 
main groups - a fragmented structure, which comprises several financial regulatory 
authorities active in the market, versus a totally consolidated structure, which comprises a 
single financial regulatory authority supervising the financial market. It then examined the 
efficiency of these structures in transferring information within and between different 
regulatory authorities.  
 Network effects and congestion in the context of financial regulation were discussed 
in Chapter Six of this research. The literature referring to network effects in general was 
applied to highlight the point that consolidating financial regulatory standards on a global 
level might also yield other positive network effects.   
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The results of the analysis which was carried out in Chapters Four to Six of this 
research are summarized below.  
When examining the problem through the prism of the incentives of financial 
supervisors to regulate or refrain from regulating, as was done in Chapter Four of this 
research, the conclusion is that the consolidated model for financial supervision helps solve 
the “overlapping regulation” problem which may arise when two different regulators with 
overlapping mandates are active in the same market.  
It is safe to assume that, due to the fact that under the consolidated model the 
regulators are subordinates of the same manager, the probability for overlapping regulation 
decreases. Therefore, assuming that “overlapping regulation” is not desirable from a social 
welfare point of view, the question became: what prevents the consolidation of all of the 
regulatory authorities in the financial market into one consolidated authority? The answer to 
this question lies in the need for diversity and minimization of regulatory mistakes as well as 
in the differences in goals of each regulatory authority.  
As mentioned already in the introduction to this research, a regulatory authority is not 
foolproof, as a financial regulator can make mistakes and these mistakes can be very costly to 
the industry and the financial markets as a whole, having a few supervisory authorities with 
overlapping responsibilities acts as a sort of insurance against mistakes and helps minimize 
the chances for unregulated gray zones.  
The analysis in Chapter Four also found that when a few regulators have overlapping 
supervisory powers, and each believes or expects that one of the other regulators will take 
care of the market failure, this might lead to the problem of ‘lack of regulation’ due to their 
fear of how the regulation will be perceived in public and how it will affect their private 
objectives function. This lack of regulation may contribute to the creation of a global 
financial crisis.   
In order to solve this problem and incentivize regulators to regulate, even in cases 
where they fear that regulating will be unpopular and might personally damage them and 
their private objectives, Chapter Four of this research concluded by recommending that 
regulators be provided with some sort of monetary “safety-net” such as early retirement 
mechanisms, while establishing a peer monitoring mechanism to reduce the probability of 
Moral Hazard problems.    
As was emphasized throughout this research, and especially in Chapter Four, under all 
supervisory models the independence of the regulatory body is important. Therefore, it is 
equally important to separate the budget of the regulatory institutions from that of the state, 
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preferably by levying taxes on the regulated firms, and to adopt mechanisms for increased 
independence of the financial regulators.  
Looking at the issue of consolidation or fragmentation for financial regulators from 
the point of view of information-flow and using a framework developed from the field of 
institutional design, Chapter Five of this research concluded that, due to issues of dilution of 
information and rigidity of the consolidated structure, it is best, from an information-flow 
perspective, to use the fragmented model for financial regulators, as long as the coordination 
problems, which are expected to occur in a fragmented model, are mitigated.  
The comparison made in Chapter Five between the structure of the new European 
financial regulatory institutions and those of Israel, the UK, and Switzerland, helps illustrate 
the pros and cons of the fragmented structure chosen by the European Union.  
One of the findings in Chapter Five of this research was that the main flaw of the 
current EU financial supervisory structure is that the different regulatory authorities are based 
in different countries, thus diminishing the probability for informal meetings which are likely 
to induce information-exchange between employees from different regulatory institutions.  
It was therefore recommended that all of the EU’s financial regulatory bodies should 
be concentrated in the same physical compound. If, due to political reasons, that cannot be 
done on a permanent basis, rotation might be a solution. However this solution is also 
dependent on costs.   
Last, examining this issue on a global level, as was done in Chapter Six, has shown 
that coordination of regulatory standards on a global level might have some positive network 
effects, such as increasing competition between different financial firms for the benefit of 
consumers, and raising the quality of the regulatory standard due to the fact that forum 
shopping can be avoided. This is true as long as diversity is not eliminated from the markets 
completely. Therefore it is preferable to use standards rather than binding laws in order to 
coordinate the regulatory actions on a global level, as standards leave more room for diversity 
of regulatory solutions.  
A final word with regards to the results derived from the different chapters of this 
research; in general we can conclude that, as has been shown in this research, the fragmented 
model should be preferable over the consolidated model in most cases as it allows for greater 
diversity and information-flow. However, in cases in which close cooperation between two 
authorities is essential, the consolidated model should be used as it cuts down on coordination 
problems which occur in the fragmented model.  
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Having said that, it should be highlighted that all models will probably fail at some 
point, and so a reasonable goal should be to minimize the number of times such failures 
occur, while knowing that complete prevention of such failures is very rare. The fact that the 
fragmented regulatory model has failed a few times in the past does not mean that it is not the 
most efficient model, but rather that, like any model, it is also vulnerable to unexpected 
market failures and the forces of change.   
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Appendix  
 
Table 8: Deposit Insurance schemes in the surveyed countries652 
Private or Governmental?  Deposit insurance 
organization 
 
Saving Limit Country  
No deposit Insurance No deposit Insurance 0 NIS Israel  
 
Governmental Institute for the Protection of 
Banking Saving (IPAB) 
1,615,134 
pesos (around 
160,000 USD) 
Mexico 
Private Non-Profit Organization  French Deposit Insurance Fund 100,000 EUR 
 
France  
Governmental Fondo Interbancario di Tutela 
dei Depositi (FITD) 
100,000 EUR Italy  
Private  Fondos de Garantia de 
Depositos 
100,000 EUR Spain 
Governmental Canada Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (CDIC) 
100,000 CAD Canada  
Government insures up to 100,000 EUR 
per deposit. Additional insurance is 
provided by private companies formed by 
the German banks 
• Bundesverband deutscher 
Banken BdB (for private 
banks) 
• Bundesverband Öffentlicher 
Banken Deutschlands  
     VÖB (for public sector banks) 
• Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Volksbanken und 
Raiffeisenbanken BVR (for 
co-operative banks) 
• Deutscher Sparkassen- und 
Giroverband DSGV (for 
savings banks) 
100,000 EUR Germany  
Privately operated. Membership is 
compulsory for all banks and securities 
dealers which are supervised by FINMA 
Deposit Protection of Swiss 
Banks and Securities Dealers 
100,000 CHF Switzerland  
Governmental Deposit Insurance corporation of 
Japan  
10, 000,000 
JPY  
Japan 
Governmental Korea Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (KDIC) 
50,000,000 
KRW (Around 
45,000 USD) 
Republic of Korea 
Governmental – administrated under the 
FSA 
Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme  
85,000 GBP The UK 
Governmental – deposits are insured by 
the government  
The Australian Government  250,000 AUD Australia  
Governmental - deposits are insured by 
the government 
The Dutch Government 
 
100,000 EUR The Netherlands  
Government insures up to 250,000 USD 
per deposit.  
Additional insurance is provided by 
private companies for customers of some 
banks. In Massachusetts the Depositors 
Insurance Fund (DIF) insures deposits 
which exceed 250,000 USD at state-
chartered saving banks. 
• Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (insures 
commercial banks) 
• The National Credit Union 
Share Insurance Fund 
(NCUSIF) insures deposits at 
credit unions. 
250,000 USD The United States of America 
 
                                                 
652
 Data taken from the websites of the financial supervisory authorities in each country.  
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